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Abstract 
This study investigates about the process of financial sector reforms in Tanzania from 
1991, in what have come to be known as the first and second generations of financial sector 
reforms. Tanzania was a socialist country from 1967 up to 1985. With the change in the 
presidency in 1985 for the first time since the independence, socialism was abandoned. 
From early 1980s up to 1985 Tanzania was in a very serious economic crisis and in urgent 
need of assistance. It is at that time when the new president accepted the conditionalities of the 
IMF/World Bank and started to embark on Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) with a view 
to stabilize the economy and open it up for the free market system. As part of the SAPs, in 
1991 the Banking and Financial Institutions Act was enacted, which is the turning point in the 
history of the financial sector in Tanzania. Private Banks, both domestic and foreign were 
allowed to enter the Tanzanian market and do their business. This marked the beginning of the 
first generation of financial sector reforms. 
This study was motivated by the question why two generations in two decades? It seeks 
to answer the following questions: 1) Why was it that Tanzania had two generations of financial 
sector reforms in only two decades? 2) What is the difference in focus in the two sets of 
reforms? 3) What are the theoretical underpinnings of the reforms in the two generations and 
4) What could still be done for a better financial sector? 
Data were generated mainly from the project documents that designed and implanted 
those reforms (appraisal documents and implementation reports). These documents were 
supplemented by semi structured interviews for the policy makers, and the quantitative data 
from the databases of the IMF/World Bank and the BOT. 
From data analysis it is clear that the approach of the first generation of financial sector 
reforms was not going to yield the desired results, because there were no adequate foundation 
xv 
 
of supporting institutions for the functioning of the private sector, such as the quality of 
property rights, the quality of registries, absence of credit information and referencing, and 
weak contract enforcement mechanism. So the private institutions were limited in the width of 
offering their services, albeit still making good profit. They could not improve significantly the 
outreach of financial services, especially in credit extension in general and long term credit in 
particular. 
The SGFSR were designed after the IMF sponsored Financial Sector Assessment 
Program, and were to be built on the foundations of the FGFSR. Their preoccupation was to 
create the necessary institutions that were lacking and to improve the quality of the existing 
institutions that support financial sector development, such as land regulations and 
management systems, contract enforcement mechanism, credit bureaus and the framework for 
long term finance. 
At the time of writing the report already positive signs of development of the financial 
sector are evident. Great opportunity has come in the area of mobile phone financial services, 
and regulators need to encourage innovations in that regard while ensuring the safety of the 
system.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.0 Background to the Problem 
In September 2008 the housing bubble burst. The bursting started with the collapse of 
Lehmann Brothers, and triggered the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. A 
summary of the sequence of events that triggered the crisis is shown in Table1. The bursting of 
the bubble set into motion the process that brought about massive losses first to Lehmann 
Brothers and then to the other big financial institutions that were connected with it in their 
business in what is known as the Domino effect, spreading the effects to the real sector as well. 
The contagion manifested more evidently in the housing sector, where most of the subprime 
mortgages defaulted, because of the drastic fall in the prices of homes, forcing foreclosures and 
leaving the banks in possession of properties that could sell only at massive losses.  
Table 1: Steps to 2008-2009 Financial Crisis 
 Step Risks 
1. Household borrows 
from the originator  
(broker or lending 
institution) 
 Assymetric information – broker did not fully know the creditworthiness of 
the borrower 
 Lax lending standards further deteriorated in 2004 and 2005 (‘teaser’ interest 
rates no equity loans, no documents) 
 In some states in the US the mortgage contract is ‘without recourse to the 
borrower’ – i.e. households can walk away from the mortgage 
2 Originator sells the 
mortgage to another 
financial institution 
 Perverse incentives – since the risk was sold on, originators had the incentive 
to sell as many mortgages as possible (‘originate-to-distribute’ model 
3 Financial institutions 
issue mortgage-
backed securities 
(MBS) 
 MBS issuers (particularly the government sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac) transferred thousands of loans to structured investment 
vehicles (SIVs), an off-balance sheet special purpose vehicle (SPV) which 
allowed these institutions to avoid capital requirements (allowing greater 
leverage). These SIVs had to be brought back onto the balance sheet once 
securities were downgraded after the crisis started. 
 Securities were separated into senior, mezzanine (junior) and non-investment 
grade (equity) tranches, but effective tranching relies on assumption that 
proper risk analysis on the underlying assets was done (which was not the 
case). 
 Mortgages were selected from geographically diverse areas but the risk of 
correlated default was much higher than predicted. 
 Securitization increased rapidly since 2001, which was based on the growth 
of sub-prime and Alt-A loans. 
4 Private financial 
sector issues 
collateralized debt 
obligations 
 CDOs issuers purchased different tranches of MBS and pooled them together 
with other asset-backed securities (backed by such assets as credit card, auto, 
business and student loans) 
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 CDOs ‘re-securitized’ securities allowing further re-distribution of risk (and 
hence, adding further complexity), converting some of them into new senior 
AAA-rated securities. 
 Investment banks were not supervised like commercial banks and thus were 
not required to adhere to capital requirements. These banks could borrow 
short-term and hold risky longer-term assets with low levels of capital. 
5 Growth in credit 
default swaps (CDS) 
 CDO issuers purchased CDS, which enabled them to receive AAA ratings. 
These purchases were not regulated as over-the-counter transactions. 
Source: Verick & Islam (2010 p. 19) 
The process of contagion was not limited to USA where it originated, but spread to other 
parts of the world where there was a strong interconnectedness in the extension of credit, as 
well as the investment of funds in the stocks of the international companies as shown in figure 
1. 
Figure 1: Key Factors behind the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis 
 
Source: Verick & Islam (2010) The Great Recession of 2008-2009. Causes Consequences and 
Policy Responses.  
 
 Hence the first round of the financial crisis spread to Western European countries and 
affected not only the financial sector but spread also to the real sector too, which suffered from 
credit crunch, where the financial institutions were not able to finance the working capital of 
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other companies, forcing the cut down of quantities produced, with the necessary laying off of 
workers. Economies of these Western countries entered into a recession (Verick & Islam, 2010). 
Figure 2: Financial Crisis Transmission Mechanism to Developing Countries 
 
Source: te Velde, et al. (2010) 
The recession produced a second round of effects, whose transmission mechanism is 
shown in Figure 2. This round affected even the developing countries, Tanzania included. The 
effects had to do with the decrease in the demand of raw materials from the industrialized 
countries, and the decline of remittances, official development aid, foreign direct investment 
and volume of transactions in the stock exchanges (Lunogelo, Hangi, & Mbilinyi, 2010).  
In response to all these effects of the financial crisis, economic policy makers came up 
with some emergency policy measures to rescue the situation as again shown in Figure 2. The 
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immediate reaction of USA and other countries affected by the first round of the financial crisis 
was the issuing of rescue packages (stimulus packages) to try to rescue their economies. This 
then was followed by a series of policy measures to try to contain the high risk that had found 
its place in the different new products in the financial system, to avoid a repeat of a crisis of 
similar proportions. So in most of the countries affected by the crisis, a series of financial sector 
reforms were taking place, to try to incorporate the lessons learnt from the devastating 
experiences of the financial crisis. In countries that were affected by the second round of the 
financial crisis, special packages were deployed to contain those effects. They also adopted 
some agenda for reforms to avoid the repeat of the crisis. 
It was at that point that the researcher became interested to learn more about the reforms 
taking place in his country in response to the crisis. When the researcher started to familiarize 
himself with the financial sector reforms in Tanzania, he came to understand that there was 
already a process of reforming the financial sector even before the 2008 financial crisis in the 
process that is known as the Second Generation of Financial Sector Reforms. Of course some 
agenda were added to the already ongoing reforms, to accommodate the lessons from the 
financial crisis, but the bulk of the agenda of the reform was from the Second Generation 
Financial sector reforms, that started before the global financial crisis. 
It that point the researcher became interested to study the Second Generation of Financial 
Sector Reforms. He wanted to understand also about the First Generation of Financial Sector 
Reforms as a background, and what are the unique characteristics of each of the two 
generations. 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
The researcher was very much interested to investigate and understand more about the 
fact that there has been two generations of financial sector reforms in just two decades. One 
would think of a generation to spread to more than one decade, and in matters of policy reforms, 
5 
 
one would expect the target to be long term too. What was it that caused the reformers of the 
financial sector in Tanzania to have two generations of reforms in such a short period of time? 
Financial reforms of 1990s in Tanzania were most dramatic and changed completely the 
way the financial institutions were operating in Tanzania. New laws were passed to allow 
private institutions, both domestic and private, to provide financial services in the country. The 
existing Government owned financial institutions had to be restructured and then privatized to 
promote efficiency and competition in the provision of the services. Government intervention 
in setting interest rates, exchange rates, and allocating credit was withdrawn. The framework 
for monetary policy was changed also, with the possibility of using indirect instruments of 
monetary policy. In addition to that the Bank of Tanzania (hereinafter BOT) had more 
autonomy in discharging its duty of overseeing the financial system in the country. Of course, 
to be able to function efficiently in the new policy environment, the BOT had to build the 
capacity to efficiently supervise the financial system using the Directorate of the Banking 
supervision. One would be tempted to think that before the decision to undertake such drastic 
reforms, a thorough feasibility study was carried out, and it was established that the type of 
reforms were right in content and timing. Moreover, one would expect that the reforms of such 
magnitude were obviously not supposed to bear all the fruits in the short run. Of course, one 
could expect a short period of adjustment to the new setup, which might not rule out completely 
a temporary decline in the quantity and/or quality of services as the new system was taking root 
and public confidence in the system was growing. 
However, after just over a decade of these new policies, a period which cannot be 
considered to be long term, a new round of equally intensive reforms followed, with a new 
name: the Second Generation of financial sector reforms (hereinafter SGFSR) to contrast them 
with the 1990s reforms known now as the First Generation of Financial Sector reforms 
(hereinafter FGFSR). It is here that the researcher perceived an interesting problem, which he 
needed to study and understand. Why were the SGFSR necessary at the time they were taken 
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and what was lacking in the FGFSR and what was it that made the two sets of reforms different. 
So this study seeks to explore the process of the most recent generation of financial sector 
reforms in Tanzania. 
Policy reforms are ubiquitous in all countries, because the world is dynamic and new 
challenges keep coming up even as the solutions to already identified challenges are found and 
applied. In Tanzania too there have been numerous reforms to economic policies from the 
colonial era throughout due to needs of the different times and to address the challenges at hand. 
However, major strands of earlier reforms can be associated with important historical events in 
Tanzania, such as the national independence and the Arusha Declaration. However, some 
reforms were driven by agendas set by international financial organizations (e.g. Washington 
Consensus by IMF and World Bank), such as the structural adjustment programs of the mid-
1980s to 1990s with the emphasis on liberalization, deregulation and privatization. The 
economic reforms in question cover all aspects of the production, distribution, consumption and 
the services that aid and accompany them. Sometimes the reforms addressed specific economic 
sectors and their specific challenges. This study is interested in understanding the rationale, and 
the process of the financial sector policy reforms, especially the most recent ones. 
Financial sector reforms that were designed by the IMF and World Bank in 1980s, found 
their way in Tanzania from early 1990s1. They were intending to solve the structural problems 
that were deemed to be the cause of the economic problems that were plaguing the nation at 
that time. This did not only happen in Tanzania, but it was common to most of the developing 
countries in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and even in the Eastern European 
countries. In Tanzania the Banking and Financial Institutions Act (BFIA1991) was the first in 
a series of financial sector reforms and opened up the financial sector for the private sector, as 
well as laid the foundation for the operation of the free market in the financial sector.   
                                                 
1 See Wobst (2001, p. xii) for the Structural Adjustment Programs 
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The researcher found it interesting that only a decade later, evaluations of the 
implementation of the financial sector reforms ushered in by the BFIA 1991 pointed out to 
some major weaknesses in the operations of the new structure of the financial sector, 
necessitating another round of reforms. Now since there is a quick succession of two rounds of 
reforms, the FGFSR (1990s) and the current SGFSR. This gave the researcher some interest in 
studying the SGFSR to explore the type of challenges addressed by the reforms and whether 
some of the challenges in the FGFSR were also being addressed in a different, more effective 
way. 
1.2. Objective of the Study 
The main objective of the study is to study the rationale, the process, the key players as 
well as the content of the two generations of financial sector reforms in Tanzania with a view 
of finding out the rationale of both, the theories governing the approaches, and the challenges 
that they were addressing. The study aimed at exploring the major focus of the reforms and 
make their evaluation. 
1.3 Research Questions 
The research questions that the study seeks to explore are: 
1. Why is it that we have two generations of financial sector reforms in two decades? 
2. What is the major focus of the FGFSR and the SGFSR? 
3. What are the theoretical underpinnings of the reforms in both generations of reforms? 
4. What could have been done differently for a better financial sector? 
1.4. Methodology 
This is a case study, which seeks to explore the process of reforms in the financial sector 
in Tanzania from around the year 1991 up to the end of 2013. The study used qualitative 
methods to collect data to answer the research problems. Here, first and foremost, the 
documents that were used to prepare and evaluate the reforms were reviewed and the content 
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of reforms explained therein were also analysed. To follow up the understanding of such 
documents, interviews were conducted with key participants of the process from the Directorate 
of Strategic Planning and Institutional Review, Directorate of Financial Stability, Directorate 
of Banking Supervision as well as the Directorate of Economic Research of the BOT. 
Interviews were also conducted with Officials of CRDB Bank, NBC (1997) Ltd., Mkombozi 
Bank and NMB Bank in Tanzania. One interview was also conducted with the Deputy Director 
of the Tanzania National Planning Commission under the President Office. 
In assessing the effects of these reforms on the financial sector, a benchmarking 
methodology was used to compare the financial development indicators for some regional peers 
as well as the averages of the Low Income Countries and Sub-Saharan African countries and 
hence position Tanzania against the peers. Using the Access Possibilities frontier a critical 
evaluation of the policies adopted was done. 
In the analysis it was important to use the theoretical framework of institutional 
economics, as the major focus of the SGFSR was to strengthen institutions that were already 
existing and to create new ones where necessary. The focus was to have institutions that create 
incentives for financial sector development, and remove obstacles for financial development 
and thus support the new structure and functioning of the reformed financial sector. It is actually 
this conceptual framework that distinguishes the approach of the FGFSR and the SGFSR. 
1.5 Data Collection and Analysis 
Two field trips for collecting data were done for the research. The first one was from 21st 
February 2012 to 25th May 2012, and the second from 25th July 2013 to 10th September 2013. 
The one was a pilot study, and helped to identify the key topical areas of investigation. This 
was important, because it enlightened the researcher to get the realistic orientation of the study, 
and necessitated a change of focus, from the initial investigation on the reform of Banking 
regulation and supervision as a response to the financial crisis, to the current topic looking at 
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wider reform issues during the first and second generations of financial sector reforms. In the 
first field trip the researcher managed to conduct a focus group discussion with senior 
management of Mkombozi Bank Ltd and interviews with Directors of Risk Management of 
CRDB Bank and NBC (1997) Ltd, and with Corporate Control Manager of NMB Bank. 
However, it was very difficult to get access to officials of the BOT. After a long procedure of 
seeking permission, the researcher ultimately managed to get to interview two staff members 
of the Directorate of Bank Supervision, who agreed on the condition that they were not to be 
recorded. They also gave the researcher some documents containing recent regulations, as well 
as the Annual Report of their Directorate. The researcher also submitted a qualitative interview 
schedule for a staff member of the Department of Financial Stability, who chose not to be orally 
interviewed, and provided a written response instead. 
The data from the first field work gave the orientation to the research but are not very 
much used in this final report because they provided a turning point, whereby the major focus 
of the study changed from investigating about reforms in regulation and supervision of the 
banking sector as a response to the financial crisis to focusing on the broad policy reforms in 
the financial sector from 1991, in the two generations of financial sector reform 
In the second field trip the major source of data for this study was from the BOT, because 
all the financial sector reforms were coordinated by the BOT. The Directorate of Strategic 
Planning and Performance Review, as well as the Directorate of Economic Research were very 
useful for that matter. Interview with the Head of Project Management Unit in the Directorate 
of Strategic Planning and Performance review was the most important of all interviews 
conducted. In addition to the interview, the official sent to the researcher some documents of 
projects relevant to this study by email and they have actually proved to be the most important 
source of data for this study. Apart from that, the researcher managed to conduct an interview 
with the Director of Economic Research. Finally he conducted an interview with the Deputy 
Executive Secretary of The Planning Commission under the President Office. 
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The data from interviews were stored in voice recorders, and were then transcribed and 
analysed by sorting out to get the major themes and their logical arrangements, and finally they 
were used to provide answers to research questions of this research. 
Quantitative data to provide the trend of the various financial development indicators 
were obtained from the databases of the databases on the World Bank website- 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx, and from the BOT website – www.bot-tz.org . 
1.6 Organisation of the Research Report 
This study is arranged in seven chapters. This chapter introduces the study by giving 
background to the research problem, and then introduces the problem together with the research 
questions and methodological issues. Chapter two presents the theoretical foundations of the 
relevant issues that actually drove the reforms in the financial sector in Tanzania. 
Chapter three presents a brief history of the financial sector in Tanzania from the time of 
the German colonial rule up to the 1980s when the structural adjustment programs were being 
implemented. Chapter four gives a narrative presentation of important events of the first 
generation of financial sector reforms, highlighting the emphasis on stabilization, liberalization 
and privatization. In the case of Tanzania, it was also the change from socialist approach of 
managing the national economy to the free market one (Wobst, 2001, pp. 1-2). An assessment 
is then made to evaluate the effects of the FGFSR to the financial sector in Tanzania up to 2003, 
when the agenda for the SGFSR was being formulated. Chapter five then presents the major 
selected issues addressed by the second generation of financial sector reforms, emphasizing the 
theoretical underpinning of New Institutional Economics as the foundation of the reforms, 
focusing on the strengthening of existing institutions and creating new ones where none were 
existent. The aim of those institutions was to promote development enhancing behaviour and 
remove barriers to financial sector development. Chapter six presents the discussions on the 
findings, linking the rationale of the reforms to the theoretical framework of institutional 
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economics. Chapter seven concludes the study by summarizing the major points of the study 
and highlighting the conclusion of the study, while giving areas for further research on financial 
sector reforms using institutional economics approach and closing the report. 
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Chapter 2 
Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks, Key Concepts 
2.1 Introduction 
In this section presents the key theories and concepts that guided the study. In addition to 
presenting these theories, a brief description of the relevance of the theories to the current study 
is also presented. 
The main theories are the New Institutional Economics and the Access Possibilities 
Frontier. Key concepts and terminologies that form the core of the analysis of this work are also 
presented.  
2.2 New Institutional Economics  
This is a school of economics, that complements the neo classical school by correcting 
some basic assumptions of the latter about information and transaction costs, and by recognising 
their importance. Stiglitz  explains shortly that the new institutional economics is an attempt to 
incorporate a theory of institutions in Economics (Stiglitz J. , 1992, p. 3). Stiglitz relaxes the 
implicit assumption of instrumental rationality2 made by the neo classical economists to 
acknowledge that most often information is incomplete and that individuals have culturally 
derived mental models which they use to process information. So different individuals arrive 
to different equillibria. In such a case there must be a cost of transacting, which necessitates the 
formation of institutions, because information is “costly and assymetrically held by parties of 
exchange” (Stiglitz J. , 1992). So institutions are formed to reduce uncertainty in human 
exchanges. Stiglitz puts it this way, “The neoclassical result of efficient markets only obtains 
when it is costless to transact. When it is costly to transact, institutions matter” (Stiglitz J. , 
                                                 
2 Instrumental rationality is a concept that assumes unlimited computational powers of decisions maker and his 
ability to make an objective description of the world as it really is. The consequence of this assumption is that 
we can predict choices that will be made by the rational decision maker, without the knowledge of the decision 
maker mode of calculation 
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1992). So institutional economics modifies the instrumental rationality assumption of the 
neoclassical economics while it maintains scarcity as the beginning of economic analysis. It 
then adds institutions as one of the critical constraints, and analyses the role of transaction costs 
as the connection between institutions and costs of production. Institutional economics views 
the political process as a critical factor in the performance of economies, and as a factor that 
explains the differences in the performance of economies, and explains the inefficient markets. 
2.2.1 What are Institutions? 
North (1994) defines institutions simply as “the rules of the game”. He viewed them as 
rules that provide a framework of incentives that shape economic, political and social 
organisations. North (1994) saw institutions to be constituted by: 
1. Formal rules (laws and constitutions) 
2. Informal constraints (conventions, codes of conduct, norms of behavior) 
3. Enforcement of the two above mentioned items. 
Schmid (2004) conceived institutions as “the norms more than just the rules of the game, 
providing constraints”. They are also enablement to do what individual cannot do alone. In that 
way they affect beliefs and preferences and provides cues to uncalculated behaviour. 
Ostrom (1990) defined institutions as rules, norms and strategies used by the humans in 
repetitive situations. Key words for him are rules and norms. By rules she meant the shared 
prescriptions (must, may, may not) that are mutually understood and enforced in particular 
situations in a predictable way by agents responsible for monitoring conduct and imposing 
sanctions. 
Scott (2001) identified three basic pillars of institutions and found it important to have a 
good interpretation of the 3 basic pillars that are vital ingredients of institutions: the regulative 
systems, the normative systems and the cultural-cognitive systems. He held that the regulatory 
pillar was legally sanctioned.  It included laws, rules, regulations and sanctions. For Scott 
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(2001) the normative pillar was morally governed and included certification and accreditation, 
and finally the cultural-cognitive pillar was culturally supported. It included common beliefs 
and shared logic of action. 
2.2.1.1 Institutions and Organisations 
The two terms are sometimes used interchangeably in a rather confusing manner. It is 
important here, to give a clear distinctions of institutions and organisations in the way the 
institutional economists used the terms. Whereas institutions are understood to be “the 
complexes of behaviours that persist over time by serving some collectively valued purpose, 
organisations, on the other hand are understood to  be the structures of recognized and accepted 
rules, formal and informal”. (Uphoff, 1986, pp. 8-10) 
2.2.1.2 Link between Institutions and Organisations 
Institutional evolution is shaped by the connection between institutions and organizations. 
Institutions are the rules of the game while organisations and entrepreneurs are the players of 
the game. Organisations are made up of groups of individuals, bound together by common 
purpose so that they achieve a certain objective. Examples of organisations include political 
bodies (political parties, senates, city councils and regulatory bodies); economic bodies such as 
trade unions, firms, family farms, cooperatives etc., and educational bodies such as universities 
and schools (Kirsten, Karaan, & Dorward, 2009). 
Organisations come into existence to reflect the opportunities provided by the 
institutional matrix. If institutional matrix rewards productive activities then organisations will 
arise to engage in productive activities. 
2.2.2 Levels of Institutional Organisation 
Williamson presented the 4 levels of institutional organisation. At the very top (level 1) 
there is embededdness. This is the social environment, or the informal institutions. This level 
includes traditions, religion, culture etc. The second Williamson’s level is the institutional 
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environment. In this level we find the formal rules of the game, which include laws, property 
rights, constitutions etc. The third level is the level of governance, which is actually the play of 
the game. In this level we find the alignment of the governance structures with the transactions. 
And finally on the fourth level we have the performance. This represent all what the neoclassical 
economists presented, including optimization, prices, quantities and incentives. (Williamson O. 
E., 1999) 
North presents the dichotomy to be between micro and macro level. Whereas macrolevel 
institutions deal with institutional environment in which organisational forms and transactions 
are embedded, or rules of the game which affect the behaviour/performance of economic actors. 
Davis & North (1970) define the macro level institutions to be the set of fundamental political, 
social and legal ground rules that establish the basis for production and exchange and 
distribution. Micro level institutions, on the other hand, deal with the institutions of governance. 
Whereas some scholars consider these to be subclass of institutional environment (North, 
1990); others focus on individual transactions, considering modes of managing transactions 
represented by Williamson (1993) who included market and quasi market and hierachical 
modes of contracting in the micro level analysis. He conceived of micro level institutional 
analysis to be that which analyse questions regarding organisational forms (integration vs 
outsourcing), and institutional arrangements: arrangements between economic units that govern 
the way members can cooperate or compete. 
Ostrom also had a view of multiple source structures located in diverse analytical levels 
as well as diverse geographical domains. At one level there are multiple and nested action 
arenas, and across level  we also find nesting of arenas, collective actions and constitutional 
choices which set the rules of the game (Ostrom, 2005)  
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2.2.2.1 Embeddedness 
Grannovetter (1985) viewed the economy to be structurally embedded in social networks 
that affect its functioning. Another scholar concured with the position but elaborated that human 
economy is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non economic. (Polanyi, 
1975) The inclusion of non economic institutions by Polanyi (1975) is crucial in the 
understanding of embededness. Economic action takes place in the networks of social relations 
that make up the social structure. Dimaggio added that economic action is embedded not only 
in the social structure but also in culture (Dimaggio , 1994). 
2.2.2.2 Formal and Informal Institutions 
In Williamson’s presentation of the four levels, we find the use of terminology that 
dichotomize institutions ino formal and informal, and I would like to define them here: 
2.2.2.2.1 Formal Institutions 
Formal institutions are the formal rules which are formally written  down and enforced 
by the state (Kirsten, Karaan, & Dorward, 2009). Of these formal institutions, law is given most 
attention, as it is clear that legal environment, especially the quality of contracts and property 
law, affect the economy. Laws shape the way business, natural resources and social activity are 
organised, determine the incentive structure, through their influence on protection of property 
rights and contract enforcement mechanisms, since rights are meaningful only if they could be 
enforced (Kirsten, Karaan, & Dorward, 2009). Constitution is also important, as it includes the 
fundamental set of rules that govern the way societies and states are organised. Clague holds 
that institutional arrangements are devised by the collective and individual actions of members. 
(Clague, 1997). From the constitutional order flow statutes, common law and various 
regulations. 
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2.2.2.2.2 Informal Institutions 
.. formal rules make up small part of the sum of constraints that shape choices… the 
governing structure is overwhelmingly defined by codes of conduct, norms of behavior 
and conventions (North, 1990, p. 36)  
Informal institutions are unwritten rules and informally sanctioned rules. The unwritten 
rules are important in structuring social conduct. Cultural endowments include normative 
behavior, codes of society and mental models for interpreting experiences (Kirsten, Karaan, & 
Dorward, 2009). These change very slowly.  
Some terminologies associated with informal institutions are defined below. 
Conventions are habits, customs, routines and standard practices (Kirsten, Karaan, & 
Dorward, 2009). Biggart & Beamish (2003, p.444) defined conventions as understandings, 
often tacit, but also conscious, that organize and coordinate action in predictable fashion. They 
are usually agreed upon, flexible and are guides for economic interpretation and interaction. 
Favereau & Lazega (2002) defined conventions as values, rules and representations that 
influence economic behaviour. 
Customs are pragmatic solutions to economic problems reified as normal. They may serve 
elite interests. Individuals adhere to certain customs even if costly because of their emotional 
commitment and self identity. 
Norms are shared prescriptions known and accepted by most participants. They involve 
intrinsic costs and benefits (Ostrom, 2005) Ostrom adds that social norms, such as customary 
laws can sometimes be superior to administrative or judicial dispute resolutions among people 
with close ties. 
2.2.3 Scope and Function of Institutions 
The function of institutions is to help agents to improve their welfare. Several institution 
may serve the same function. 
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According to North (1993) institutions exist to perform the following functions: first to 
form incentive structures of a society and second to determine economic performance by 
influencing the costs of production through influencing the input and transaction costs. Hall & 
Soskice (2001) view institutions to have the function of shaping the behaviour of firms in three 
ways: first institutions are socializing agencies in that they instil a particular set of norms and 
attitudes in those who operate within them. Second, they confer power on certain actors who in 
turn affect the course of the institution. And third institutions of political economy form a matrix 
of sanctions and incentives to which relevant actors are supposed to respond. 
Hodgson (1998) sums up the view of New Institutional Economics on functions of 
institutions by highlighting that institutions are governance tools which help individuals 
cooperate to overcome market failure and manage conflicts resulting from different interests or 
clash of ideology. But he emphasises that this notion must coexist with equally valid notion that 
institutions are formed and changed by individuals. 
This work will draw from the function highlighted by North (1993) that institutions form 
incentive structures of society that are determinants of economic performance, due to their 
influence on transaction and information costs. 
2.2.3.1 Imperfect Information 
Neo classical economics was built on the assumption of a perfect market. One of the 
assumptions of the perfect market is that economic actors (individuals, households, firms, 
governments) have complete information about all aspects of business profit and consumption 
utility, including market opportunities, available technology, costs of production under 
alternative production arrangements, prices, natural resources, quality of goods produced and 
the intention of fellow actors. This assumption was necessary for the general equilibrium theory 
based on demand and supply. However, in the real world there is no perfect and freely available 
information. This fact leads to risk and uncertainties in transactions, as most often either the 
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buyer or the seller will have more information than the other party, the reality known as 
information asymmetry. Searching for and obtaining information regarding the products and 
buyers, or the customers and their intention, is very important to reduce those risks of 
transaction failure. But searching for information is not costless, some costs known as 
transaction costs are involved, which often are significant (Ackerlof, 1970; Stigler, 1961; 
Stiglitz J. E., 1985a; Stiglitz J. E., 1985b; Arnott, Greenwald, & Stiglitz, 1993) 
Recognition that imperfect information leads to recognition and hence incorporation in 
Economic analysis and policy, of substantial transaction costs in most forms of economic 
activity, and has profound implications in Economics (Stiglitz & Grossman, 1980). Transaction 
costs impede exchange, and so impede competitive markets’ ability to reach efficient equilibria 
even for private goods (market failure is normally attributed to public goods), leading to market 
failure. Modification of institutions to allow more efficient resource allocation and exchange 
becomes an important subject of economic policy (Stiglitz & Grossman, 1980) 
Different approaches have come about on how to analyse institutional issues in 
transactions and contracts. These include moral hazard and agency theory, transaction cost 
economics and incomplete contracts theory. 
2.2.3.1.1 Moral Hazard and Agency 
Agency theory, developed by Jensen & Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), Fama & Jensen 
(1983) studies the effects of institutions in reducing transaction risks and costs arising from 
imperfect information in carrying out transactions. 
2.2.3.1.2 Transaction Costs vs Transaction Risks 
Transaction costs are costs originating from the various actions taken to reduce 
transaction risks. That is why some scholars consider transaction costs and transaction risks 
together (Dorward, 2001; Poulton, Kydd, & Dorward, 2005). This is because economic agents 
are supposed to invest in transaction costs to reduce the risks of transaction failure. Despite 
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transaction costs, it is difficult to eliminate transaction risks completely. So transaction costs 
provide an optimal trade off where marginal transaction costs are equal to marginal utility of 
risk reduction. 
The transaction costs involved include the costs of establishing and enforcing the 
exclusive property rights and the definition and enforcement of the attributes of the goods or 
service exchanged. Transaction risks represent the losses incurred because of failure to enforce 
exclusive property rights, which arise with public goods and externalities. Transaction risks 
also occur when there is a failure to enforce the required attributes or complete the transaction, 
problems which arise due to difficulties in obtaining information about the goods, services or 
the actors involved in the exchange (commitment problem). Another type of transaction risks 
arise from difficulties to enforce the agreements (Poulton, Kydd, & Dorward, 2005) 
2.2.3.1.3 Principal Agent Problem 
Principal-Agent problem is related to the problem of one party (agent) acting on behalf 
of another (principal). It arises when an agent, who is supposed to act in the best interests of the 
principal deviates from those interests and pursues his/her own interests. Ideally those interests 
were supposed to be spelled out in the employment contract. The aim of the contract is to 
provide the incentive to the agent to act in the best interests of the principals (Kirsten, Karaan, 
& Dorward, 2009). 
2.2.3.1.3.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory addresses the question of how the principal can structure contracts, 
incentives and sanctions in a way that will best influence the behavior of the agents towards 
achieving the principal’s goals (Kirsten, Karaan, & Dorward, 2009). This involves some costs 
known as agency costs. 
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2.2.3.1.3.2 Agency Costs 
Agency costs are the sum of monitoring expenditures of the principal, the bonding 
expenditures of the agent and the residual loss (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). So there is a link 
between agency costs and transaction costs. 
2.2.3.2 Transaction Cost Economics 
Arrow (1969) defined transaction costs as the costs of running the economic system. 
Williamson (1985) distinguished between the ex ante and ex post transaction costs. Ex ante 
transaction costs are those of drafting, negotiating and monitoring an agreement, wheras ex post 
transaction costs include costs of maladaptation, haggling, setup and running associated with 
governance and the bonding costs of securing commitment. Williamson also added that 
transaction costs are unique costs to each agent or firm and are related to the process of 
exchange itself. Coase (1960) argued that provided there are costs of reaching, modifying and 
implementing agreements (transaction costs), the relative merits of different organizational 
forms depend on a comparison of the costs of transacting under each. Eggertson (1990) 
enumerated six types of transaction costs 
1. Costs associated with searching information about the product to be contracted upon. 
2. Costs associated with bargaining that is needed to find true position of buyers and 
sellers when prices are endogenous. 
3. Costs associated with the making of the contracts. 
4. Costs associated with monitoring of contractual partners. 
5. Costs associated with enforcement of a contract and the collection of damages when 
partners fail to observe their contractual obligations. 
6. Costs associated with the protection of property rights against third party 
encroachment 
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Schmid (2004) adds another set of two to the list: that the future is uncertain and the 
reality that deviates from the unbounded rationality assumption: i.e. the human brain is not 
capable of handling complex decision making in a predictable manner 
Transaction Cost Economics maintain that the implication of positive transaction costs is 
that contracts are typically incomplete (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1999). So 
transaction costs are incurred by parties to protect themselves against the hold up problem3, and 
institutions are there to economize on such costs, to reduce the information and transaction 
costs. 
So the focus of transaction cost economics is on the costs of doing business, specifically 
the making, monitoring and enforcing of contracts. The ease or difficult of contracting and the 
type of contract made are determined by the nature of transaction costs which, in turn are 
influenced by the extent to which the information is imperfect, and risks involved in the event 
of transaction failure. (Kirsten, Karaan, & Dorward, 2009) 
Williamson (1991) identifies three determinants of transaction costs and of transaction 
cost-reducing governance structures: the specificity of assets involved, the uncertainties 
surrounding the transaction and the frequency of that transaction. He argues that the higher the 
degree of asset specificity the higher transaction costs, also the higher the degree of uncertainty 
the higher the transaction costs and the lower frequency of  transaction the higher the transaction 
costs. Williamson argues that increases in these three variables are associated with shifts from 
spot markets to hierarchical form of governance, which involve vertical integration of a veriety 
of alternative governance structures or institutional arrangement. 
                                                 
3 Hold up problem is a hazard that occurs when parties that have invested in relation specific assets expose 
themselves to the risks that may arise if circumstances change their trading partners may try to expropriate the 
rents accruing to the asset. 
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So the working hypothesis of Transaction Cost Economics is that an economic 
organisation is an effort to align transactions, which have different attributes, with governance 
structures, with different costs and compentencies in a cost economising way. (Williamson, 
1991). Dorward (2001) is more precise in putting it that an economic organisation is an effort 
to maximize profits, allowing for trade-offs among risks of contracting, transaction costs 
required to reduce the risks and normal production (transformation) costs, risks and revenues. 
2.2.3.3 Property Rights 
Property rights are a fundamental institution governing who can do what with resources 
(Kirsten, Karaan, & Dorward, 2009). Bromley (1991) defined property rights as “the capacity 
to call upon the collective to stand behind one’s claim to a benefit stream”. Furubotn & Pejovic 
(1972) view property rights as the claims, the entitlements and related obligations among the 
people regarding the use and disposition of a scarce resource. 
From the above definitions, the key element is that property rights have more to do with 
social relations. A property right is not a link between a person and a thing, they are  
“the relations between people with regard to a thing, or the benefit stream generated from 
the thing. All property rights are associated with the duties of others to observe them, 
and also with the duties of the rights-holder to do certain things to maintain the right to 
the resource” (Kirsten, Karaan, & Dorward, 2009). 
Institutional economists put a strong emphasis in the importance of defining property 
rights well and precisely. Well-defined property rights and institutions for implementing them 
make it possible to arrange for the transfer of rights and also the trade off among the 
arrangements meaningful. If property rights are well established and there is no transaction 
costs an externality can be internalised  between two private parties through bargaining and 
negotiations (Coase, 1960). Coase showed that in the absense of transaction costs, the outcome 
would be efficient and equitable regardless of who owns the property rights. He showed also 
that in the presence of transaction costs, different systems of property rights may yield different 
outcomes in terms of efficiency and equity. 
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Esminger (1992) argues that the system of property rights that eventually evolve is a 
function of their economic consequences and ideology regarding equitable distribution of the 
benefits of the rights, and the bargaining power of the various interest groups. Demsetz  (1967)  
and Alchian & Demsetz (1973) argue that the formalization of property rights in land is 
necessary and very important for economic development. They further argue that well defined 
property rights guide incentives to reap personal gains from the opportunities arising from the 
property (long term investments) and also create opportunites to access finance and enhance 
efficiency in land market. So well defined property rights are very important. Platteau (1995) 
argue that in the case of Africa, well defined property rights might compromise with some 
community advantages of the collective ownership of land. Platteau adds in another work that  
“high transaction costs, poor, partial and arbitrary enforcement of rights, and lack of 
infrastructure can seriously constrain the efficiency of individual property rights 
especially if those rights do not enjoy the support of custom and general sense of 
fairness”  (Platteau, 1996 cited by Kirsten, Karaan, & Dorward (2009, p. 49)). 
It is important to note, however, that property right scholars accept the importance of 
flexible and adaptable institutions especially to population trend and resouce 
availability/scarcity provided those changes are not be in the direction of privatization (Kirsten, 
Karaan, & Dorward, 2009). A special balance must be made between the individual property 
rights and the common interests of the society consideration such things as transaction and 
enforcement costs, and factors related to the environment, technology and distribution. 
2.2.3.3.1 Incomplete Contract Theory 
This theory focuses on “the way different organizational structures assign property rights 
to resolve the issues that arise when contracts are incomplete” (Kirsten, Karaan, & Dorward, 
2009, p. 49). In this theory organization arrangements are discussed on the basis of ownership 
and control of key assets. 
The basic idea of Incomplete Contract theory is that due to bounded rationality and the 
high cost of drafting a “complete contract” it is very difficult in day to day transactions to have 
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contracts that specify ex-ante all details and contingencies relevant to the transactions. Due to 
those limitations, most of the contracts that are entered to are incomplete. Specifically an 
incomplete contract has gaps, missing provisions, and ambiguities and has to be completed (by 
renegotiation or by the courts) with strictly positive probability in some states of the world (Hart 
O. , 1993) 
Oliver Hart provided the seminal idea for incomplete contract theory, but developing the 
ideas of Williamson. However Hart took a perspective different from Coasian view that the 
genesis of firms is incomplete contracts, and proposed that the incompleteness of contract is 
“brought about by bounded rationality, and incomplete information which, in turn, necessitates 
the allocation of power and control” (Grossman & Hart, 1986). 
2.3 Financial Access Frontier 
Financial possibility frontier is a diagnostic tool that was developed by World Bank 
Economists (Beck , Maimbo, Faye, & Triki, 2011; Beck & Feyen, 2013; Beck & de la Torre, 
2007) who were concerned with policies that promote financial deepening in developing 
countries. The World Bank Economists believe that financial deepening taken at the right pace 
leads to long term growth. However, financial deepening taken too rapidly would lead to a 
financial crisis. 
The basic question posed by the economists is how far can and should countries go in 
facilitating financial deepening? Might there be levels of financial deepening that is too high 
for an economy? (Beck T. , 2012). 
2.3.1 The Conceptual Framework 
The financial possibilities frontier is constructed by analysing the drivers of supply and 
demand for financial services. The main drivers are fixed costs and default risks (Beck & de la 
Torre, 2007). In addition to those, there are cultural factors and financial literacy (Beck , 
Maimbo, Faye, & Triki, 2011). So from these constraints, potential and actual demand and 
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supply curves for financial services were constructed, and formed the basis and framework of 
analysing the outreach of financial services. 
2.3.1.1 Fixed Costs 
There are fixed costs involved in the provision of financial services at individual, 
institutional as well as economic system level. Considering these fixed costs, it is necessary for 
businesses in the financial sector to capture economies of scale so that they operate profitably. 
Normally such economies are achieved by either providing high value services or high volume 
services or a combination of the two. 
2.3.1.2 Risk 
Risk here is more relevant for credit services because in those services default is an 
important consideration. Risk is the possibility of making loss because the actual transaction 
value received by the financial service provider turn out to deviate from the expected transaction 
value. 
Risk can be borrower specific or systemic. Systemic risk is the type of risk that affect all 
the market players at the same time. This may be due to macroeconomic uncertainty such as 
inflation, terms of trade, real interest rates and real exchange rates. Contractual and 
informational environment is also important in the determination of systemic risk. The 
importance of that environment is due to the serious effects of poorly defined creditor rights 
and difficult to enforce creditor rights, deficiencies in accounting practices, the absence of well-
functioning credit bureau and geographical limitations (Beck T. , 2012). 
It is very important to consider risk because the providers of financial services reduces 
the supply of their services once they perceive the default risk to be too high. The presence of 
risk brings about agency problems, which arise from the fact that agents do not work for the 
best interests of the principals. In this case, the debtors intentionally do not disclose all the 
important information relevant to the project for which they borrow, thus they may use the loan 
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funds for projects with higher risks than the creditor is aware of. This is the situation known as 
information asymmetry. In this situation the debtor stands to gain in the good state of the world 
while limits his/her loss in the bad state of the world, a situation known as moral hazard. When 
interest rates charged on the loans is too high, it tends to attract riskier borrowers who are likely 
to default, because honest borrowers will shun from such contracts. This will result in higher 
probability of default (Beck & de la Torre, 2007). 
2.3.2 Isoprofit Curves 
Figure 3: Isoprofit Curve 
 
Source: Beck & de la Torre (2007), The Basic Analytics of Access to Financial Services p. 85 
 
Beck & de la Torre (2007) used the isoprofit curve to develop the framework of analysing 
the supply originating broadening of the financial services. 
The curve above is an iso-profit curve. The iso-profit curve is drawn for a given level of 
state variables.  It shows “the combination of transaction number of payments and savings 
services that yield the same profit for a given financial institution” (Beck & de la Torre, 2007) 
The horizontal axis measures the number of transactions. For the ease of analysis, Beck 
& de la Torre (2007) assume that the number of transactions increases with the number of 
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clients. The vertical axis measures the ‘typical’ value4 of the payment or savings transaction 
handled by the institution. (They hold the number of transactions per client constant). 
The iso-cost curves are downward sloping since an increase in the number of clients is 
needed for the financial institution to make the same profit as we move towards lower typical 
transaction value. The curves are parallel, with curves more distant from the origin representing 
higher profits. Movement along an iso-profit curve towards a larger number of clients 
represents, by definition, a supply induced broadening of access. 
Beck & de la Torre (2007) note that the iso-profit curves are not continuous as we move 
towards a larger number of clients. This is because it is not easy for financial institutions to 
trade off smoothly a higher transaction value for a higher number of clients while still making 
the same profit. That is why there are discontinuities in the iso-profit curves since the different 
production functions may be needed to provide low value high volume transactions than the 
one needed to provide high value transactions. The discontinuities explain the difficulty for the 
same financial institutions to provide both low value and high value services. But, more 
importantly, they explain why the financial institutions in the developing countries cluster at 
the North West corner (few clients – high value services) with only a few institutions in the 
South East corner (many clients – low value services). The banks in developing countries are 
not motivated to incur costs to change their production function in order to move to the South 
East to a point like B (Beck & de la Torre, 2007).  
Beck & de la Torre (2007) argued that lack of competition is the main reason for the 
banks not to move to the South East corner point B. They could make money comfortably by 
targeting larger firms and wealthier households. In this way they would have little motivation 
to manage the idiosyncratic costs effectively to reach the new clients in the South East. Since 
                                                 
4 Typical value is the average value of the transactions of a client. It is assumed that the number of transactions 
per client is constant. 
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many potential new entrants are small banks, and since the customers in the South East are 
more costly to save, this group is underserved by both the larger banks and the small banks. 
2.3.3 Introducing the Frontier 
Beck & de la Torre (2007) found that price and income level are the major economic 
determinants of demand for payment and savings services. However, the socio-cultural factors 
have significant impact too. At the same time, fixed costs and risks were the major determinants 
of supply for deposits, payment and savings services. 
Figure 4: The Access Possibilities Frontier 
 
Source: Beck & de la Torre (2007), The Basic Analytics of Access to Financial Services. 
  
2.3.3.1 Potential demand Curve 
Consider D* a potential demand curve in figure 4. This curve is driven purely by 
economic factors i.e. income and price.  
𝐷∗ = 𝑓{𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒, 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒}, whereas demand increases as income increases and decreases 
as price increases. 
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Demand reflects the marginal willingness to pay for the financial services. Beck & de la 
Torre (2007) expect customers with demand for large-value/high volume transactions to have 
a higher marginal willingness to pay than customers with few and small transactions. So a 
higher price reduces the share of the population that will demand payment and savings services, 
thus a downward sloping demand curve. 
2.3.3.2 Actual Demand Curve 
Beck & de la Torre (2007) analysed D (the actual demand curve) in the following way. 
This is the demand curve that takes into account the non-economic demand factors that include 
financial illiteracy and Cultural factors. 
𝐷 = 𝑓{𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒, 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒, 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦, 𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠}, whereas Demand is 
related to income and price as above and increases as financial illiteracy increases and, likewise, 
it decreases with the increase in the cultural barriers. 
Normally the actual demand is below the potential demand. This is because, for a given 
level of price and income, self-exclusion arising from illiteracy and cultural factors such as 
religious or ethnic issues, reduce the actual demand. We assume that there would not be an 
over-demand for financial services due to illiteracy and cultural factors, and so the actual 
demand will not exceed the potential demand (Beck & de la Torre, 2007; Beck , Maimbo, Faye, 
& Triki, 2011). 
The distance between the actual and the potential demands denotes self-exclusion and 
that distance need not be constant across the population spectrum. But assuming self-exclusion 
to be inversely related with income, the gap between the potential and actual demand increases 
as we go along the horizontal axis (Beck & de la Torre, 2007; Beck , Maimbo, Faye, & Triki, 
2011). 
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2.3.3.3 Supply Curve 
Beck & de la Torre (2007) assumed supply to be purely driven by the fee charged for the 
services. As the fee increases, it becomes more profitable for service suppliers to reach a larger 
share of the population by targeting households and firms with increasingly lower and lower 
value transactions. So the supply curve is upward sloping. As we move along the horizontal 
axis, the curve becomes steeper. This is explained by the switching costs and the flat iso-profit 
curves (Beck & de la Torre, 2007; Beck , Maimbo, Faye, & Triki, 2011). 
In Figure 4: The Access Possibilities Frontier, S* denotes the potential supply5, that is 
assumed to be the supply resulting from the aggregation of the supply from the highest feasible 
iso-profit curves for a given price. 
2.3.3.4 The Access Possibilities Frontier 
Point I is the Access Possibilities frontier. It is the intersection of the potential demand 
and potential supply curves. Point I denotes the maximum outreach point for payment and 
savings services that can be reached in a country’s financial system given the state variables. 
Point I is the constrained maximum, associated with a bankable population A on the horizontal 
axis. So 1-A is the non-bankable population6. 
2.3.3.4.1 Moving forwards the Access Possibilities frontier 
The access possibilities frontier can be moved by shifts (or changes in curvature) in the 
potential supply and potential demand curve as a result of changes in the state variables (Beck 
& de la Torre, 2007; Beck , Maimbo, Faye, & Triki, 2011). Factors that can help to shift the 
Access Possibilities Frontier forward are: the increase in per capital income, the more even 
distribution of the national income, Improvement in a country’s infrastructure and the 
                                                 
5 Potential supply is the share of the population that can be serviced by efficient financial service providers, given 
the state variables. Efficiency in supply implies that providers maximize profits for a given price, so they are 
located in the highest feasible iso-proft curve 
6 Non bankable population is the share of population that cannot be provided with market based payments and 
savings services given the state variables. 
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improvement in a country’s institutional environment (Beck & de la Torre, 2007). The other 
points in the Access possibilities frontier represent the different types of Access Problems. In 
the following sections Beck & de la Torre (2007) are going to introduce those access problems. 
2.3.3.4.2 Demand Driven Access problems 
Point II represents a point demand side access problems. The potential supply S* curve 
intersects with the actual demand curve D. This is the access problem resulting from a lower 
than potential demand, due to self-exclusion of agents in the demand curve. The banked 
population is lower than the bankable population. So along the horizontal axis A-B is a measure 
of a demand driven access problem (Beck & de la Torre, 2007). 
2.3.3.4.3 Supply Driven Access Problem 
This is represented by points III and IV in figure 4. Both are points representing inefficient 
supply (due to high costs). The result of this sub optimal supply is creation of the equilibria 
where the banked population is lower than the bankable population given the state problem. 
Point IV is worse than III as self-exclusion results in a demand lower than the potential demand. 
So A-C and B-D are measures of access problems driven purely by supply inefficiency (Beck 
& de la Torre, 2007). 
2.3.3.4.4 State variables Driven Access Problem 
This is the case where point I in fig. 4 is lower relative to countries with comparable levels 
of economic development. This happens in the case when there is political instability or weaker 
informational and contractual environments (Beck & de la Torre, 2007).  
When contractual and informational environment is conducive for lending, then the rate 
of increase of loans granted to applicants by lenders increase at a faster rate as interest rate 
increase. So weak contractual and informational environment cause the supply of credit services 
to be lower than the potential, because of incentive problems (Beck & de la Torre, 2007; Beck 
& Feyen, 2013; Beck , Maimbo, Faye, & Triki, 2011). 
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2.3.4 Policies to Promote access to Financial Services 
The first important step by Beck & de la Torre (2007) for policy formulation is to 
determine whether the access problem is because the financial system is inside the possibilities 
frontier. If this is not the case, then to determine the reasons why the frontier is, say, too low 
compared to similar countries. 
2.3.4.1 Market Developing Policies 
These are the types of policies that address the deficiencies in state variables. They are 
policies that are appropriate when the prudent access possibilities frontier is below the potential. 
This cluster of policies aims at raising the sustainable frontier by changing the state variables. 
These state variables include the legal and constitutional reforms, public sector reforms, and 
macroeconomic upgrades. The extent of applying those policies depends on the extent of 
macroeconomic volatility, the state of contractual and informational environment, and the scope 
of idiosyncratic risk diversification (Beck & de la Torre, 2007; Beck T. , 2012; Beck & Feyen, 
2013) 
So in market developing policies structural reforms are needed to improve institutions 
and other state variables. Some of the structural reforms are outside the reach of financial sector 
policy makers. Labour is an important input in the financial service provision. Any distortions 
in the labour market affect the position of the potential financial possibilities frontier. Similarly, 
communications services are crucial to the development of financial services provision (World 
Bank, 2004a). Undeveloped telephone infrastructures as well as limited competitiveness in the 
provision of phone services do actually drive up the costs for financial services. In addition to 
that, a deficient transportation infrastructure can increase the cost of outreach in the more 
remote areas, even when we have innovative mobile banking (Beck & de la Torre, 2007; Beck 
T. , 2012; Beck , Maimbo, Faye, & Triki, 2011).  
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Another important factor is “the level of costs of doing business” due to various reasons, 
including widespread corruption, insecurity, deficient electricity provision, which together 
drive up the fixed cost element of financial service provision with negative repercussions for 
outreach. Last but not least, the size matters, in that small economies should find ways to reap 
benefits of economies of scale” (Beck & de la Torre, 2007). Sometimes the small economies 
have to see how they can reap the benefits of cooperation with neighbours. 
2.3.4.2 Market Enabling Policies 
Here, regulatory policies and actions that promote innovation and competition are 
important. When there is a healthy level of competition, financial service providers will try to 
innovate in order to keep themselves in the business. The type of innovations here will include 
the tailoring of the services for the low income clients, the use of mobile branches, cell phone 
banking for remote areas at low costs etc. All of these have an ultimate result of improving cost 
management. Financial institutions will only be motivated to go for such measures when there 
is competition (Beck , Maimbo, Faye, & Triki, 2011; Beck T. , 2012). 
2.3.4.2.1 Demand Side Policies 
When the financial system is operating below the possibilities frontier, and where the 
main problem is self-exclusion due to cultural barriers and financial illiteracy, appropriate 
policies will have to be the provision of financial literacy campaigns to raise the awareness of 
the necessity and advantages of the using credit to develop the small enterprises would be 
appropriate (Beck & de la Torre, 2007; Beck T. , 2012).  
Cultural barriers such as objections to some credit services on religious grounds could be 
overcome by offering special products that are tailored to the group, such as Islamic Banking. 
2.3.4.2.2 Supply Side Policies 
These are the short and medium term policies that create incentives for private lenders 
and investors to step in and offer their services without shifting too much risks and costs to the 
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government. Market enabling services aim to foster competition to enable the market to increase 
financial services, at the same time lower the cost of provision of the services due to efficiency 
gained as a result of operating in a competitive market (Beck T. , 2012) 
Removal of impediments to entry in the market is one of prominent market enabling 
policies that featured high in the Washington Consensus. Also modernization of payment 
systems and creation of credit registries are important in this regard. Together with that, forcing 
institutions to share their information, as well as preventing special clubs being formed help in 
enabling the market to grow and to attract investors (Beck & Feyen, 2013) 
2.3.4.3 Market Harnessing Policies 
These are policies that aim to prevent the financial system from moving beyond the 
frontier, i.e. to target long-term equilibrium. Among these include the risk oversight and 
management, supervisory framework, macro-prudential management, upgrading of regulatory 
framework to mitigate risks that stem from increased competition, cross border regulatory 
framework to prevent such spread of risk as that which caused the financial crisis of 2008-2009, 
as well as consumer protection frameworks and financial literacy programs aiming at making 
consumers make prudent decisions (Beck & de la Torre, 2007). 
2.4 Application of Theoretical Framework in this Study 
In this chapter I have introduced the framework of New Institutional Economics as well 
as the financial possibilities frontier. It is important to note that the financial possibility frontier 
derive its theoretical underpinnings also from New Institutional Economics, as it identifies risks 
and transaction costs to be the most important considerations in analysing demand and supply 
of financial services. 
New Institutional Economics is used here as an interpretative tool to understand the logic 
of SGFSR, especially when it comes to issues that not to be directly connected with the financial 
sector such as the improvement of the efficiency of the courts, and property rights. Throughout 
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NIE will be used to show the link between the policy measure and the reduction of risks and 
transaction costs, hence providing incentives for providers of services to provide more of their 
services, and to avoid opportunistic behaviour from both supply and demand side. 
The exposition of Financial Possibilities frontier concluded by deducing the different 
types of policies that are available to policy makers depending on the state of the financial 
sector. Among the most important considerations is the determination of whether the 
economy’s financial possibility frontier is below what is expected at its level of development, 
compared to countries of the same level  of development or not.  
2.5 Conclusion 
This section introduced the theoretical framework of Institutional Economics, which is 
the main interpretive framework of the current reforms that are being done in Tanzania in the 
SGFSR. Major theories that are developing in Institutional Economics were presented such as 
Informational Economics, problems of Moral Hazards and the relationships between agents and 
principals, Transaction cost Economics, and Incomplete contract theory, to mention but a few. 
But then a specific tool to analyse financial sector, which is also built on the foundation of 
Institutional Economics – The Financial Possibility Frontier was introduced in sufficient detail. 
This tool will be used to assess the relevance of the policies (market developing policies or 
market enhancing policies and market harnessing policies) that have been taken, based on the 
state of development of the financial sector at the point of the reforms. 
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Chapter 3  
The History of the Reforms in the Financial Sector in Tanzania 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter lays the foundation of understanding the reforms that are taking place now, 
by looking at the way the financial sector was developing in Tanzania from the colonial period 
up to the time of the structural adjustment programs in the late 1980s. Throughout the chapter, 
important developments are highlighted together with the causes and effects in the broad 
economic context. 
The sections of this chapter are organized according to the phases of German Colonial 
rule, the British Colonial rule, Pre Arusha Declaration independent Tanzania, and then the 
socialist phase after the Arusha Declaration. The approach is to trace the major players in the 
financial sector and their role in the economy at all these different periods. 
3.1 The Financial Sector in Colonial Tanganyika 
Tanzania passed under two phases of colonial occupation. From 1884 Tanzania was a 
German colony, and remained so for 30 years. In effect Germany lost Tanganyika as a colony 
in 1914, when the WW1 broke out (Kimei, 1987, p. 42). 
3.1.1 Financial Sector under the German Rule 
The economic interest of the German colonial master for Tanganyika was to make it serve 
as a source of primary products for use in German industries. So the early efforts made by the 
administration were focusing on establishment of plantations and setting up of the infrastructure 
to transport the products for export. Thus tea, sisal, cotton and coffee plantations were 
established and began production (Kahama, Wells, & Maliyamkono, 1986, pp. 17-18; Kimei, 
1987, p. 43; Abdi, 1977, p. 42). At the same time, the Germans constructed two railway lines – 
the Central Railway Line and the Northern Railway Line – by 1905, just over twenty years of 
establishing their rule. The railway lines were used to transport labourers to the plantations as 
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well as to transport the crops from the plantations to the ports for exporting them (Kimei, 1987, 
p. 43). The financial institutions that came up were to serve the plantation economy. So 
plantation areas as well as those with major transportation activities hosted the branches of the 
financial institutions. During the German colonial rule only two financial institutions were 
introduced and operated in Tanganyika. 
3.1.1.2 Banking in Tanganyika under German Colonial Rule 
The financial sector was set up to serve the structure of the colonial economy and so fulfill 
the objective of the colonial occupation (Abdi, 1977, p. 42; Kimei, 1987, p. 43). There were 
only two banks that established their operations in Tanganyika. The Deutsche Ostafrikanische 
Bank was established in 1905, and had the functions of issuing the currency as well as being 
the banker to the government. It also served in the main production centers and in the entry and 
exit points by facilitating payment and providing the credit that was needed by the plantation 
owners as well as the exporters (Kimei, 1987, p. 71). In 1911 Handelsbank für Ostafrika was 
established, and opened its first branch in Tanga, the main sisal producing area (Kimei, 1987, 
p. 71). The objectives of establishing it and the manner of its functioning suggests that it was 
more of a cooperative bank. So up to 1914 when the war broke out there were only two banks 
in Tanganyika, one operated as a central bank and commercial bank and another as a 
cooperative bank. 
3.1.2 Financial Institutions during the British Rule 
It is important to note that at this juncture that, the period from the end of the WW1 until 
1945 Tanganyika had an undefined political status (Kimei, 1987, p. 43). It was during that time 
the indigenous population gradually started to produce cash crops in their own small scale 
farms. In 1945 Tanganyika became a Trusteeship under the United Nations, and from there on 
that the British government started to address developmental issues more seriously in 
Tanganyika. One big difference with the German rule is that the British government allowed 
the indigenous population to engage in the production of cash crops such as cotton, coffee and 
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tobacco, and so the share of the subsistence sector started to decline. At the same time there 
was the commercialization of the food crops, as the quantity of food crops being marketed was 
increasing. So the intense activities of the financial institutions developed gradually as the status 
of the colony was clear. 
3.1.2.1 Central Banking during the British Rule 
When Germany lost the war, the League of Nations gave its mandate to Britain (which 
was already ruling Kenya and Uganda back from 1884) to administer Tanganyika. However, 
the political status was not clearly defined until after the end of World War II in 1949 (Kimei, 
1987, p. 42). As it was the normal custom of the British colonial administration, East Africa 
was a common currency area and all the monetary issues were organized by one board, the East 
African Currency Board (hereinafter EACB), that was founded in 1919 (Kimei, 1987, pp. 57-
58). The functions of the EACB included the control over the supply of currency of the colonies 
under its authority. It was necessary that the monetary affairs were so managed as to ensure the 
complete convertibility of the East African Currency to the Pound Sterling. But before that, the 
EACB did the task of issuing the new East African Shilling that was to replace the four 
currencies existing hitherto.7 The fall in the value of silver during the period of the currency 
conversion resulted into heavy losses to the EACB, which limited the growth of the Board in 
the early years. The Great Depression that followed also weakened the position of the EACB 
further only to recover from 1932. It was only after 1949/50 that the EACB distributed its first 
dividends amounting to 3 million East African Shillings (hereinafter EAS) to member countries 
(from net income earned on the reserves). (Kimei, 1987, p. 59) 
                                                 
7 In Tanganyika there were the Indian Rupee, the German silver rupee issued by the Deutsch Ostafrikanische Bank, 
the German token coins issued during the war (1914-1916) and the local rupee coins issued by the British Currency 
Commissioner during 1916-1919. 
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3.1.2.1.1 Monetization of the African Population during the British Rule 
Kimei (1987, p.60) noted that during the period 1919-1955 the EACB acted passively as 
an automatic money changer, to guarantee the automatic convertibility of the EAS to the 
sterling and vice versa, but that it did not play any active role neither in influencing the quantity 
of currency nor the local credit conditions. The increase in the use of money, however, was 
experienced because of the decision of the British government to encourage the indigineous 
population to produce cash crops, thus removing those farmer from the subsistence sector, and 
consequently monetizing them (Kimei, 1987, pp. 60-61).  
3.1.2.1.2 Fiduciary Issue 
From 1955 there were some changes in the policy of the EACB that allowed the board to 
lend the money to the governments under its authority through the fiducial issue.8 Tanganyika 
was allowed to issue East African Shillings 56 million in 1956, 114 million in 1959 and 112 
million in 1961. These ranged from 15 to 26% of the overall government budgeted revenue. 
3.1.2.2 Commercial Banking during the British Colonial rule 
In 1919 when the EACB was established and included under its authority Tanganyika, 
there were only two financial institutions inherited from the German era, the Deutsch 
Ostafrikabank and Handelsbank für Ostafrika (Kimei, 1987, p. 71).  
3.1.2.2.1 Domination of Commercial Banking by ‘The Big Three’ 
With the exit of the Germans from Tanganyika three banks of British origin took over: 
The National and Grindlays Bank, The Standard Bank and the Barclays Bank.9 These were 
known as the Big Three, and dominated the banking scene in Tanganyika up to 1950, when 
more smaller banks entered Tanganyika. The big three had made an agreement in 1929 in which 
                                                 
8 Through the fiducial issue provision, the EACB was allowed to issue currency against the securities of the 
governments and other specified intergovernmental organizations. In effect that meant that there was a possibility 
that currency in circulation could increase without matching with the rise in foreign exchange reserves. 
9 For more about the big three see Kimei (1987, pp 71-72) 
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they pledged to cooperate in their business which included fixing the minimum charges among 
themselves. They also agreed to harmonize their interest rates and exchange rates, as well as to 
discriminate the outsiders. They also made their own arrangement for clearing of the payments 
(Kimei, 1987).  
3.1.2.2.2 External Oriented Operations and Capital Flight 
Still the structure of the economy under the British rule was the same as that of the 
Germans: characterized by dependence. Their main preoccupation was to facilitate export – 
import trade, and in this way they did not serve the local entrepreneurs. They had very little 
impact on the indigenous people (Abdi, 1977, p. 48). 
In terms of managing the commercial banks assets and liabilities, we also see a preference 
for investment in foreign liquid assets: cash at the central office and correspondent banks and 
investment in foreign assets. In 1950 68% of their assets were in foreign obligations, and 44% 
of the loans extended were for financing export trade and distributing the imports (Abdi, 1977, 
p. 48). 
Figure 5: Domestic and Foreign Assets Growth 
                                                               
Source: Abdi (1977, p.48) 
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3.1.2.2.3 Cooperative Movement 
It is worth mentioning that the period under the British rule is the one marked by an 
increase in monetization, due to permitting the indigenous people to produce cash crops in their 
own farms. The British administration responded to this development by introducing the 
cooperative movement in 1932, which was growing very rapidly and which became one of the 
beneficiaries of credit from the commercial banking (Kimei, 1987, p. 82). But in general the 
commercial banking had little impact in transformation of the economy. It was still a dependent 
economy with external oriented production pattern, and the banks were still owned by the 
foreign companies and operated according to the interests of the foreign countries. So we can 
say that, commercial banking and the financial sector in general had a very small contribution 
to the indigenous economic development (Abdi, 1977, p. 46).  
3.1.2.3 The Introduction of Regulation of Commercial Banking   
Up to 1960 there was no any legislation guiding the operations of the banks, so they were 
guided by the policies and regulations of the respective multinational that owned and controlled 
them (Kimei, 1987, p. 73).  Kimei (1987) also continues to observe that it was only in 1960 that 
the Bank Ordinance (1960) was enacted. The ordinance, among other things, stipulated that 
only a company or a cooperative society licensed by the Registrar of Companies may perform 
such business. It also defined the minimum paid up capital (EAS 2 million), and required that 
at least 25% of their annual income be invested in East African governments bonds and stocks, 
and introduced a mandatory inspection by the Registrar of the Companies (Kimei, 1987, p. 73). 
Kimei (1987) notes that there was a very important omission, in that no regulation was put 
forward on liquidity of banks.  
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3.1.3 Conclusion 
Financial sector in the colonial period was run by the multinational banks, and had to 
serve the major economic aim of the colonial economy: the production and export of primary 
products. In this way branches were opened in the areas of the plantations, and in the ports 
where exports and imports were carried out.  The Central banking functions were mainly limited 
to the issuing of the currency and managing its stability (as was the case during the German 
colonial rule) and in addition to that managing the convertibility to the pound sterling.  
We are not able to trace any policies that aimed at developing the market or enabling the 
market. It was in 1960 with the Banking Ordinance that we see some regulations like the 
minimum paid up capital and the requirement for inspection. 
3.2 Financial Sector after Independence 
The newly independent country inherited from the British rulers an economy that had a 
sizeable subsistence economic activities and population, with 30% of GDP being accounted for 
by those activities. It was only 4% of the population that was employed on wage-labour (Abdi, 
1977; Kimei, 1987). Agriculture contributed more than 50% of the GDP, and the rate of growth 
of nonagricultural production was slow (Abdi, 1977). There was no much diversification of the 
main export products, with cotton, sisal and coffee being the major ones, and the foreign sector 
was still very important.  Thus the same structure of dependency was there . 
The newly independent nation resolved as national priority to strive to maximize growth 
by the private enterprises while adhering strictly to external and internal balance. The main 
approach was to increase agricultural output by improving traditional methods, at the same time 
transforming agriculture to on that was capital intensive, at the same time to invest in socio-
economic infrastructure and achieve structural change through increase in import substitution 
industries (Kimei, 1987).  
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3.2.1 Phase I: 1961-1967 Continuation of the Inherited Structure 
There was no much change in the financial sector in the first years after independence. 
The only change was that some new indigenous banks were formed: Tha Tanzania Bank of 
Commerce (1965), the National Cooperative Bank (1964) and the People’s Bank of Zanzibar 
(1966). Nevertheless, the big three (National and Grindslay, Standard and Barclays) were still 
dominating with 48 branches out of the total 70 in Tanzania, and were organised in a cartel at 
the time of nationalization (Abdi, 1977).  The rest were under the other smaller foreign banks 
and the newly established indigenous banks. The EACB was still performing the Central 
Banking role, while new arrangements for post independence Central Banks for the three East 
African countries were underway. In 1966 the BOT took over from the EACB all the central 
banking responsibilities guided by the BOT Act 1965 (URT, 1965; Kimei, 1987; Kahama, 
Wells, & Maliyamkono, 1986, p. 77).  
3.2.2 Phase II: 1968 – 1991 Market Replacement Policies 
After the Arusha Declaration in 1967, commercial banking underwent major reforms. All 
foreign banks were nationalised and the National Bank of Commerce was took over. The 
branches of all the nationalised banks were taken over by the National Bank of Commerce in 
the mainland and by the People’s Bank of Zanzibar in Zanzibar and Pemba (Kimei, 1987, pp. 
123-126). 
The vision of the new leadership was to have a banking system that would give priority 
to the service to the community and not solely focus on the maximization of profit (Kahama, 
Wells, & Maliyamkono, 1986, pp. 130-140). The government owned banks were thought (by 
the newly independent government) to be more efficient in mobilization and redistribution of 
savings for the requirement of economic development, and to ensure that even the rural areas 
were served adequately. (Abdi, 1977; Kahama, Wells, & Maliyamkono, 1986, pp. 138-140). 
So the National Bank of Commerce opened branches in all district headquarters in order to 
reach as many people as possible. It was an attempt to promote outreach (Kimei, 1987). 
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So 1967 -1991 was a period in which the commercial banks were owned and operated by 
the state. The state also controlled the prices (interest rates and exchange rates) in the financial 
sector. It is important to point out that the commercial banking became monopolistic and lacked 
competition. It also proved to be inadequate and ineffective for resource mobilization (Kimei, 
1987). 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter traced the development of the financial sector from the time of the German 
rule up to the Socialist era in Tanzania. It is shown that the financial sector was very limited in 
the colonial rule, as it was catering the needs of the traders who were engaged in the 
international trade, and the producers of the primary products. The majority of the population 
was not yet monetized and so were not impacted by the presence of the banks. The spread of 
the financial services was also concentrated in the major production areas and was very limited 
in terms of depth and breadth and even outreach, and the major players were foreign banks. 
It is shown in this chapter also that after independence, there were efforts to introduce 
local banks, and all of those banks were state owned. After Arusha Declaration in 1967, all the 
foreign banks present in the country were nationalized and their assets were taken over by the 
National Bank of Commerce in Tanzania mainland and the People’s Bank of Zanzibar in the 
Zanzibar and Pemba. It is also shown that there were efforts to promote the outreach, and the 
NBC opened branches in all the districts in Tanzania. But at the same time all credit was 
centrally allocated. The challenges that arose from this system will be discussed in chapter 4 as 
they form the background to the reforms that were undertaken to liberalize the financial sector 
as well as to privatize the state owned enterprises in the sector. 
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Chapter 4 
The First Generation of Financial Sector Reforms 
4.1 Problems of the State Dominated Tanzanian Financial Sector  
Cheng & Podpiera (2008) gave a very good summary of the situation of Tanzania in the 
1980s:  
In Tanzania, the poor performance of the state-owned financial sector in the late 1980s 
forced the government to search for new policy directions. Non performing loans (NPL) 
accounted for over 65% of the loan portfolio, fiscal and financial operations were 
intermingled, and the regulatory system was inappropriate (Cheng & Podpiera, 2008). 
Nyagetera & Tarimo (1997, pp. 72-73) summarized the following characteristics of the 
financial sector by the time of 1990s reforms. 
1. Domination of the public sector in terms of ownership and control of almost all 
financial institutions 
2. Heavy intervention by the government in the day-to-day management of banks and in 
decisions regarding pricing and resource allocations 
3. Absence of competition among financial institutions. 
Due to those characteristics that persisted during all this period combined with a 
deteriorating macro-economic environment, there were some structural problems that 
Nyagetera & Tarimo (1997, p.73) summarized:  
“First that the payment system was inadequate and inefficient. Their second argument is 
that the existing financial institutions were monopolistic and uncompetitive. Third, they 
point out to the fact that interest rates and exchange rates were being set by the 
government, and credit and foreign exchange were being allocated by the government. 
This led to an ineffective resource mobilization, with ineffective instruments and 
strategies. Fourth, and as a result of the preceding factors, large portfolios of 
nonperforming loans were accumulated. Fifth, that most financial institutions suffered 
from capital inadequacy, and finally there were weak policies to address the problems”.  
 
The World Bank (1999) explains the same problems in another way: 
There was no legal framework for harmonizing the activities of all financial institutions 
and no supervisory body for enforcing adherence to prudential standards. The 
government maintained interest rate controls and used state-owned banks as a means of 
directing credit to parastatals and cooperatives. The financial institutions disregard for 
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asset quality, combined with an unfavourable economic environment led to a large 
accumulation of nonperforming loans.10 
Due to these problems, in August 1988 the Government set up a Presidential Banking 
Commission, under the former governor of the BOT, Charles Nyirabu – hence the name The 
Nyirabu Commission - to analyse the problems and offer suggestions as to what to do to rescue 
the situation. The commission submitted its report to the Government in July 1990 (Nyagetera 
& Tarimo, 1997, p. 73; World Bank, 1995b, p. 2; African Development Fund, 2000, p. 1). The 
recommendations focused on stimulating competition by establishing freedom of entry of both 
domestic and local private banks, strengthening the existing financial institutions by removing 
non-performing loans and strengthening corporate governance (World Bank, 1995b, p. 2). As 
a result of the recommendations: through the assistance of Financial Sector Adjustment Project, 
funded by the World Bank, The African Development Bank and the governments of the United 
Kingdom and Switzerland (African Development Fund, 2000, p. 1), new Legal and institutional 
framework was prepared and installed, major restructuring of the financial institutions was 
done, private (both domestic and foreign) investors were allowed to and did establish their 
financial institutions in Tanzania, a good portion of non-performing loans were recovered and 
the management of the monetary policy was revamped. In short, the new focus was on the need 
to stimulate competition by allowing foreign banks and joint ventures (Nyagetera & Tarimo, 
1997, pp. 73-84; African Development Fund, 2000, pp. 3,8-10; World Bank, 1995b, pp. 2-3). 
4.2 First Generation Financial Sector Reforms 
Following the report of the Nyirabu Commission recommendations, there was a major 
shift in the institutional framework from the emphasis on public sector towards the private 
sector which operates by market oriented principles (Nyagetera & Tarimo, 1997, pp. 71-74; 
African Development Fund, 2000, p. 3; World Bank, 1995b, p. 3). This is clearly seen by the 
decision to allow free entry and exit of financial institutions (Nyagetera & Tarimo, 1997, p. 76; 
                                                 
10 World Bank. (1999). Tanzania: Recent Economic Development. Washington DC: World Bank. p. 29. 
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Lipumba, 1992; African Development Fund, 2000, p. 11; World Bank, 1995b, p. 10), as well 
as to restructure the hitherto existing public sector institutions (Nyagetera & Tarimo, 1997, p. 
75; African Development Fund, 2000, p. 8; World Bank, 1995b, pp. 8-9). A number of 
supportive legislations were enacted for that purpose, the main ones being: The Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act 1991 (hereinafter BFIA 1991), the Loan and Realisation Trust Act 
1991 (hereinafter LART 1991), the Foreign Exchange Act 1992, Capital and Securities Markets 
Act 1994, BOT Act 1995 and Insurance Act 1996 (Nyagetera & Tarimo, 1997, p. 73; African 
Development Fund, 2000, p. 8; World Bank, 1995b, pp. 7-10) 
4.2.1 Removal of Rigid Controls 
Interest rates and exchange rates were controlled by the government since the Arusha 
Declaration. This was reformed and from June 1992 the BOT gave up the responsibility for 
setting interest rates. However, the BOT retained the authority to set the maximum lending rate 
(Nyagetera & Tarimo, 1997, p. 74; World Bank, 1995b, p. 7). In addition to that, there was 
another restriction that the 12 month deposit rate should be above inflation. However, from July 
1993 the maximum lending rate was removed (African Development Fund, 2000, p. 7; World 
Bank, 1995a), and from July 1995 there was no longer the restriction on the deposit rate, thus 
the interest rates were fully liberalized (Nyagetera & Tarimo, 1997, p. 74). 
Exchange rates restrictions were also lifted gradually. In April 1993 the Bureaus de 
Change started operations and were authorized to buy and sell foreign currency at freely 
determined rates. The official rates, however, for official transactions were still set by the BOT 
(Nyagetera & Tarimo, 1997, p. 74). The government established the weekly foreign exchange 
auctions, which from July 1993 involved only the Bureaus de Change, but from August the 
same year included in addition all commercial banks. These auctions were to unify the exchange 
rates. From June 1994 daily Inter Bank Foreign Exchange Market (hereinafter IFEM) was 
established to replace the auctions, and from July 1996 the participation to the IFEM was 
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restricted for commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions (Nyagetera & Tarimo, 
1997, p. 74). 
Another lifted restriction was the Branch Network Management. Banks were free, after 
BFIA 1991 Act to expand or reduce the branch network. As a result of this loss making branches 
by the NBC were closed (Nyagetera & Tarimo, 1997, p. 75). 
4.2.2 Creation of Competitive Environment 
BFIA 1991 provided for the freedom of entry of the private sector – both domestic and 
foreign – into the banking business, and eliminated the restrictions on competition. As a result 
new financial institutions established their business in Tanzania (Nyagetera & Tarimo, 1997, p. 
75; African Development Fund, 2000, p. 8). 
Since prior to the reforms all the banks were state owned, and had an accumulation of 
non-performing assets, it was necessary to restructure the state owned banks. This was done by 
first conducting an audit in 1992 that classified the bank assets, so as to identify the magnitude 
of the Non - Performing Assets. The bad assets were passed on to the LART, and the NBC, 
CRDB and THB were prepared for recapitalization (Nyagetera & Tarimo, 1997, pp. 75-76; 
African Development Fund, 2000, pp. 8-9). 
4.2.3 Strengthening of the Supervisory Capacity of the BOT 
The new legislations: BFIA 1991, Foreign Exchange Act 1992 and the BOT Act 1995 
provided regulations and guidelines for licensing of new financial institutions, the minimum 
capital requirement for the financial institutions, and set exposure limits and requirements for 
off-site reporting. Moreover, they established the guidelines for prudential management of the 
financial institutions (URT, 1991; URT, 1995; African Development Fund, 2000, p. 8; World 
Bank, 1995b, pp. 7-8). All these empowered the BOT for a more effective regulation and 
supervision of the banks (Nyagetera & Tarimo, 1997, pp. 76-77). 
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In order to meet the new challenges of supervision stipulated by the BFIA 1991 and the 
BOT Act 1995, the BOT upgraded its Supervision Unit into the Directorate of Banking 
Supervision in 1992, through technical assistance provided through the Financial Sector 
Adjustment Credit (FSAC) and Financial Institutions Development Project (FIDP) (African 
Development Fund, 2000, p. 8). The capacity of the Directorate was also built through training 
and external technical assistance as well as computerization (African Development Fund, 2000, 
p. 8). New guidelines were also introduced to facilitate the implementation of the BFIA. This 
was only a beginning of the long process of establishing effective supervision, which is a never 
ending process. The Directorate of banking Supervision has become an important part of the 
functioning of the financial sector in Tanzania. 
4.2.4 New Approach to Monetary Policy 
Prior to these reforms the monetary policy formulation and implementation were guided 
by the BOT Act 1965, with the amendments of 1971 and 1978. According to that framework 
monetary policy had multiple goals: to regulate money supply, to fix monetary variables and to 
provide for development finance (Nyagetera & Tarimo, 1997, p. 74). In this way it was not 
focused. In more than two decades, the monetary policy so handled failed to achieve the desired 
objectives set. In fact, Annual Finance and Credit Plan (hereinafter AFCP) was taken to be 
everything in the conduct of the monetary policy, and therefore even the monetary targets were 
not explicit, and were assumed to be implied in the AFCP (Nyagetera, 1992). 
In fact, the BOT had no autonomy in setting the monetary targets, since the money supply 
was endogenous. The most important issue for the government was that its activities were 
adequately funded. In this way the growth of money supply was being dictated by the fiscal 
deficits. (Nyagetera & Tarimo, 1997, p. 77) 
51 
 
4.2.5 Restructuring and Privatization of State Owned Banks and Financial Institutions 
Lack of competition was an issue of major concern to the financial sector in Tanzania at 
the beginning of the reforms. This was because of the monopoly position of the NBC in the 
mainland Tanzania and the PBZ in Zanzibar (World Bank, 1995a, p. 9). All efforts to allow 
new entry would not bear any positive results if the monopoly banks continued to exist the way 
they were. One of the recommendations of the Presidential Banking commission was to split 
NBC into two units, thereby promoting competition (World Bank, 1995b, p. 5). But the first 
step was to restructure the NBC, and all other state owned banks and to remove their NPLs 
through the Loan and Assets Realisation Trust (LART). 
4.2.5.1 The Role of the Loan and Assets Realisation Trust (LART) 
This was a government body, created through an act of parliament in June 1991 with the 
aim of recovery of the non-performing loans of the state owned financial institutions. In June 
1992 the administration of the LART was set up by the appointment of the Administrator, the 
Board and Tribunal members (World Bank, 1995a, p. 8). At the same time Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed, specifying the responsibilities of the financial institutions and the 
Government in the process of transferring non-performing loans (Nyagetera & Tarimo, 1997, 
p. 75; World Bank, 1995a, p. 8). Meanwhile, the BOT completed the task of conducting 
portfolio reviews and loan classifications of all the state owned banks in 1993, and all the non-
performing assets of NBC, CRDB and TIB were transferred from the balance sheets of the 
banks to LART for recapitalization. By 1994 recapitalization of over TShs. 200 billion worth 
of bonds to NBC, CRDB and TIB was done (Minister of Finance - Tanzania, 1995, p. 40; World 
Bank, 1995a, p. 8). However, total recoveries by LART were only TSh. 1.6 billion by December 
1994 (World Bank, 1995a, p. 8). 
The work of LART was meant to prepare the financial institutions for privatization once 
the quality of assets was good (Minister of Finance - Tanzania, 1995, p. 40). In the following 
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sections the actual process of privatization of the state owned banks: NBC, CRDB and TIB will 
be presented. 
4.2.5.2 Restructuring of NBC and Privatization of NBC (1997) Ltd. and NMB 
The privatization of NBC was to follow after recapitalization (Minister of Finance - 
Tanzania, 1995, p. 40; World Bank, 1995a, p. 9). However, the issue of privatization of the 
largest bank was politically very sensitive (Cull & Spreng, 2008, p. 7). No wonder that the 
Tanzanian parliament took a very long time to give its authorization of the privatization of the 
National Bank of Commerce, which at that time was the only commercial bank in Tanzania 
(World Bank, 2000a, p. 7). But finally consensus was reached. It was agreed, as the Presidential 
Commission for Banking advised, to split the NBC into two banks and a holding company. 
Privatization was justified as necessary since the new banking laws suited most the privately 
owned financial institutions, and the macroeconomic environment was opened to the market 
forces (Minister of Finance - Tanzania, 1995, p. 39). But, in addition to that, it was clear that 
the reforms would not have resulted in the desired competition in banking if nothing was done 
on the monopoly position of NBC (Minister of Finance - Tanzania, 1995, pp. 39-40). So on 
October 1st 1997, the split of NBC was complete and NBC (1997) Ltd, NMB Ltd., and NBC 
Holding Company became three distinct entities and were operational (World Bank, 2000a, p. 
7; Cull & Spreng, 2008, p. 6). 
NBC (1997) Ltd and NMB Ltd. were to be distinguished by the core businesses. NBC 
(1997) Ltd. was to be a fully-fledged commercial bank and focus its attention on corporate and 
large customers (World Bank, 2000a, p. 8; Cull & Spreng, 2008, p. 7). On the other hand, NMB 
was to provide both commercial and microfinance services to both urban and rural areas. The 
business plan of NMB was to be tailored to the needs (both savings and credits) of small urban 
and rural businesses and agricultural customers (World Bank, 2000a, p. 8; Cull & Spreng, 2008, 
p. 7). 
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What followed after the split was to privatize both banks. But it was clear from the very 
beginning that the NBC (1997) Ltd. was more attractive to the potential investor due to its core 
business, and the fact that it was the biggest Bank with over 30% of market share of total bank 
deposits in Tanzania (Cull & Spreng, 2008, p. 7). It was not easy though, as the experience of 
restructuring up to that time had resulted into less services by the banking sector. There was 
that political sensitivity of the government convincing the population that it was doing the right 
thing (World Bank, 2000a, p. ii; Cull & Spreng, 2008, p. 7). 
In August 1998 both banks were offered for sale. As expected NBC (1997) Ltd. attracted 
bids much quicker and by January 1999, ABSA had won the bid and purchased 70% of the 
shares of NBC (1997) Ltd. From April 1st 2000 ABSA took over the management of the bank 
(Bank of Tanzania, 2000). The cost of restructuring NBC (1997) Ltd was around US $ 9 million 
compared to the estimated $3.6 million (World Bank, 2000a, pp. ii-iii; Bank of Tanzania, 2000). 
4.2.5.3 Privatization of NMB 
When NBC was split into NMB and NBC (1997) Ltd., NMB was to be designed to adopt 
a core business of catering for small scale financial services serving small urban enterprises and 
rural agricultural undertakings (World Bank, 2000b). This type of business seemed not to be 
attractive to investors. So when both banks were offered for sale in August 1998, bids for NMB 
were slow in coming, whereas things moved very fast for NBC (Bank of Tanzania, 1999). This 
was partly because all the loans (assets side of the balance sheet) had been moved to the balance 
sheet of NBC (1997) Ltd., and so NMB remained short of assets, with liabilities exceeding 
assets by over TZS 84 billion, and had only a provisional license (World Bank, 2007, p. 29). In 
addition to that, the staff expertise in microfinance business was short of what was needed at 
that stage of transition (Bank of Tanzania, 1999). 
As an interim step, NMB entered into a US$ 4.9 million legally binding contract with a 
management contractor: The Development Alternatives Inc., a US consulting firm, expert in 
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microfinance business to manage it for three years from July 1999 (World Bank, 2007, p. 19; 
Cull & Spreng, 2008, p. 8). The contract, however, was extended several times until September 
2005 when privatization was completed (World Bank, 2006a, p. 30). The contractor was to be 
responsible for the management of day to day business of the bank, while transforming it into 
an efficient, stable, profitable, low-cost savings bank and ultimately into a microfinance bank. 
The government provided the management with a time-bound plan. One of the items in the 
agreement was not to extend credit for all the time under the management in order to strengthen 
the balances sheet position of the bank. Lending started in August 2000 (World Bank, 2007, p. 
11). Up to August 2000 NMB was investing in the government securities, and drew the rest of 
its income from fees from remittances, payment services and account charges (World Bank, 
1999b, p. 30). 
There were delays, however, in implementing the plan for NMB privatization. Many 
reasons contributed to the delay, one of them is that NMB became profitable under the 
management contractor, and so voices expressing opposition to privatization increased, and the 
whole issue was becoming politically sensitive (World Bank, 2007, p. 7; Cull & Spreng, 2008, 
p. 10). At some point President Benjamin Mkapa had to replace the whole Board of Directors 
because they also expressed opposition to privatization, he had to insist before their replacement 
that privatization would go on regardless the opinion of the board (Cull & Spreng, 2008, p. 10). 
However, this affected the original plan of privatization, as some amendments were done to the 
plan. Even though the original plan was to sell 70% of NMB shares to a strategic investor, the 
actual sale was only 49% to Rabobank of the Netherlands on September 30th 200511, at the sale 
price of USD 29 million. Eventually the government remained with 51% of shares, 21% of the 
shares were sold to Tanzanians (Cull & Spreng, 2008, p. 11).  
                                                 
11 See World Bank, 2007, p. 5 
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It is worth noting, however, that although the Government retained the majority shares, 
it was not interfering in any way in the running of the bank. Also the performance of the bank 
in terms of profitability and asset quality was good too. Another important thing to note is that, 
privatization need not go with contraction in the access of financial services, as NMB succeeded 
to enter into microfinance business with great success (World Bank, 2007, p. 11&30)  
4.2.5.4 Restructuring of CRDB 
The process of recapitalization involved the transfer of TZS 5 billion of the non-
performing loans to LART. A further TZS 40 billion was written off, being offset by the 
treasury bills. Apart from that the Tanzania government injected TZS 2.3 billion in CRDB as 
equity (African Development Fund, 2000). Following recapitalization through LART, the next 
step was to privatize CRDB. Privatization was an issue that was very sensitive politically at that 
time, and perhaps that sensitivity led to a small bank (CRDB) to be the first to be privatized. 
Discussions between DANIDA, who financed the process, and the Government of Tanzania 
reached a consensus in 1992 and by October that year a restructuring plan was finalized (World 
Bank, 1995b). When the management of the bank was changed in 1993, commitment to 
privatization became stronger. The plan called for the privatization of CRDB by the selling of 
shares to cooperatives and private individuals. 30% of shares were held by a DANIDA funded 
trust pending their sale to the public. A new organizational structure was put in place and more 
than 600 members of the staff were retrenched. Still the performance was not good, as losses 
continued to grow and the viability of the bank was in doubt. The biggest step towards 
privatization was in 1995 with the sale of 41% of shares to the public, 29% to a Trust capitalized 
by DANIDA, and 30% to cooperatives and corporations. However, it was after the passing of 
the tests on the capital adequacy of the bank, the level of recovery, provisioning and write-off 
of impaired assets that a freeze on lending imposed by BOT was removed and CRDB was fully 
licenced. In July 1996, CRDB was renamed into CRDB Bank Ltd, and became the first 
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Tanzanian bank to be privatized (African Development Fund, 2000; Minister of Finance - 
Tanzania, 1995). 
 4.2.6 Government Redefining its Role 
From the Arusha declaration up to the mid-1980s, the government, in addition to the 
ordinary functions of providing social and economic infrastructure as well as maintaining law 
and order, had assumed an additional role of being an active participant in industrial production, 
commerce and trade. With the first generation of financial sector reforms, the government 
committed itself to gradually abandon its active role in industry, trade and commerce. This was 
done by the passing of new legislation allowing the private sector to enter into the businesses 
hitherto restricted to the government as well as by the systematic and gradual privatization of 
the state owned enterprises. 
With the National Investment Promotion Policy of 1996 and the National Investment Act 
of 1997, the Tanzanian government resolved to strengthen its capacity to perform the role of 
policy formulation and reform, management of the economic infrastructure, provision of 
supportive legal and regulatory framework, maintaining law and order, and ensuring that the 
contract enforcing mechanisms were functioning. This was necessary to provide enabling 
environment to the private sector to function smoothly, since the existing institutions were all 
set up to support the economy dominated by the public sector. But this involved a lot, and had 
later to be more fully addressed in the Second Generation of Financial Sector Reforms, to be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
4.3 Remaining Challenges 
Much was achieved by the first generation financial sector reforms as discussed above. 
However, critical challenges still remained, which were constraining the development of the 
financial sector and its role in promoting economic development in the country. The discussions 
in the parliament of Tanzania on the two bills to repeal the BFIA 1991 and the BOT Act 1995 
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were used to extract the major challenges that were pointed out by the legislators as key 
shortcomings of the financial sector in Tanzania. 
4.3.1 Dualism in the Economy 
It was evident from the discussions in the parliament that the country development was 
still characterized by some dualisms, the most important for our discussion here being rural 
versus urban, formal versus informal, and the rich versus the poor. The financial sector that 
emerged after the first generation financial sector reform failed to address equally the needs of 
the different parties in the dualism. The majority of Tanzanians still live in the rural areas, and 
the economic activity of the majority of those rural Tanzanians is agriculture. However, the first 
generation financial sector reforms produced a financial system in which the rural areas were 
almost completely neglected. Most of the bank branches that were operating in the rural areas 
prior to 1991 were closed as part of the restructuring of the NBC. New banks are concentrating 
their activities in major urban areas, especially Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Arusha and Moshi. 
The loan portfolio of the banks also show a low representation of agriculture. The members of 
the parliament showed this concern when they were discussing the BFIA 2006. Honourable 
Simbachawene said: “Our agricultural sector will not grow, will never be a priority in the real 
sense if we do not take deliberate steps to assist small holding peasants”.12 
Another Member of Parliament Hon. Said Arfi, emphasised on the need to address 
developmental challenges of the rural areas said: 
Banking services are nowadays available only in urban areas. The rural population have 
nowhere to deposit their surplus. The scarcity of banking services has increased, and to 
make matters worse they are still limited to big urban centres, and in some cases only 
up to district headquarters.13 
                                                 
12 See URT (2006) Tanzania Parliament Hansard, 3 (6), p.49 
13 See URT (2006) Tanzania Parliament Hansard, 3 (6) p. 95 
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Hon. Elisa Molel expressed the same concern: “Banks have been running their business 
only in urban areas, they are yet to extend their services to rural areas, hence the low income 
population do not benefit from their presence”14 
Still the needs of the poor and the marginalized in the country was another concern by 
Hon. Simbachawene: “Our people are ready, they are ready and committed to alleviate their 
poverty, but have no access to credit” 15 
All of those lawmakers were emphasizing the fact that the financial sector as it developed 
after the BFIA 1991, has left a large section of the population unserved. The first generation 
financial sector reforms succeeded in increasing the number of financial institutions in business, 
but did not succeed to make that service reach the majority of the people in the rural areas 
engaged in agriculture. The reforms to empower the free market have not produced a solution 
to the problem of financial inclusion. 
4.3.2. Inadequate Long Term Finance 
It is expected that a well-developed and efficiently functioning financial sector would be 
able to provide long term finance too. This is important because the projects funded by these 
types of loans are the ones that contribute to a healthy long term growth performance. Long 
term finance may be used to buy machinery and equipment. It may also fund construction of 
houses for residential or business purposes and setting up new factories and production plants. 
Unfortunately, the performance of the financial sector in Tanzania after the first generation of 
financial sector reforms did not witness sufficient growth in this type of financial service. The 
lawmakers showed their concern in this regard in their discussion to pass the Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act 2006. Hon. Katagira said: 
The banks operating in Tanzania are satisfied to extend short term credit and still get 
profit. Medium and long term finance have more risks, because the longer the time to 
                                                 
14 See URT (2006) Tanzania Parliament Hansard, 3 (6) p.46 
15  See URT (2006) Tanzania Parliament Hansard 3 (6) p.48 
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repay, the more uncertainties and possibility of loss. The government must then provide 
incentives to the banks to lend more. 16 
Another Member of Parliament Hon. C. Keenja was more specific on issue of housing 
finance: “We do not have any institution that finance housing. We had THB, which was 
liquidated and yet nothing has replaced it, to afford us with housing finance. We need to have 
a Housing Financing institution”.17 And Hon. Chegeni added that “It is important that housing 
financing be developed in Tanzania, so that people may afford to construct houses”18. 
4.3.3 Credit to Private Sector Growth below the Expected 
When the first generation of financial sector reforms was being prepared, it was expected 
that financial intermediation would increase at a good rate. However, a good amount of the 
funds mobilized was not efficiently channeled to productive investment projects in the private 
sector as shown in Figure 11. Banks remained with far more liquidity than the level stipulated 
by prudential regulations. In the parliamentary discussion of the Bill of Banking and Financial 
Institutions, Hon. Simbachawene put it shortly that “our banks have excess liquidity but do not 
have borrowers”19 
In the same parliamentary discussions the Minister of Finance explained that one of the 
reasons for limited growth of credit to private sector was the crowding out of credit by 
government securities. The government securities were offering higher returns to the bank at 
their level of risks to the extent that banks preferred to invest their deposit money in these low 
risk securities. The high yield of the government securities also contributed to the raising of the 
lending rates, which in turn resulted into excess liquidity20. 
 
                                                 
16 See URT (2006) Tanzania Parliament Hansard 3(6) p.64 
17 See URT (2006) Tanzania Parliament Hansard 3(6) p.68 
18 See URT (2006) Tanzania Parliament Hansard 3(3) p. 52 
19 See URT (2006) Tanzania Parliament Hansard 3(6) p. 48 
20 See URT (2006) Tanzania Parliament Hansard 3(3) p. 40 
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4.3.3.1 Provision of Collateral for commercial lending 
In this aspect, there are two problems that are closely relevant. Most borrowers do not 
have the requisite assets to pledge as collateral. Even those who really own houses or land, do 
not have titles to legally certify their ownership. So for most of the people in the rural areas, 
land and landed property holdings cannot be used as valid collateral. This makes it difficult for 
them to access loan facilities since banks need to be assured of recovery in the event of default. 
In the developed countries, even without having the legally recognized title deeds, 
creditworthiness can be used instead to access finance as suggested by Hon. Ezekiel Maige: 
“It is important that there be incentives on the side of government to accept the common 
assets owned by the people, such as land, farms or permanent crops such as coffee, which 
in fact provide certainty that it would still be there in three to four years of the maturity 
of the loan, and so could be pledged as security. Currently there is no incentive on the 
part of the banks to do so. This is a missed opportunity to alleviate poverty for the 
needy.”21 
 But this also was not adequately addressed in the first generation financial sector reforms. 
4.4 Assessment of the Performance of the Financial Sector 1991-2003 
In this section I am going to go through some of the indicators of financial development 
indicators from the time the reforms were initiated up to 2003, when the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program was done. I will go through some measures of financial depth: namely 
Broad money as a percentage of GDP and credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP. 
Next, measures for efficiency of the financial sector will be examined. Here I will take the 
interest rate spread as well as the interest rate margins. I will also include some measures of 
costs, to see the percentage of total costs that went to non-interest expenses, to see how effective 
are the banks in allocating the funds at their disposal to productive activities. I will also look at 
measures of access to finance, to see how the development of the financial sector has helped 
the sector to reach to a greater percentage of the population. 
                                                 
21 See URT (2006) Tanzania Parliament Hansard 3(6) p. 103 
61 
 
4.4.1 Financial Depth 
Financial deepening is the increase in the level of financial services in a country. It is 
reflected in the availability of wide range of products for investors for their savings and risk 
management, and for borrowers for their credit needs and risk management. 
I will take three measures of financial depth: Broad money as a percentage of the GDP, 
credit to private sector as a percentage of the GDP and Deposits as a percentage of the GDP 
(World Bank, 2004). I use the data provided by the World Bank’s database: World 
Development Indicators, available online. In each of the indicators, my aim was to take the data 
from 1992 to 2003. This is because the reforms began with the enacting of the BFIA 1991, and 
so the trend of these indicators will shed light as to the impact of these reforms in the 
development of the financial sector. 
4.4.1.1 Broad Money as a Percentage of GDP 
Farlex Financial Dictionary22 defines Broad Money to include highly liquid instruments 
like all physical currency and deposits in checking accounts, but also less liquid deposits like 
those in savings accounts, certificates of deposit, institutional money market accounts, 
repurchase agreements and other assets that do not circulate very often. It may also include debt 
securities with maturities of less than two years, repurchase agreements and other assets. 
Broad money is a proxy measure of financial depth. It measures the level of development 
of payment services as well as that of savings and credit intermediation (Lynch, 1996, p. 7). 
The figure below shows the trend of the development in Broad Money as a percentage of GDP 
in Tanzania and in East African countries (for comparison) as well as averages for Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) as well as Low income Countries (LIC) from 1992 to 2003. This period of time 
was chosen because of the fact that the FGFSR began in the year 1991 with the enacting of the 
                                                 
22 Farlex Financial Dictionary (2012) accessed  on 16 April 2014 from http://financial-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Broad+Money  
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BFIA 1991, and ended with the Financial Sector Assessment Program 2003, whose findings 
and recommendations created the agenda for the SGFSR.  
In the figure below (Figure 6) the level of Broad Money as a percentage of GDP for 
Tanzania is consistently higher than that of Uganda but always lower than that of Kenya and 
the LIC and SSA averages. However, the trend for Tanzania shows a slight initial increase in 
the first years up to 1995, and then a decline in the following years up to 199823, and then an 
increase at a slow rate up to 2003. Comparing the level of Broad Money at the start of the 
financial sector reforms and at the time of closing the first generation of the reforms, we see 
that there was a very small increase from 22.07% of GDP to 22.95% of GDP. 
Hence I can say from the figures of the Broad Money time series, that the reforms did not 
have a significant impact on the financial deepening in the first 12 years. 
Figure 6: Broad Money as a Percentage of GDP  
 
Source: World Bank (2014): World Development Indicators 
                                                 
23 It should be noted that in the year 1996 NBC (the then biggest commercial bank in Tanzania with more than 
90% of total assets of the banking sector) started its restructuring. The restructuring involved the closure of some 
branches and the laying off of more than 2000 members of staff. In 1997 NBC was split into two banks NBC 
(1997) Ltd. And NMB. Most likely the decline was due to the shock to the banking sector caused by that exercise. 
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4.4.1.2 Private Credit to GDP 
Financial development must be connected to increased financial intermediation 
(Caporale, Rault, Sova, & Sova, 2009). Financial intermediation in turn is the process whereby 
the savings are mobilized from those who have savings and investment needs, to fund the 
investment projects of borrowers and entrepreneurs who have creative and productive projects 
that need financing. Unless the savings mobilized are channeled to viable productive 
undertakings, the whole process of financial intermediation would be useless. So some scholars 
view the indicator of domestic credit to the private sector to be the best indicator of the 
development of financial sector (Djankov, McLiesh, & Schleifer, 2005). In the figure below, 
the trend of domestic credit to the private sector from 1992 to 2003 are shown for Tanzania, 
Kenya and Uganda as well as for SSA and LIC.  
Figure 7: Domestic Credit to Private Sector 
 
Source: World Bank (2014) World Development Indicators 
Figure 7 shows that one year of the beginning of the financial sector reforms in 1991, in 
terms of Domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, Tanzania (14.03%) was 
behind Kenya (32.67%) but slightly above the averages of the LIC (12.63%) and SSA (13.68%). 
The data for Uganda are not available for that year. One year after the inauguration of the 
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financial sector reforms, (1992) Tanzania recorded a decline to 9.74% of the GDP credit to the 
private sector, which was higher than Uganda (4.0%) but lower than Kenya (34.84%) and the 
averages for the region of SSA (54.20%) and for the income group LIC (14.08%).  
The trend for Tanzania in the first decade of reforms shows an initial decrease to reach 
the minimum of 3.09% in the year 1996, before the level of domestic credit to the private sector 
started again to increase at a slow rate to reach 8.08% in the year 2003. So for the period of the 
first generations of the financial sector reforms, domestic credit to the private sector declined 
from an initial level of 13.9% in 1992 to 8.08% in the year 2003. 
Again, using domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP as a measure of 
financial deepening, we see that the first 12 years of the financial sector reforms did not have a 
positive impact on financial deepening. It is noted also that Uganda, which had a lower level of 
this indicator in 1992 (the first available data in this period) was experiencing constant increase 
in the level of domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP. 
4.4.1.3 Bank Deposits as a Percentage of GDP 
The main function of financial institutions is financial intermediation. Financial 
intermediation is the process of pooling together the resources of the savers and making them 
available for entrepreneurs for investing them in viable investment projects. So the extent to 
which the financial institutions in an economy can mobilize savings is an indicator of how 
efficient the financial institutions are in that particular economy. It is also a measure of depth 
of the financial sector in that economy.  
We are going to examine the data we have in hand for the bank deposits as a percentage 
of GDP in the first decade of the reforms. We are going to include the data for Kenya and 
Uganda for comparison, and the data for LIC and SSA for benchmarking. 
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Figure 8: Deposit Money Bank's Assets to GDP 
 
Source: World Bank (2014): World Development Indicators 
Tanzania had an initial level of domestic deposits as a percentage of GDP of 5.83%, which 
was higher than the level of Uganda with 3.66%, but very much lower than the level of Kenya 
of 24.73% and the regional average of the SSA of 14.57% and the average of LIC countries of 
12.49%. In the year 2002 the level of domestic deposits as a percentage of GDP for Tanzania 
of 10.14% was catching up with the regional averages for SSA (13.5%) and LIC (12.17%), 
although the level of Kenya was still very much higher at 35.35%. 
Regarding the general trend for the period, we find that there was an initial increase to 
the maximum of 14.24% in 1995. This is the period when barrier of entry was lifted for private 
financial institutions both foreign and domestic, and new entrants began to enter the market. 
The period of initial increase was followed by a declining trend for the years 1996-1998 
reaching a minimum of domestic deposits that were 8.13% of the GDP in 1998. Again this is 
the period in which the largest bank in the country, the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) was 
being restructured. The restructuring involved the closure of loss making branches, which 
reduced the access to the financial services in the rural areas. The period from 1999 -2000 
experienced a very slow but constant increase in the domestic deposits as a percentage of GDP. 
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This corresponds with the period of completion of the privatization of CRDB Bank and NBC 
(1997) Ltd, and the increasing number of entrants into the market. However, most of the 
increase was in the major urban centers, especially Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Mwanza and Moshi. 
We can note that during this period there was a slow deepening of the domestic deposits. 
It was catching up with the regional averages, but was still very low for the ideal financial sector 
to produce a significant contribution to economic development. So the initial reforms have not 
yet transformed the financial sector to the intended level of growth and contribution to the 
economy. 
4.4.2 Banking Competition and Efficiency of the Financial Sector 
Financial sector efficiency refers to the extent to which the financial sector fulfills its 
function resulting into the maximum possible financial intermediation with minimum possible 
costs. Efficiency can be measured by how the products are priced in the financial sector. When 
there is a wide gap between the selling price of the products sold and the purchase price of the 
products bought by the financial sector, the respective sector will be inefficient, in the sense 
that potential safer credit takers will be priced out because of too high lending rates. Also some 
depositors may also may decide not to deposit in the respective financial institutions because 
of too low deposit rates (Honohan & Beck, 2007). The causes of this inefficiency may be many 
and varied, but the major one is the lack of competition, which makes a few institutions too 
dominant in the banking sector to be able to dictate the price movements in the market. This 
may provide an explanation for too high lending rates and too low deposit rates. Another reason, 
which can be felt more when combined with the lack of competition may be the operating costs 
that are too high (Beck , Maimbo, Faye, & Triki, 2011, p. 50), necessitating the financial 
institution to price such products as credit high enough to be in the position to break even. Loan 
loss provision and reserve requirement by the Central Bank is another factor, necessitating the 
banks to charge a higher risk premiums for credit extended. Beck , Maimbo, Faye, & Triki, 
(2011) argue that the spreads are caused by differences in bank characteristics such as size, 
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liquidity, ownership and variation in market structure; and country characteristics such as the 
institutional framework and the level of economic development. On the issue of institutional 
framework, Beck , Maimbo, Faye, & Triki (2011) point out that it has mainly to do with the 
contractual framework, whereby the less developed the contractual framework, the higher the 
interest rate spreads. They also add that higher capital requirement increases overhead costs and 
margins. 
Interest rate spread for the period of reforms will be examined. The data available are 
from 1995 onwards, but they will be sufficient to make an assessment of the efficiency of the 
financial sector. 
4.4.2.1 Interest Rate Spread 
Interest rate spread in a financial system refers to the difference between the average 
lending rate and the average deposit rate in that financial system (World Bank, 2004). In Figure 
9 below the interest spread for Tanzania is presented, and the comparison with Kenya and 
Uganda is made, while also the benchmarking against the LIC and SSA data is made, to show 
how the level of Tanzania compares with countries of similar level of development. 
Figure 9: Interest Rate Spread 1995-2003 
 
Source: World Bank (2014) World Development Indicators 
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In the graph of interest rate spread, we notice that in our first year of observation and in 
the following six years, the spread for Tanzania was higher than those of Kenya and Uganda, 
as well as those of SSA and LIC. We note also that the maximum spread was in the year 1996, 
which is the time when the biggest bank in the country, the NBC was undergoing its 
restructuring. The restructuring of NBC caused the immediate effect of reduction of financial 
services because of closure of the loss making branches in the areas of comparatively less 
economic activities. 
We notice also that from 1996 up to the year 1999 there was a slow but regular decline 
of the level of the spread from 20.3% to 14.14%, followed by an increase in the following two 
years 2000 and 2001. Interest rate spread then declined to 11.5% in 2003. 
In the early years of reforms it was clear that the gap of the spread between Tanzania and 
the East African neighbors, Kenya and Uganda was wider than in the year 2003, when Tanzania 
had a lower spread than Kenya, and was almost at the same level with the regional averages, 
while slightly higher than Uganda. 
The data for spread shows that during the period of reforms there was a constant 
improvement in the level of spread. This may be due to the entry of private financial institutions 
and the restructuring of the biggest bank – the NBC – which led to the split of the bank into 
NBC 1997 Ltd and NMB Bank, which definitely increased competition. Even then Tanzania, 
Kenya and Uganda need to do more in this respect, as the spread above 10% is still high. 
I will examine the profitability of the banks, which have been mentioned above to be 
connected in a way with lack of competition and inefficiency in the financial sector, which in 
turn contribute to the high spread. 
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4.4.2.2.1 Return on Equity 
Figure 10 Return on Equity 
 
Source: World Bank (2014) World Development Indicators 
This study noted that the BOT uses the fact that banks in Tanzania have got high profit 
margin to be a point that demonstrate the healthy position of the operations of banks. I will take 
that with reservations, because the high profit margins are not obtained in an environment where 
the interest rate spreads are so high. So, high profit margin may be a symptom of inefficiency 
that ensue due to lack of competition. 
Figure 10 above shows the return on Equity for Tanzania. Return on Equity is a measures 
of profitability against the shareholders’ funds invested in the business.  
 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑎𝑥
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
,  
In figure 9 the actual data for ROE in Tanzania are given, and for comparison purposes, 
the corresponding figures for Kenya and Uganda, as well as the averages for LIC and SSA for 
benchmarking purposes. The data available for all these countries are from the year 1999. For 
the first three years, Uganda recorded the higher profit margin  (41% in 1999, 63.14% in 2000 
and 54% in 2001) than the regional neighbours(for Tanzania and Uganda respectively 32.3%  
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and 6.72% in 1999,  35.18% and 14.2% in 2000, and 35.47% and 19.87% in 2001)and the 
averages for the SSA and LIC (for LIC and SSA respectively 14.7% and 15.17% in 1999, 
21.22% and 19.15% in 2000 and 20.7% and 19.95 in 2002). We note that Tanzania was always 
the second in those three years after Uganda. For years 2002 and 2003 Tanzania recorded the 
higher profit margins than the neighbours in East Africa with ROE 39.68% in 2002 and 44.18% 
in 2003. Uganda had ROE of 20.06% in 2002 and 37.87% in 2003, whereas Kenya had 3.05% 
in 2002 and 16.72% in 2003. The averages of ROE for SSA and LIC were also lower than the 
corresponding Tanzanian figures. 
4.4.2.2.2 Return on Assets 
Returns on Assets is another measure of profitability. It measures how best the financial 
institution puts the assets at its disposal to a good use. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 =  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑎𝑥
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
In figure 11, the figures for Returns on Assets for Tanzania as well as Kenya and Uganda 
are presented, and the averages for SSA and LIC are provided as well. 
 Figure 11: Return on Assets after Tax 
 
World Bank (2014), World Development Indicators 
The pattern is similar to that of ROE, both in Trend and in the way the countries compare. 
We note, however, that in 2003 Uganda had a marginally higher ROA of 3.21% compared to 
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Tanzania’s 3.17% for the same year, whereas the ROE for the same year was higher for 
Tanzania than Uganda. 
We note also, that Tanzania had consistently higher ROA than the averages for SSA and 
LIC, but was closing the gap with time. 
The figures for ROE in Tanzania show that there was an environment that created the 
possibilities of the financial institutions to earn higher profit margins than the average margins 
for SSA and LIC. 
4.4.2.2 Government Crowding Out Private Sector Credit 
In an economy where the free market functions efficiently credit is allocated to the 
projects that have the best returns. Where most of the resources mobilized by the financial sector 
go to the government and state owned enterprises, the allocating mechanism is considered to 
be inefficient.  
The graph below shows the trend of credit to government and state owned enterprises 
from the start of the first generation financial sector reforms until they year 2003 where the 
FSAP took place. 
Figure 12: Credit to Government and SOE as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank (2014) World Development Indicators 
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Observing Figure 12, we see that Tanzania began the reforms with large portions of the 
resources mobilized directed to the government. We note that Kenya and Tanzania have been 
the countries with highest percentage of credit to the government compared to Uganda and the 
averages for SSA and LIC. However, Tanzania managed to lower this share of credit, and from 
the 1997 it was extending lower percentage of GDP to the government than Kenya, and from 
2000 even lower than Uganda. This shows that reforms were working well in this respect for 
Tanzania. The challenge remains that the yield of the government securities are rather high, 
causing the banks to prefer a lower risk higher return investment of the resources mobilized. 
4.4.3 Access to Finance 
It is difficult to obtain accurate and reliable indicator of access to finance in a country. 
(Beck , Maimbo, Faye, & Triki, 2011) (Abdi, 1977). However, there are proxies that are 
available and give a good indication of the extent of access to finance in a given country. Such 
proxies include the number of branches per capita, ATM and/or point-of-sale per capita, and 
number of bank accounts per capital. In 2004, the World Bank launched an effort to collect 
proxy indicators on outreach by measuring the number of branches and automated teller 
machines (ATMs), and deposit and loan accounts. (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Peria, 2007) 
4.4.3.1 Commercial Bank Branches per 100,000 Adults 
We are using the data provided by the World Bank on outreach. The data available is 
from 2004 as Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Peria (2007) noted. So we use only the data for 2004, 
which show where Tanzania stood after the first round of reforms. 
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Figure 13: Commercial Bank Branches per 100,000 adults 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
From the data in figure 13, Uganda and Tanzania with 1.1 and 1.2 branches per 100,000 
adults respectively were marginally below the SSA and LIC averages for Commercial Bank 
Branches per 100,000 adults. Kenya with 2.7 branches per 100,000 adults was very much above 
the averages of 1.3 branches for LIC and 1.6 branches for SSA per 100,000 adults in the year 
2004. 
This shows that the access of the banking services in Tanzania was still very much 
underdeveloped compared to the countries. That is most of the reforms resulted into a growing 
number of financial institutions concentrated in bigger urban areas. So still much has to be done 
to develop the Tanzania Financial sector in that respect. Policies that will enable the banks and 
other financial institutions to open sufficient number of branches in both rural and urban areas 
are still very much needed. 
4.4.3.2 ATM per 100,000 Adults 
Another proxy measure used by the World Bank is the number of ATMs per 100,000 
adults. For this measure also the data are available for Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda as well as 
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.6
2.7
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
2004
Number of branches
Ye
ar
KEN SSA LIC TZA UGA
74 
 
the averages for SSA and LIC from 2004. We take the data for 2004 to indicate the level of 
access for the respective countries after the 12 years of the FGFSR.  
Figure 14: ATMs per 100,000 adults 
 
Source: World Bank (2014) World Development Indicators 
The data in figure 14 shows that Tanzania had the lowest number of ATMs per 100,000 
among the three East African countries. With 0.3 ATMs per 100,000 adults, compared to 
Uganda’s 1.1 and Kenya’s 1.6, Tanzania was very much behind even the SSA average of 0.7 
ATMs per 100,000 adults.  
Again this reinforces the observation in the previous section that a decade of FGFSR did 
not succeed very much to significantly develop the financial sector in terms of the access of 
finance in Tanzania. 
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Figure 15: Bank Deposits as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
Figure 15 above shows the position of Tanzania, vis a vis the countries of the same 
environment and the averages of Low Income Countries (hereinafter LIC) and the Sub-Saharan 
Africa (hereinafter SSA). The data for all other countries are available from 1981, but the data 
for Tanzania are available from 1988.  
It can be noted that Kenya is above all selected countries in terms of the Bank Deposits 
as a percentage of GDP, and throughout the time observed Kenya was above the averages of 
SSA and LIC.  
Regarding Tanzania, we note that it has always had the ratio of Bank Deposits to GDP 
lower than the average for SSA and LIC. 
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It is interesting to note the trends also. Tanzania Deposits have been rising 3.5% in 1988 
to 5.35% 1992, the deposits then increased at a faster rate to reach 14.23% of the GDP in 1995, 
8.1 % in 1998. There was a constant upward trend then throughout to reach 21% in 2008. One 
may note, however a general upward trend from 1992 – the year when the reforms started to 
take effect, suggesting that there has been a positive impact of the reforms on deposits in 
Tanzania. 
4.5 Washington Consensus 
Washington Consensus is a collective phrase to depict those development strategies based 
on market fundamentalism. The policies were emphasizing privatization, liberalization and 
macroeconomic (usually meaning price) stability, while at the same time striving to downscale 
and minimize the role of government (Stiglitz J. , The Post Washington Consensus, 2005). The 
architects of these policies believed that since these policies succeeded in the Western Europe 
and USA, then they were an instant solution to all economic problems. So most of what was 
done in the FGFSR was motivated by this set of reform packages called Washington consensus. 
The policies did not consider that there are market failures due to imperfect information 
and agency problems. They did not consider the need for safety nets and the necessity to 
promote equity, both of which cannot be done by the free market (Stiglitz J. , The Post 
Washington Consensus, 2005, p. 24) 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the major policy measures of the first generation financial 
sector reforms. I have shown in this chapter that among other things, the policy makers removed 
the rigid controls of the government, and created the competitive environment by allowing the 
private sector to enter the financial sector provision in Tanzania. The BOT had to strengthen 
their supervisory capacity, which is necessary in for the stability and safety of financial system. 
The FGFSR also established the foundation of the functioning of indirect monetary policy. But 
the bulk of the work of the FGFSR was in the restructuring and privatisation of the state owned 
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banks. The LART played a crucial role of transferring the non-performing loans from the banks’ 
balance sheets and collecting as much of them as possible. The biggest bank NBC was split into 
two, and later privatized. Another state owned bank CRDB was also privatized. It is pointed 
out there that the government changed its role, from being an active provider of the services in 
the financial services, to the one of being the facilitator of the financial system, by building the 
institutions that provide incentives for the development of the financial sector. It is shown in 
this chapter that despite all these reforms, the immediate impact was the decline in service 
provision, and to strengthen the differences between the formal and informal sectors, the rural 
and the urban, and also market failure in the area of long term finance. This set up the agenda 
for the SGFSR, the topic that will be picked up in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Second Generation Financial Sector Reforms 
5.1 Introduction 
The FGFSR allowed entry of private financial services providers, both domestic and 
foreign. Also attempts were made to restructure and privatize the state owned financial 
institutions. Some institutions were not yet privatized, such as the Peoples’ Bank of Zanzibar 
and the postal banks. This chapter presents the major policy measures that were taken during 
the SGFSR. It addresses the attempts to improve the business environment, the measures to 
establish the mechanisms for efficient flow of information by having efficient registries in the 
land administration, in business registration and in the credit information and credit referencing. 
In the chapter also deals with the reforms in the legal and judicial system. Reforms done in the 
pension sector as well as the insurance sector will be presented and their influence of long term 
finance. 
5.2 The Background to the Second Generation Financial Sector Reforms 
In 2003, after a decade of reforms, the World Bank together with the International 
Monetary Fund in collaboration with the BOT, conducted a comprehensive assessment of the 
financial sector in Tanzania in the view of assessing the effectiveness of the reforms undertaken, 
and to identify the areas of weakness that needed to be addressed. In July 2003, the Financial 
Sector Assessment Program (hereinafter FSAP) mission presented their report to the BOT 
(Bank of Tanzania, 2004). In the reports, there were recommendations that the FSAP made, and 
which the BOT adopted as agenda for the SGFSR 
Bank of Tanzania (2007a, p.10) gives the major recommendations of the FSAP mission: 
 Reform of the government owned financial institutions, including finalization of 
privatization process of financial institutions still under government ownership. 
 Legal and judicial reforms to remove the main obstacles to lending 
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 Enhancing access to financial services, including the promotion of microfinance and 
creation of credit registry. 
 Liberalization and development of long-term investment by insurance companies and 
pension funds. 
 Avoiding policy prescriptions or practices to open special windows for SMEs at 
financial institutions, or the need for government –promoted development banks 
 Improvement of banks regulation and supervision and crisis preparedness. 
In March 2004, the Ministry of Finance created an Inter-institutional committee for the 
SGFSR, to oversee the FSAP reform agenda (IMF, 2004, p. 48; Bank of Tanzania, 2005; World 
Bank, 2006b, p. 10). The Inter-institutional committee worked to prepare the action plan, which 
was ready by June 2005 and was submitted to the Minister of Finance for approval (Bank of 
Tanzania, 2006; World Bank, 2006a, p. 10). In August 2005 a seminar for Permanent 
Secretaries of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar was conducted, to sensitize them on 
activities of the SGFSR, and the financial responsibility for the Government of Zanzibar (Bank 
of Tanzania, 2006). Various consultants were engaged to advice on specific issues of the reform 
programs, and their advices were incorporated in the Financial Sector Reform implementation 
Plan, which was ready by March 2007, and was adopted by the Government for implementation 
(Ministry of Finance Tanzania, 2007). 
In the following section, major reforms that were done in the spirit of the SGFSR will be 
presented. 
5.3 Business Environment Concerns before the SGFSR 
From the experience of the first generation of financial sector reforms it was clear that 
the transition from the centrally planned economy to market economy was not so smooth. The 
institutional arrangements that are supposed to work well in the market economy were 
introduced in the environment which was not yet ready for them. It was necessary then to start 
to create institutions that would create a conducive business environment for the market 
economy to function efficiently, and hence to enable the reforms that had been undertaken from 
1991 in the financial sector to bear fruit. That is why “during this period (1990s), the 
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government convened a task force to identify areas of legal reform required to bring the legal 
system in closer conformity to the requirement of a functioning market economy” (Finnegan, 
2004) 
5.3.1 Efforts to Improve Business Environment before SGFSR 
It is important to acknowledge that there were already efforts to improve the business 
environment even before the SGFSR, though the efforts were not viewed as major items of the 
reform agenda itself. In the first generation financial sector reforms the major concern was to 
create the structure of free market economy. In the first place, reforms were done to remove 
price controls so as to let the market set the prices of the different financial products available 
in the market. Measures were taken to allow freedom of entry and exit of the financial 
institutions in the financial business, both domestic and foreign through the enactment of the 
BFIA 1991 and the BOT Act 1995. Other measures were directed to remove the direct 
intervention of the government in the financial institutions functioning apart from providing the 
legal and regulatory framework. The greatest preoccupation, however, was to strive to privatize 
the as many of the state owned enterprises as possible, and different donors were interested to 
support the strengthening of the private sector in Tanzania (African Development Fund, 2000).  
At the time of preparation of the agenda for SGFSR, the private sector in Tanzania, was 
dominated by micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), with a study giving a figure of 
2.7 million MSME, 60% of them in urban areas, and with high rate of exit - estimated 60% 
exiting the business within the first 5 years (World Bank, 2005b). 
However, there existed some major regulatory barriers for doing business. The law had 
no provision of separation of personal vs business assets, and this made most of the businesses 
to die once the proprietor died (World Bank, 2005b, p. 4). 
It was also difficult to register a company, for company registration could be done in Dar 
es Salaam only. Also permits to start pharmacies, tour agencies, restaurants and cell phone 
81 
 
service provision were issued in Dar es Salaam only and costed between USD 4,000 and USD 
5,500 (World Bank, 2005b, p. 5). 
The officials responsible to handle such procedures were also excessively slow in 
applying the law, and so most decisions were arbitrary and even when one was not satisfied the 
options were limited, one could take up to 570 days to have one’s objection granted. 
The costs of starting and closing a business were on the average USD 2,700 and 2,750 
respectively, which was four times the average yearly wage of a Tanzanian. The access to stock 
market was also restrictive, demanding a track of profitability for three years, and some USD 
50,000 in capital (World Bank, 2005b, p. 4). 
Important indicators of business climate in Tanzania at that time are given in the table 
below together with selected countries for comparison: 
Table 2: Selected Business Climate Indicators for Tanzania 
  TZA SSA KEN UGA CHN IND OECD 
Starting a 
business 
Duration (days) 35 63 64 36 48 71 19 
Cost (% of GDP per capita 161 215 46 117 14 62 6.8 
Min Capital (% of GDP per capita 6 297.2 0 0 947 0 41 
Hiring and  
Firing 
workers 
Difficulty in hiring Index 67 47 33 0 11 56 30 
Rigidity of Hours Index 80 63 20 20 40 40 50 
Difficulty in firing Index 60 47 30 0 40 90 27 
Rigidity in Employment Index 69 53 28 13 30 62 36 
Firing Costs (weeks of wage) 38 53 47 12 90 79 35 
Enforcing 
Contracts 
Number of Procedures 21 35 25 15 25 40 19 
Duration (days) 242 434 360 209 241 425 225 
Cost (% of GDP per Capita) 35 42 41 22 26 43 11 
Getting 
Credit 
Collateral creation cost (% of per capita 
GDP) 
21 .. 3 12 0 11 .. 
Coverage 0 8 0 9 4 0 75 
Credit information 0 1 4 0 3 0 5 
Private Bureau coverage 0 35 1 0 0 1.7 590 
Legal rights 5 4 8 5 2 5 6 
Closing 
business 
Actual time 3 3 5 2 2 10 1.5 
Actual cost % of estate 22 19 22 30 22 9 7 
World Bank (2005a) Doing Business in 2006 
So it was important that something was to be done to improve the business climate in 
Tanzania, by removing those regulations, policies and institutional constraints. So business 
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environment strengthening was an important ingredient of the institutional reforms of the 
SGFSR (World Bank, 2005b, p. 4) 
5.3.2 BEST agenda 
In July 2002, the preparation of the Business Environment Strengthening for Tanzania 
(BEST) program was completed and was formally adopted under the President’s Office for 
Planning and Privatization (World Bank, 2003). It was initially funded by DANIDA, DFID, 
SIDA and the Government of Netherlands: the total cost of $25.4 million over 5 years period 
from December 2003 (DANIDA, 2008). This BEST program aimed at addressing Legal and 
Judiciary Issues (Land law, Labour law, Business licensing legislation, commercial court, and 
tax issues) (DANIDA, 2008). The ultimate aim of BEST was to reduce the burden on businesses 
by eradicating as many procedural and administrative barriers as possible (Tanzania Bankers 
Association, 2007b, p. 12). So when the SGFSR was adopted by the Government, the World 
Bank was willing to join in as a co-donor for the agenda of business environment strengthening. 
World Bank signed a MOU in July 2006 (DANIDA, 2008). 
5.3.2.1 Business Licensing 
In the pre-reform era there were some rigid regulations regarding business licensing that 
acted as barriers to the starting of new small and medium enterprises. The aim of licensing fee 
was revenue generation, apart from its normal regulatory function (Ministry of Finance 
Tanzania, 2004. Para 10).  Through the BEST initiative, license fee rule for small businesses 
was changed from July 2004. From that time on, the license fee was applicable only upon 
establishment rather than on an annual basis. This was intended to reduce the costs of business. 
The reforms were a shift to transparent and efficient licensing for registration, not for revenue 
generation (Ministry of Finance Tanzania, 2004. Para 10). This spirit of improving the quality 
of institutions, was already manifesting and was to be the major preoccupation of the SGFSR. 
Of course, the SGFSR was to continue with further licensing and other business environment 
reforms 
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5.3.2.1 BEST Agenda under the SGFSR 
Under the SGFSR, there was a new program Tanzania: Private Sector Competitiveness 
Project (PSCP), whose agenda coincided with the agenda of the BEST program including, the 
Review of Civil Justice System in Tanzania and the Review of Land Dispute Settlement. 
5.3.2.1.1 Review of Civil Justice System in Tanzania 
This was a long term project that was undertaken by BEST project from 2005 -2012, and 
the final report has been published only recently. (URT, 2013), and the major focus is to make 
the civil cases be decided on the issues at stake, and not to let other issues that do not have 
direct bearing with the issue at hand be the reason for delay of the cases. Also the review has 
stressed on the importance of alternative dispute resolution mechanism for commercial cases, 
as where it is possible it reduces time and expenses of reaching a resolution. 
5.4 Financial Access 
FSAP identified one of the challenges that the Tanzanian Financial sector was still facing 
to be that of limited outreach (World Bank, 2000a). A decade of financial reforms could not 
achieve to increase the financial access to a greater percentage of the poor people, both rural 
and urban. But with the rural population, the problem was even worse, since the expansion of 
new financial institutions as well as that of the branches of the already existing institutions was 
concentrated in urban areas. The problem that limit this financial access was the inability of the 
poor people to fulfil the lending conditions of commercial banks. So there were some barriers 
to the expansion of lending. The first obstacle is that most of the poor people do not have the 
collateral acceptable by the commercial banks to qualify for loans. Even though they might own 
land, they could not use their land holding as collateral because in most cases the rural land is 
not registered, and so they did not have title deeds (DANIDA, 2008). 
To address these challenges, the SGFSR embarked on the initiative to create credit 
registries and credit reference systems, to reform land laws so as to improve property rights and 
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improve land administration systems that acted as impediments to financial access. There are 
other issues, which address more than one challenge, and will be treated in the subsequent 
sections. 
5.4.1 Establishment of Credit Registry and Credit Reference System 
The FSAP strongly recommended the creation of credit registry and a credit reference 
system. This is the arrangement that would enable the people who do not have material 
collateral to have the possibility of creating a reputational collateral, which would facilitate 
their access to finance (World Bank, 2005b). 
5.4.1.1 Credit Registries 
Credit registries are the depositories of data about history of individuals and businesses 
and their reputation of borrowing and repaying. They are also powerful tools of assessing, 
supervising and monitoring credit risk in the economy (World Bank, 2013a). World Bank 
explains further that Credit bureaus also offer fraud detection, debt collection, marketing 
services and credit scoring, while credit registries offer ratings to financial institutions and other 
services to financial supervisors. 
For our purpose of financial sector reforms, creation of credit registry and credit reference 
bureau was targeting to increase the access to finance. World Bank (2013) in their Doing 
Business Report for the year 2013, highlighted this importance. They argue that,  
Credit registry helps to reduce information asymmetry thus helping both the lender and 
the borrower. The lenders will be in a position to get, through the credit registry, 
information that would otherwise be elusive to them, thus empower them to make more 
informed decisions. On the other hand, the borrowers will be in the position to develop 
good reputational collateral for repayment. This supplements the traditional collateral 
that they might not have. In this way credit registry and credit referencing system 
empower both the lenders and the borrowers and hence facilitates access to credit to those 
formerly excluded because of lack of traditional collateral (World Bank, 2013a, p. 90). 
5.4.1.2 SGFSR and Credit Registry 
Immediately after adopting the agenda for SGFSR in March 2007, the authority 
overseeing the implementation of the program, the BOT, hired Sterling Merchant Finance Co. 
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Ltd. to provide a framework for Credit Reference System (Bank of Tanzania, 2007c). The 
consultant moved quickly to have the framework ready, and was ready by October 2007, then 
a workshop of stakeholders was held. In the conference the consultant company presented its 
report on regulations as well as licensing guidelines for credit reference databank and credit 
reference bureau and handed it on to BOT for further action (Bank of Tanzania, 2008). BOT 
then submitted the regulations and guidelines to the government for publishing them in the 
government gazette (Bank of Tanzania, 2009). On 14th May 2010, the Credit Reference 
Databank Regulations (GN 177) and Credit Reference Bureaux GN 178 licencing guidelines 
were gazetted (Ministry of Finance Tanzania, 2009; World Bank, 2013b, p. 32; URT, 2013, p. 
98). 
The next step was to start the process of establishing the credit reference databank. A 
consultant was hired to oversee the installation and commissioning of the credit reference 
databank in December 2011 (IMF, 2012b). At the same time a public notice inviting credit 
reference databank and bureaus operators to apply for licenses was issued, and received an 
immediate response from international operators (Ministry of Finance Tanzania, 2011). By 
September 2012, the work of installation of databank was completed and Creditinfo 
International GmbH of Germany was licensed for Credit Reference Databank operations. In 
December 2012 Dun and Bradsheet Co. from USA became the first Credit Reference Bureau 
operator to be licensed in Tanzania (IMF, 2012a; World Bank, 2013b). 
So now a credit reference databank and a credit bureau are operational, and a good 
foundation has been laid for promoting financial access among the people who lack traditional 
collateral. Information is already being shared among lenders in order to reduce information 
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, and increase access to credit. At the same time it 
is expected that the creation of credit reference system will reduce default rates and lower the 
cost of credit as well as improve borrowers’ responsibility and behaviour. 
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5.4.2 Reforms Related to Land Laws 
In the SGFSR many reforms were done in connection with land laws. These reforms were 
trying to address and solve the main challenges that manifested during the FSAP. The Financial 
System Stability Assessment Report for Tanzania noted that there were some reforms done, 
which contain important advances, but are “flawed in important respects with implications for 
the availability of mortgage based finance”. (IMF, 2003b, p. 28 para 65) The report goes on to 
elaborate on the missing legal foundation arguing that:  
.. because of bankers’ caution as well as the collateralization requirements of the BOT, 
mortgages remain important in Tanzania banking, even where the main assurance of 
creditworthiness is the expected cash flow of the business. (IMF, 2003b, p. 28 para 65)  
The IMF (2003b) report (FSAP) also mentioned that the Land Act 1999 had added 
impediments to the development of mortgage lending, but the problems (statutory delays and 
prohibition on sale of improved land) were technical and could be resolved.  It is worth noting 
that the IMF (2003) report did not mention financial sector development impediments 
associated with Land Courts as stipulated in the Land Cases Adjudication Infrastructure and the 
Land Registry and Tilting processes. By 2003 there was a multiplicity of land courts at various 
levels that were not properly networked, and so there was a need to look at the land courts 
landscape and update it in terms of resources and personnel, as well as the court infrastructure. 
There were also the multiplicity of laws governing land aspects that were not properly 
harmonised, resulting into a system that was very ineffective. (Bank of Tanzania, 2007b, p. 78)  
So, the main challenges were: absence of adequate capacity for adjudication of land 
disputes, presence of conflicting legislations related to land issues, and absence of land 
registries at and district levels (Bank of Tanzania, 2007a, pp. 147-150). The existing land 
adjudicating system was based on Civil procedure code Cap. 33 and Land Dispute (Court) Act 
No. 2/2002. The use of civil procedure prolonged preliminary procedure in filing pleadings thus 
hindering a speedy disposal of disputes. Even when the Mortgage Financial (special provision) 
Act No. 17/2008 was passed, land disputes adjudication jurisdiction was placed at the Land 
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Court instead of commercial court (URT, 2013, p. 105). The procedures in the Commercial 
Court was more appropriate. But even the effectiveness of Commercial Court contract 
enforcement was being undermined by the court brokers who were supposed to oversee the 
execution of commercial court rulings. The court brokers, however were not disciplined and 
were not complying with the rulings of the commercial court. Hence it was found necessary to 
establish the new procedures of appointment of court brokers as well as supervising them. 
SGFSR adopted the agenda to reforms the shortcomings to the land law that acted as 
impediments to the development of the financial sector. 
5.4.2.1 Enhancement of Property Rights 
Property rights are “the liberties or permits to enjoy the benefits of wealth while assuming 
the costs which the benefits entails” (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973). Kironde (2006) further 
explains that property rights prevent a person or group of persons or institutions from forcibly 
expropriating what belongs to the other and thus enable the cooperative solution to arise 
voluntarily. The owner of the rights is guaranteed the right to use, the right to benefit from the 
property, the right to change its form and substance and the right to transfer the rights, and so 
gives the owner the incentive to use them in the most productive and competitive manner 
(Kironde, 2006).  
Jaffe & Louziotis (1996) and Feder & Noronha (1987) put property rights into three 
categories: the right to use, the right of exclusion and the right of transfer. They further explain 
the categories that with the right to use, the property owner has the final say as to whether the 
property should be used and if so how, with the right of exclusion: those who have no claim to 
the property are prohibited from benefiting from it. With the right to transfer, the owner is 
enabled to trade the rights for another bundle of rights contained in another asset. Another 
scholar , Eaton, gave a rather more extensive definition of property rights 
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Property rights are economic interests supported by the law. In real estate, these property 
rights are referred to as bundles of rights because the ownership of a parcel of real estate 
may embrace  a great many rights, such as the right to occupancy and use, the right to 
sell or rent it out in whole or in part, the right to bequeath, the right to transfer by contract 
for specified period of time and the rights to the benefits to be derived by occupancy and 
use of real estate. (Eaton, 1995, p. 45) 
Taylor (2004) summarized the property rights in the table below 
Table 3: Categories of Property Rights and Definitions 
Property Right Meaning 
Occupy/Use/Enjoy The right to occupy without the threat of eviction 
Restrict The right to restrict others from accessing the property (right of 
exclusion) 
Dispose/Buy/Inherit The right to sell, or give away, or mortgage, or buy or inherit 
Develop/Improve The right to be able to put the property to some form of development 
such as building, or installation of infrastructure 
Cultivate/Produce The right to use land/property to grow food , keep animals, or operate 
home based economic enterprises 
Sublet The right to be able to pass on the land or property to somebody else 
for rent and for a duration of time 
Fix rent Freedom from rent control legislation 
Pecuniary The right to benefit from any increase in property values 
Enforce The right to legal redress in the event of breach of laid-down rights 
Access services The right to enjoy services such as access roads, drains, open spaces, 
sewers and social services 
Access formal credit The right to use the property in financial transactions, including it as 
collateral 
Source: Taylor (2004) 
5.4.2.1.1 Why are Secure Property Rights Important? 
Secure and well defined, transferrable property rights are important for various reasons. 
First, is that secure property right is a condition sine qua non for land related investments, which 
may in themselves be sources of employment to many people, and certainly contribute to the 
growth of the economy. Second, secure property rights open possibilities for access to formal 
credit, when the rights are acceptable as collateral required for acceptance of credit contract. 
The third advantage of secure credit rights is the increase in government revenue, as properties 
with secured rights are charged property taxes that are a revenue to the government. But 
government revenue increase indirectly from the growth of the businesses that are stimulated 
by the secured rights, which increase the tax base. 
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5.4.2.1.2 Property Rights in Tanzania 
The FGFSR did not pay much attention to the issue of property rights. Up to 2007, 
property rights were not adequately settled and the system of property registry was not very 
efficient as noted by Rabenhorst & Butler (2007, p. 9). So high in the agenda of SGFSR was 
the issues of improving regulations regarding property rights, as well as providing those rights 
to the holders of land by registering the unregistered properties (Rabenhorst & Butler, 2007). 
The system that was existing at that time was of issuing and maintaining paper documents (title 
certificates) in the registries. The system was labour intensive, and sometimes lacked personnel, 
while archival facilities were poor and inefficient (Rabenhorst & Butler, 2007, p. 9). There was 
also inadequate orientation toward customer service, and most of the activities had to be 
approved by the Ministry of Land in Dar es Salaam, i.e. there was a high degree of 
centralization. This caused delays in processing the documents, and in the case of mortgage 
formation, delays in retrieving the stored documents. 
Before the reforms land tenure in Tanzania was in the form of a right of occupancy and 
leasehold. There was no freehold system. The primary legislation governing land ownership 
was the Land Act, No.  4 of 1999 as well as the Village Act No. 5 of 1999. Under the Land Act, 
there were several categories of land but the most relevant was the general land. The right of 
occupancy or leasehold of the general land was under the authority of the Commissioner for 
Lands. Village land, on the other hand, was under the administration of the village authorities 
and when offered for occupancy or lease, certificate of title could be granted by these authorities 
to the holder. 
Just after the FSAP, IMF Country Report No. 03/238 highlighted the importance of 
strengthening property rights in Tanzania. Specifically, IMF reports: 
The comparative absence of long term credit is often blamed on the Land Act of 1999, 
which may have shifted the balance of protection away from the lender to the borrower. 
There has been continuous pressure from the banks for extensive changes in this law to 
allow them to secure lending on landed property with greater assurance. It is unlikely 
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that much expansion of longer term finance can be expected without some amendments 
to the law, though such amendments will not be a panacea.  (IMF, 2003a) 
World Bank (2003) had specifically mentioned the possibility of collateralization, 
foreclosure and consent of spouse to be the critical impediments to lending. In the meantime, 
even during the FSAP there were efforts to make reviews in the Legal and Judicial sector to 
enable them to facilitate the growing and efficient functioning of the private sector in Tanzania. 
Work was already being done through the BEST program that was funded by DANIDA, DFID, 
SIDA and the Government of the Netherlands. So by the time the FSAP came with the 
recommendations on the 10th of July 2003, even before the Inter Institutional Financial Sector 
Reform Council was established (established in March 2003), the Principal Secretary of the 
Ministry of Finance was already talking of the implementation of reform agenda: 
To remove the remaining impediments in the development of the financial sector, 
amendments to the Land Act, which continues to hamper the use of land as collateral 
will be presented to the Parliament in October 2003. Before that the proposed draft 
amendments will be reviewed jointly by the Ministry of Lands, the Attorney General 
Chamber, the BOT and the Tanzania Bankers’ Association, to ensure that they are 
consistent with the Government objective of increasing access to bank credit by much 
wider range of population. (Ministry of Finance, 2013,  para. 31) 
In this way, I am of the position that the spirit of the SGFSR (focus on upgrading the 
institutional qualities) was already existing even before the formal launch of the programs that 
came under the official name of the SGFSR. On the 20th of October 2003 the Land  
(Amendment) Bill, 2003 was submitted to the Parliament for the first reading, approved in 
February 2004, published in the Government Gazette No. 42 Vol. 84, and was assented to by 
the President on 30th March 2004 (IMF, 2004).  
Regarding the property rights, the amendments sought to simplify the procedures for 
registration and titling of the landed property. These amendments were “a result of sustained 
pressure from the banks to the legislators to allow them of secured lending on landed property 
with greater assurance” (IMF, 2003a). In the Land (Amendment) Act 2004, the right of 
ownership of land is recognised both statutory and customary as explained by Urbansolutions 
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(2012). The Act states clearly that interest in land has value, and anybody occupying land (even 
under customary law) is liable of compensation both for the loss of interest in the land and for 
other losses and provides for the possibility of transferring land from one category to another. 
(URT, 2004)  
Urbansolutions (2012) summarizes the content of the Land (Ammendment) Act 2004 that 
it is the principal legislation on land matters. The Act covers the underlying legislation 
surrounding mortgates in Tanzania under Chapter X of the Act. That land in Tanzania is public 
land and remain vested in the President as the trustee for and on behalf of all citizens of 
Tanzania. The Act also divides Public Land into three categories: The general land24, the village 
land25 and the reserve land26. There is a provision in the Act that clearly defined the mechanism 
of transferring land from one category to another. Emphasis is put on the fact that interest in 
land has value, and that value is to be taken into consideration in any transaction affecting that 
interest (Urbansolutions, 2012). 
Land Act 1999 moved to legally secure customary rights. Under this Act, customary 
rights are given equal status to granted rights of occupancy. The Village Land Act provides for 
the possibility to acquire written and registered documentation of customary land rights (Willy 
, 2003). 
5.4.2.1.3 Formalization of Land Ownership 
The problem of dead capital was one of the barriers to access finance. Dead capital is 
unregistered land and the assets that are attached to it. It is called dead capital because of the 
                                                 
24 All land that is not reserved land or village land is general land, but includes also unoccupied or unused village 
land. See Urbansolutions (2012, p.14) 
25 All land belonging to registered villages, land demarcated and agreed to as village land by relevant village 
councils and land that villages have been occupying and using as village land for 12 or more years under customary 
law is known as village land. See Urbansolutions (2012, p. 14) 
26 All land protected by law, or designated land such as national parks, land for public utilities (highways and those 
under the Town and Country Planning Ordinance), wildlife reserves and land classified as hazardous, which 
designates land whose development would pose a hazard to the environment (e.g river banks or mangrove swamps) 
is known as Protected Land. See Urbansolutions (2012, p. 14) 
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loss of opportunities to the holder such as using it as collateral and even selling it at market 
price (De Soto, 2000). 
Given the magnitude of the problem, it was not realistic that measures to formalize 
property rights in Tanzania would cover the whole country in a short period of time. 
5.4.2.2 Land Registry Modernization 
First Generation of Financial Sector Reforms did not cover issues of Land Registry. In 
the preparation of the documents for the SGFSR, a review of the prevailing condition of the 
registry at the time was done, to reveal some major weaknesses. It was reported that  
There was a lack of efficient and transparent land registration system leading to 
corruption and/or fraudulent land transactions. This is manifested by rampant forged or 
fake title deeds offered to banking and financial institutions as security for loans. (Bank 
of Tanzania, 2007b, p. 80)  
Also the national land registration databank was non-electronic and not well-coordinated. 
On the contrary, the procedures of registration were slow and antiquated leading to delays in 
registration of titles (URT, 2013, p. 32). Also processing recommendation for financing to 
mortgage issuers was taking too long because of the slow procedure of searching through and 
retrieving the manually kept documents in the registry (Bank of Tanzania, 2007b; URT, 2013, 
pp. 32-33) 
The Committee that prepared the agenda for the SGFSR felt that there was a need to 
modernise and link (network) land registries in the country to avoid multiple registration and 
multi-titling of the same property (Bank of Tanzania, 2007b) 
So the agenda of SGFSR in the issues connected with land registry was made in an 
attempt to address the weaknesses in the land legislation that continued to constrain the financial 
sector development. In the program document we find that the objective of addressing the land 
issues in the SGFSR is to “introduce and promote an efficient and harmonious legal and judicial 
infrastructure for collateralization of land and settlement of land disputes” (Bank of Tanzania, 
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2007a, p. 147). The four activities that are mentioned are: to strengthen a mechanism for 
adjudication of land disputes27, to modernise the land registries28 and land title registry and 
search services to reduce the time lag in registering land titles29,  and resolve the Land Act 
issues relating to granting of credit30. The main activity connected to the Land Act issues was 
to amend the land regulation, to remove impediments to land-related collateralization. 
In the letter of intent to the Managing Director of IMF dated 10th July 2003, the Minister 
of Finance showed that plans were underway to computerise and improve the land registry 
(Ministry of Finance Tanzania, 2003, para. 31 ). The Government Roadmap on the 
Improvement of the Investment Climate in Tanzania shows the establishment  of Land 
Registration and Land Information System at the headquarters, six Zonal Offices and in all 
districts to be the major short term and long term agenda (URT, 2013, p. 42). The work of 
designing the system had already been completed by the consultants - Cowi A/S and Orgut 
Consulting AB. The work of procurement of contractors for supplying equipment and installing 
them in place, as well as the training of operators was underway (URT, 2013, pp. 42-43) 
Another important step was the preparation of the Strategic Plan for the Implementation 
of the Land Act, in which strategic principles and priority areas and activities, together with the 
time frame for their implementation for 10 years (2005-2014) were clearly delineated. The 
priority was on the update and, where necessary, amendments of existing laws and policies to 
enhance access to land by investors (titling and registration laws). (Urbansolutions, 2012). 
5.4.2.3 Land Titling 
The development of mortgage finance, needed amendments of some legislations related 
to land administration. The issues of registration and titling were important for the development 
                                                 
27 Bank of Tanzania, 2007a, p. 147 
28 Bank of Tanzania, 2007a, p. 148 
29 Bank of Tanzania, 2007a, p. 150 
30 Bank of Tanzania, 2007a, p. 149 
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of mortgage market, and were already considered in the Land (Amendment) Act 2004, and the 
Strategic Plan for Implementation of Land Law (SPILL) had this as the important emphasis 
(Urbansolutions, 2012).  
There was also a move to create incentives to Housing Development Companies to build 
affordable housing to the majority of the people, while utilising the land more efficiently and 
facilitating access to the home owners of the services. The incentives were to be created by 
removing barriers that were holding back estate developers from constructing apartments for 
selling to several owners at the same time (Rabenhorst & Butler, 2007). It was then necessary 
to consider the creation of a law that would facilitate registration of apartments and give more 
securities to lenders. So the SGFSR started the process of setting the regulations enabling the 
estate developers to construct high buildings with a big number of flats (or units) and sell each 
unit to different buyers, with each unit owner eligible to get a title deed after completing the 
sale agreement. (Urbansolutions, 2012; World Bank, 2010, p. 3). Mortgage Finance (Special 
Provisions) Act 2008 provided for the management of the division of buildings into units, 
clusters, blocks and sections owned individually or co owned. It is a way forward in creating 
incentives towards property development, as well as mortgage finance market. 
Interests of third parties in the mortgaged properties was another serious barrier to the 
development of mortgage market. Chapter X of the 2004 Land Act amended the earlier 
regulation that had the provision of foreclosure by the power of sale, and added an exception to 
it where residential properties could only be foreclosed through judicial enforcement process. 
The 2004 amendment intended to protect individual borrowers and their families from banks 
eager to take their matrimonial homes at default. The presence of this provision was a 
disincentive to lenders as it made the enforcement of contracts more difficult, involving long 
and expensive litigation process. This, in effect, works against the borrower in the long run, as 
the number of lenders to enter the market would be reduced, competition will also decline, and 
interest rates will have to be higher. So in 2008 Mortgage Finance (Special Provisions) Act, the 
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non-judicial mortgage enforcement procedure was restored. Another important contribution of 
the Mortgage Finance (Special Provisions) Act no 17 of 2008 was the clear stipulation of the 
only reasons that provides for a possibility of a court to deny a foreclosure claim: i) if the loan 
has been paid and ii) if the loan was never taken. The new law does not entertain the Spousal 
Consent for matrimonial home loophole used before by many to prevent foreclosing (World 
Bank, 2010, p. 3).  
Heavy penalties were introduced for those intending to abuse the spousal consent for 
matrimonial home to block foreclosure. According to Mortgage Finance (Special Provisions) 
Act no 17 of 2008, not to disclose a spouse when mortgaging a home is now a criminal offence 
and one could be sentenced to pay half of the loan amount as fine, or go to jail for up to 12 
months in case of being found guilty of such offence (World Bank, 2010, p. 3). 
5.4.3 Legal and Judicial Reforms 
In the previous section some reforms were mentioned that have connection with land laws 
and their enforcement. In this section we concentrate on the functioning of the judiciary, 
especially in the issues of commercial dispute resolution and the enforcement of contracts. Here 
also we admit from the outset that there were plenty of reforms already done prior to 2003 when 
the agenda of the SGFSR was being set. The FSAP highlighted the need to strengthen the 
commercial court by providing it with the required resources and building its capacity.  
This study is going to begin by linking the ongoing reforms with the agenda of the SGFSR 
and proceed to see what was actually done in the SGFSR. 
5.4.3.1 Commercial Court 
Soon after the liberalization of the economy of Tanzania in 1986, the business community 
both domestic and international were lobbying for the creation of a specialized commercial 
court. After the BFIA 1991, when the new foreign banks entered the Tanzanian market, 
international investors, who had acquired shares of the newly privatized banks and other 
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business firms, added their support to the commercial court. They needed a swifter judicial 
mechanism for recovering their debts. (Finnegan, 2004) 
Finnegan (2005) argues that the existing courts were not very efficient in resolving the 
commercial disputes. In the first place, some members of the judiciary lacked a sound 
understanding of applicable commercial laws and legal principles. Sometimes these members 
of the judiciary were required to handle cases involving commercial disputes, resulting into less 
efficient and less effective commercial dispute resolution. A specialized commercial court 
would address that weakness. He also noted that there were widespread cases of poor 
management of cases and corruption, which could have come about as a result of low levels of 
remuneration within the judiciary and the lack of adequate physical infrastructure because of 
inadequately funded operating budgets. Another problem that Finnegan (2005) noted was the 
loopholes given by the Civil Procedure code, which entertained casual adjournments and 
temporary injunctions, which in turn increased the delays and compounded the backlog 
problem. Finnegan (2005) gives a concrete example that a sample of commercial cases filed in 
1997 revealed that 56% of them were still pending and had yet to be resolved as of December 
2000, and of the 44% of cases that had been resolved took an average of more than 15 months. 
So due to those challenges, during the early 1990s the government convened a task force 
to identify areas of legal sector that required reforms in order to bring the legal system in closer 
conformity to the functioning of the market economy. One of the recommendations adopted by 
the task force was the creation of a specialized court to hear commercial and financial cases. 
This recommendation was accepted at the highest level of the government and was formally 
approved in 1997 (Finnegan, 2004). 
From 1998, The Danish Overseas Development Agency (DANIDA), took a specific 
interest in the commercial court project. DANIDA provided financial assistance for the 
establishment of the court, including the training of the court staff, refurbishment of the 
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permanent Commercial Court building and the provision of equipment and supplies (Finnegan, 
2004) 
The Commercial court of Tanzania started operations as one of three divisions of the High 
Court of Tanzania in September 1999 (URT, 2010). The aim of establishing it was to put in 
place a specialized court which would cater for the business community by resolving the 
commercial disputes efficiently and effectively. This was necessary in the prevailing situation 
of liberalization and privatizations (URT, 2010; Finnegan, 2004)  
There was a need among the business community as well as the investors both domestic 
and foreign, for a court that would effectively, efficiently and speedily resolve 
commercial disputes that were to emerge in the wake of the expanded business and 
commercial activities. The commercial court came as a result of privatizations that came 
by (URT, 2010). 
5.4.3.1.1 The Focus of Commercial Court Tanzania 
From its inception, the Commercial Court of Tanzania targeted to handle cases of 
commercial significance. These included cases involving the formation and governance of 
business firms, the contractual relationship of firms, the restructuring or payment of commercial 
debts, the liabilities arising out of a firm’s business activities etc. (Finnegan, 2004). However, 
commercial court subject matter is not exclusive, instead, the court shares the jurisdiction over 
commercial matter concurrently with the general division of the high court. In the first three 
years of operations, the court had a pecuniary jurisdiction over cases involving amounts of 
controversy of at least TZS 10 million, which was later raised to TZS 100 million in 2002. The 
commercial court charges a higher filing fee. In this way it is viewed to be prohibitively 
expensive to small businesses (Finnegan, 2004). 
Finnegan (2004) noted that the majority of cases filed with the commercial court involved 
debt recovery claims or other type of contract dispute, and the businesses that lead in filing the 
cases in the commercial court were the banks. 
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5.4.3.1.2 Assessment of the Performance of Commercial Court prior to SGFSR 
Commercial courts managed to handle the cases more efficiently and speedily. In the first 
four years cases took an average of 4 to 5 months to be resolved, compared to 4 to 5 years for 
commercial cases at the High Court general division. (Finnegan, 2004) 
“Expectation from the business community is very high”. Lord Justice Bwana (2006) 
noted this when he said “bankers expect courts to act justly, effectively and speedily in 
disposing of cases. They expect this to be done by adhering to the highest judicial ethics and 
observing a sense of responsibilities to the society” (Bwana, 2006). It is against this background 
that the challenges that still remaining will be pointed out. 
5.4.3.1.3 Challenges of Commercial Courts to be addressed by SGFSR. 
Lord Justice Steven Bwana noted that: 
It had become frustrating in the sense that debt recovery was a time consuming process. 
Debtors used courts to obtain orders which delayed liability or the execution process. 
Injunctions were misused and overstretched even beyond their legally recognised limits. 
Once an injunction was obtained by the debtor against the financial institution, nothing 
else was forthcoming. In so doing, banks and other financial institutions ability to lend 
money to other borrowers became frustrated. In brief, while the rest of the country was 
forging ahead economically, the courts of law were used to frustrate those efforts. That 
was wrong. The law institutions, especially the courts, should become principal tools for 
the promotion of business growth. In order to be so, it is my view, that law and the courts 
in particular must move faster and be more responsive to social or business change. The 
courts, which interpret the law, should not only frustrate those positive changes in society 
but they should also not remain static while everything else moves on. Courts must 
develop and adopt themselves to the signs of time in society. (Bwana, 2006, p. 3) 
Bwana (2006) in the quote above is referring to the issues of injunctions, adjournments, 
execution or failure of court orders by court brokers, being indifferent as to the effect of their 
actions to the economic development of the country. These were still there even after the 
establishment of the commercial court and were still acting as barriers to the expansion of the 
financial sector. 
But although the court is to take most of the blame for that, there are situations whereby 
the work of the court is made difficult by some laxity on the side of the banks in handling their 
contracts. Bwana (2006 p.4) talks of this laxity “there should be professionalism in handling 
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lending contracts right from the stage of drafting them”. He continues to elaborate that “the 
banks should use proper contract documents. They should also ensure that security 
documentation is regularized, and verify the value of property pledged and the status of the 
spouses in the case of matrimonial homes”. Finnegan (2005) sums up these problems of due 
diligence by banks by pointing out that: first that some flaws are created (by the lender) during 
the granting of the loans and in the prosecution process, second borrowers/spouses capitalize 
on the flaws so created and third the provisions of the law – which seems to lean on borrowers 
favour but unfairly against the lenders – allow such capitalization. Finnegan (2005) also 
emphasized that sometimes the lack of due diligence is of high degree to the extent that 
securities are incompatible (of very low value) with the facilities extended. 
Though the commercial court so established helped in improving the commercial dispute 
resolution mechanism in Tanzania, there were still much to be done to improve contract 
enforcement. That is why the first objective of the SGFSR is to “improve access to financial 
services as a result of better lending environment and efficient legal and judicial infrastructure” 
(Bank of Tanzania, 2007a, p. 21). Also the very first key priority area of the SGFSR is defined 
to be Legal and Judicial Reform. Among the activities involved were to improve the facilities 
for land and housing tribunals and to strengthen the existing commercial courts and enhance 
their efficiency and establish commercial court in Zanzibar. (Bank of Tanzania, 2007a, pp. 23-
26). 
5.5 Reforms in the Contractual Saving Institutions 
In Tanzania, the major contractual savings institutions are the pension funds followed by 
the insurance companies. They are important component of the financial sector because they 
are the biggest customers of the commercial banking in terms of deposits, and also the leading 
holders of the government securities. Moreover, in a country which is experiencing acute 
shortage of long term financing, they could provide part of the solution, because the maturities 
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of their contracts are typically long term, and so it could be easier to match those deposits with 
long term finance, that is so crucial for the economic growth (World Bank, 2006b, pp. 31-32). 
The SGFSR, realised the importance of these contractual saving institutions, and included 
them in objectives 7: “To promote an efficient and competitive pension sector responsive to 
market demands and supported by appropriate legal regulatory structures”, and objective 8: “to 
promote an efficient, sound and competitive insurance industry with different products and 
wider outreach and market based investment policies” (Bank of Tanzania, 2007a). So two out 
of 10 objectives were dedicated to the contractual savings financial institutions. Stability of 
these contractual savings institutions is very important, as they are the major provider of 
liquidity to the commercial banking institutions, as well as the leading holders of the 
government securities. This work is interested in the nature of reforms in the pension funds and 
insurance companies, due to their importance in the stability of the financial system. The nature 
of their investment policies is also important, so this section is interested on the changes in these 
policies due to their effect on the availability of long term finance. 
5.5.1 Regulatory Reforms of Pension Funds 
The initial study done by the SGFSR on the pension funds observed the fact that the 
pension funds were “excessively liquid and heavily weighted to government securities” (Bank 
of Tanzania, 2007a, p. 111). So it was deemed necessary to develop an appropriate legal and 
regulatory framework for the pension funds and to provide for the possibility of establishment 
of the private sector pension funds. The major focus of the reform was to harmonise the rules, 
legislation and procedures governing all the pension funds, and to allow for the portability of 
benefits across the pension funds. In addition to that, the reforms provided a unified legal and 
regulatory framework. The SGFSR also put in place the framework for supervising the pension 
funds which paved way for the establishment of the Social Securities Regulatory Authority 
(SSRA) and the commencement of its activities. 
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In 2006, M/S Cadogan Financials (US based financial consultant firm) was hired to draft 
various policy options for reforming the pension sector. In October 2006 M/S Cadogan 
Financials presented their findings to the government for review and policy formulation (Bank 
of Tanzania, 2007c).  
The reform agenda was guided by the fact that Social security is a right stated in article 
22 of the UN Declaration of Human rights of 10th December 1948, and article 11(1) of the 
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, which states: 
The state authority shall make appropriate provisions for the realisation of a person’s 
right to work, self-education and social welfare at times of old age, sickness and disability 
and in other cases of incapacity … (URT, 1977, Article 11[1]) 
However, apart for such a right being provided for in the constitution the reality on ground 
is different. In 2006, social security covered only 5.4% of the labour force (then estimated at 
16 million), with the informal sector labour mostly excluded, as well as most of the 
disadvantaged groups (Bank of Tanzania, 2007b, p. 40). 
Even for those included, the benefits provided to them “were not adequate to meet the 
beneficiaries’ basic needs” (Bank of Tanzania, 2007b, p. 41), and so there was an urgent 
necessity of reviewing the number and magnitude of benefits as well as to introduce indexation 
of current levels of earnings (Bank of Tanzania, 2007b, p. 41). 
It was also observed that the benefits of the existing pension funds were not portable when 
members move from one fund to another, or to other countries in the East African Community. 
This is due to lack of uniformity of legislations, operational rules and procedures. Sometimes 
this implied that members had to lose their rights when they had to move (Bank of Tanzania, 
2007b, p. 41). 
It was also observed that different pension funds were under different ministries, 
governed by different rules and procedures that brought about conflict in administration. The 
PSPF, GEPF PPF and ZSSF were under the Ministry of Finance; while NSSF was under the 
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Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and LAPF under the Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Administration. On top of that, there was no common regulator in place, and no 
common coordinator of the activities of the funds (Bank of Tanzania, 2007b, pp. 41,43). 
Another important area of reform was investment policy. Here the issue uniformity of 
asset allocation to different sectors across the different funds, which up to the time of reforms 
differed from one fund to another was considered an important reform agenda. It was 
considered important to reform the regulations such that all be governed by a set of uniform 
investment policies regarding asset allocation. It was observed also that there was a need to 
widen the investment horizon so as to boost the investment returns and reduce risks (Bank of 
Tanzania, 2007b).  
Since pension funds manage contracts which are long term in nature, and at the same time 
there was an acute shortage of long term financing in the financial system, adjustment of 
investment policies to enable the pension funds to contribute to the improvement of the position 
of long term finance, which is important for growth and poverty alleviation (Bank of Tanzania, 
2007b). 
It was also important to introduce flexibility in pension management. Up to the time of 
SFGSR, pensions were being adjusted on ad hoc basis, and so there was a need to introduce 
indexation, which systematically adjust the pensions to the cost of living and inflation (Bank of 
Tanzania, 2007b).  
Another important issue for reforms was the inclusion of regular actuarial valuations in 
the management of the pension funds. At the time of SGFSR, actuarial valuations were done at 
the interval of three to five years, and were conducted by external experts. It was deemed 
important to conduct those valuation more frequently, and to build the capacity of internal 
experts to conduct them, even at the level of the supervisory authority (Bank of Tanzania, 
2007b). 
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There was also a need to construct a new supervisory and regulatory framework, to 
achieve uniformity in the practices of the different pension funds, and this was important as the 
plan to introduce of private pension funds could only be realised once there is a regulatory 
framework in place. The new regulation were expected to embrace the above mentioned 
challenges such as inadequacy of benefits, coordination, and transferability of the benefits and 
internal governance of the funds as well.  
Another important issue is that of governance. The review found out that there were not 
sufficient specifications of the composition of the board, especially on how to select the 
members. The choice of members was arbitrary, and though effort was made to ensure inclusion 
of major stakeholder groups, sometimes it was not realised. But more important is the 
representation in the Board meetings of the associations of pension fund professionals (Bank 
of Tanzania, 2007b). 
 The process of reviewing resulted into a draft of the National Social Security Bill, which 
was submitted to the parliament in February 2008 for first reading. The major issue in the bill 
was the establishment of the Social Security Regulatory Authority (hereinafter SSRA) (Bank 
of Tanzania, 2008). The bill was passed by the parliament and became the Social Securities Act 
2008, in June 2008. As already mentioned above, the Act provided for the establishment of the 
SSRA, which was to be vested with the responsibilities of regulating and supervising the 
pension sector in the mainland Tanzania (Ministry of Finance Tanzania, 2011, para. 40). In 
November 2008, the Social Securities Act became effective, and the SSRA was officially 
established as a regulator of the pension funds in Tanzania mainland and the issuer of 
investment guidelines, while the BOT was given the power to supervise the financial matters 
of the fund (Bank of Tanzania, 2009). However, it was only in September 2010 that the SSRA 
started to operate, with the appointment of the first CEO (Ministry of Finance Tanzania, 2011). 
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The SSRA started implementing its task by registering the existing social security funds 
as per section 8 of the Social Securities Act 2008, and introduced immediately a regulatory 
oversight over the registered funds (Ministry of Finance Tanzania, 2011). 
The SSRA also did an actuarial valuation of the existing funds, with the aim of informing 
the further necessary policy decisions, including investment guidelines (Ministry of Finance 
Tanzania, 2011). In the actuarial audits conducted, some public pension funds were found to 
have actuarial deficits31, and were deemed unsustainable due to a combination of low returns 
in investment and the generous benefit packages (World Bank, 2013b). 
In March 2012 the SSRA issued investment guidelines for the pension funds, which 
addressed the issues of returns on investments as well as the extent to which the benefits were 
reasonable. The aim is to boost returns in investment, while assuring the possibility of meeting 
the reasonable benefit payments (IMF, 2012a, p. 44 para. 50). But at the same time, the pension 
funds saw an opportunity to contribute in the promotion of long term finance, since most of the 
contracts are long term, so it is easy to match them with long term assets. During the reform 
period it is useful to note that, intensive training was given to the staff of SSRA to build the 
capacity for the fulfilment of the duties of supervising and regulating the pension funds, as well 
as to be able to conduct actuarial analysis (World Bank, 2006a). 
So the SGFSR introduced the SSRA with the duty to supervise and regulate the pension 
funds, at the same time the SGFSR paved ways to the issuing of new investment guidelines to 
ensure reasonable returns leading to reasonable benefits for the members. The SGFSR also 
identified the pension funds as one of the important sources of long term finance, and 
incorporated in the investment guidelines the issues of long term investment. 
                                                 
31 The results of the actuarial evaluation of the five mainland pension funds (PSPF, LAPF, NSSF, GEPF and PPF) 
were released by the government in April 2013 and revealed that PSPF was not actuarially sound. This was 
consistent with the independent actuarial report funded by the FSP. 
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5.5.2 Regulatory Reforms of Insurance Sector 
As mentioned above, the eighth objective of the SGFSR was to “promote an efficient, 
sound and competitive insurance industry with different products and wider outreach and 
market based investment policies” (Bank of Tanzania, 2007a, p. 21).  
It is worth noting that the insurance sector was liberalized in 1996 by the issuing of the 
Insurance Act Cap. 394 of 1996, which, among other things, established a supervisory authority 
of the Insurance sector The Insurance Supervisory Department under the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Affairs.  
In the FSAP 2003, the committee responsible for reforms in the insurance sector observed 
that there was an need to address challenges in the following major area: to revise the 
supervisory functions of the insurance sector, to adopt an active and coordinated  approach to 
corporate governance, to revise the investment policy and to boost the public confidence (IMF, 
2003b). 
With regard to supervisory functions, FSAP observed that the existing system was 
enforcing compliance through legislative and administrative measures such as the on-site 
inspection (Bank of Tanzania, 2007b). This system was deemed to be rigid, costly and time 
consuming, especially in the practices of on-site-inspections 
It was also observed that the investment policies of the different pension funds were too 
restrictive as shown by Bank of Tanzania (2007b): 
Table 4: Investment Policy of Social Security Funds 
S/N Investment Type Proportion of Total Assets 
1 Government Securities 20% 
2 Bank Deposits 30% 
3 Statutory deposits at BOT 50% 
   
Source: Bank of Tanzania (2007b) 
106 
 
It has to be noted that such policy was set in 1998 as a prudent measure in the initial stages 
of the liberalized marketplace, hence it was more protective. But after some years of the 
presence of the private sector, it was felt that there was a need of reviewing it, due to the fact 
that most of the insurance companies have achieved stronger stability, and have built strong 
positions in reserves and shareholders’ funds, and so the position of liquidity was very good for 
meeting the payment claims. A new and more urgent challenge, however, was to boost the 
investment returns, because the premia included only a thin risk premium and claims were 
increasing whereas the investment policy was still very cautious and too risk averse (Bank of 
Tanzania, 2007a). 
In the agenda that was finally adopted, reform in the insurance sector was also included. 
Areas in which the SGFSR sought to reform the insurance sector include the revising of 
important legislations governing the sector, and ultimately to make amendment to the Insurance 
Act (Bank of Tanzania, 2007a, p. 50). There was a felt need to move towards risk based 
supervision, and hence it was necessary to build the capacity for that, including installation of 
the necessary IT infrastructure, and the knowhow of handling the supervision software (Bank 
of Tanzania, 2007a, p. 51).  
Other important aspects include the preparation for legal and regulatory framework for 
the participation of banks in the insurance business. In addition to that there was a need to 
strengthen public confidence in the insurance industry by revisiting professional indemnity 
limits for intermediaries and create an effective and quick redressing mechanisms for the 
insuring public, and speedy settlement of insurance disputes (Bank of Tanzania, 2007a, p. 52). 
The SGFSR, in developing the framework for long term financing, found out that the 
insurance companies could provide part of the solution to this problem, as the nature of most 
insurance products were of long term maturity. Since long term financing, which is crucial for 
long term growth, is still very limited in Tanzania, and since most of the assets provided by the 
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banking sector are of short term duration, and since the capital markets for shares and bonds 
are not well developed, possibilities from insurance companies as well as pension funds could 
alleviate this problem. So a revised investment policy for the insurance companies as well as 
for pension funds could provide the much needed boost to long term finance (Bank of Tanzania, 
2007a). 
So, eleven years after the enactment of the act in 2007, the process of enacting a new Act 
started and came to completion in April 2009 when a new Insurance Act No. 10 of 2009 was 
enacted. Among the changes brought by the Insurance Act No. 10 of 2009, was the 
establishment of the Tanzania Insurance Regulatory Authority32. The regulatory authority was 
given more powers than the former Insurance Supervisory Department, which was more 
advisory than functional (TIRA, 2010). Also the Act provided that the functioning of TIRA was 
to be independent of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the top leaders of the authority are 
now appointed by the President, and not the minister as before the Act (TIRA, 2010). Another 
important change is the inclusion in the Board of the representation from insurance professional 
bodies such as the ATI, TIBA and TIAA. Prior to the Act members of the Board were chosen 
according to the discretion of the Minister. The new Act has established a special quasi-court 
tribunal, under the leadership of a senior lawyer (of the level of a High Court Judge), to deal 
with disputes between policy holders and insurers on issues related to their contracts (TIRA, 
2010). In connection with that, an Appeals Tribunal was established by the Act.  
5.6 Addressing the Problem of Long Term Finance 
The FSAP report noted that there was an “absence of a framework that facilitate long-
term development financing targeting infrastructure and basic service provision which would 
propel growth and economic development” (Bank of Tanzania, 2007b, p. 83) . So far, such 
investments had been funded by the Government Budgetary allocations as well as donor 
                                                 
32 Section 5 of The Insurance Act No. 10 of 2009 provides for the establishment of the regulatory authority. 
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support. Donors, however, have their preferences, and so only those projects preferred by 
donors get funded. Moreover, due to funding sources, there is inadequate participation of local 
stakeholders, those who are actually most affected by the projects. In addition to that, there is 
no market-based transparency in the provision of long term development finance. 
In the pre FGFSR period, CRDB was specializing in development finance for rural areas, 
TIB was also dedicated to promote long term investment by funding those investments, and 
THB was giving housing finance, which is long term finance too. TDFL was also no longer 
effective in long term financing (Bank of Tanzania, 2007b, p. 83). 
So after the implementation of FGFSR, the FSAP assessed that there was “a vacuum in 
the long-term development financing” (Bank of Tanzania, 2007b, p. 83). The report continued 
that the institutions that were created for that purpose were “lacking a sustainable framework” 
(Bank of Tanzania, 2007b, p. 83) 
The FSAP assessed also that the financing needs were increasing with “the increasing of 
Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs), and the expansion of the industrial sector” (Bank 
of Tanzania, 2007b, p. 84). The need of a better infrastructure for the expansion of the economic 
activities such as better roads, good communication network, reliable power supply, clean and 
water supply was growing too, whereas the financing available was mostly short term. 
The private sector financial institutions were mainly commercial banks, which in the case 
of Tanzania were faced with problems of maturity mismatch in their attempts to contribute to 
the provision of long term finance. The biggest non-bank financial institutions are in the 
business of insurance and pension sectors. Both insurance companies and pension sectors 
contribute very little in the provision of long term finance although the maturity of their 
liabilities are mainly of long-term nature and could very well be matched with long-term assets 
such as loans and other long term financing. 
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So FSAP felt a need for preparing a framework that would facilitate the increase in the 
provision of long term finance by financial institutions in the private sector. Three issues were 
important, and all are issues pointed out by the new institutional economists to be necessary. It 
was necessary to establish and improve property rights, to strengthen contract enforcement 
mechanisms and remove loopholes of information asymmetries, and finally to make the 
macroeconomic conditions supportive of long term finance (IMF, 2003b). 
5.6.1 Property Rights and Long term Finance 
In the issues of property right for long term finance, the SGFSR had to address the issue 
of land delivery systems, to modernise the land registry together with its searching and 
retrieving of records, and to improve the legal framework supporting mortgage financing, and 
condominium laws. 
5.6.1.1 Land Delivery System 
This is a system that connects the servicing of residential land by the government, to 
provide roads, water supply and electricity while demarcating the plots to be allocated for 
building purposes, then giving the property developers opportunity to construct residential 
houses for selling them to the public, and finally connecting the property developers to the 
financial institutions that will enable the individuals and households to take possession of the 
residential home, while paying for it using mortgage financing (Tanzania Bankers Association, 
2010, p. 9).  
This system was lacking, but it is very important. Recent reforms discussed in section 
5.4.2 of this work have provided for the possibility of such arrangements. 
5.6.1.2 Legal Framework Supporting Mortgage financing 
SGFSR resulted into the Mortgage Financing Act of 2008. In the act, the property rights 
of an individual purchasing a house and creating a mortgage were clearly defined vis a vis third 
parties (spouses included). In the new regulation, it is a criminal offence not to disclose the 
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presence of spouse for a home for which a mortgage is created, and in case of violation, a fine 
of half the value of the mortgage could be charged or an imprisonment of up to one year could 
be sentenced upon the offender (URT, 2008, p. 5, para. 8). 
Also SGFSR made some amendments to the civil procedure code to remove the loopholes 
used by lawyers for making delaying tactics when contracts are to be enforced. 
5.6.1.3 Condominium Laws 
These are rules governing the relationship of parties who hold land horizontally (Tanzania 
Bankers Association, 2010, p. 9). They are very useful in the development of housing and 
mortgage markets in urban areas, because they provide incentive for developers to build flats 
and apartments needed by the medium and lower end population, also useful in the case of 
scarcity of land (Rabenhorst & Butler, 2007, p. 11). Condominium laws were introduced in 
Tanzania in 2008, by the Unit Titles Act No.18 of 2008. Paragraphs 8 to 11 provide legislation 
on the registration of the units and paragraphs 19 to 27 establish the rights of the owners of 
those properties (URT, 2008a). The law also provided for the formation of association of 
owners to manage and maintain the common property of the building. 
5.6.2 Role of Insurance Companies and Social Security Schemes 
In the agenda of the SGFSR, these contractual savings institutions were given high 
attention. In section 5.5 of this work analysis was made in what actually happened in these 
sectors as to the reforms. One of the important aspects of the reforms in this section was to 
provide for the possibility of long term investments. In 2012, the BOT published the Social 
Security Schemes investment Guidelines, which were made in accordance with the Social 
Security Act of 2008 and included the maximum of 40% of total assets to be invested in long 
term debt (commercial paper, promissory notes and corporate bonds), up to a maximum of 30% 
to be invested in licensed collective investment scheme (Bank of Tanzania, 2012). Thus another 
source of long term investment has come forth. 
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5.6.3 Lease Finance in Tanzania 
Leasing is a medium term financing technique for the procurement of machinery, 
equipment, vehicles and properties. It is a complementary form of financing, and is a good 
alternative to the traditional long term bank loans. It is good because it increases a company’s 
ability to source financing, and is suitable for small and medium enterprises that lack collateral 
to access traditional forms of finance. 
Efforts to develop lease finance in Tanzania were pioneered by Tanzania Lease Project, 
which is the initiative by the government of Tanzania, in collaboration with the IFC and the 
government of Tanzania to empower Tanzanians to participate in the economy by having more 
possibilities of financing (World Bank, 2005). In 2005 the initiative conducted a study of the 
leasing market in Tanzania, with a view of profiling the leasing industry in Tanzania, and 
identify critical issues for the growth and development of the industry. In the April-July 2005 
study, three major obstacles to the growth of lease finance were identified to be, one is the 
absence of leasing legal framework and the connected issues of enforcement of lease contracts 
and repossession of leased assets, two was the inadequate tax incentives for leasing and three 
the lack of public awareness of the opportunities for lease finance (World Bank, 2005, pp. 1-
2). In August 2005 a discussion was held between the World Bank, commercial banks, 
equipment and vehicles suppliers, the TRA, CMSA and other stakeholders to discuss issues of 
feasibility of lease finance in Tanzania. 
The ultimate aim was to introduce and develop lease finance in Tanzania. In actual fact, 
the Tanzania Lease Project was a technical assistance team on leasing to the government of 
Tanzania under the framework of the SGFSR, and was working on preparation of leasing 
product development for the financial services sector. In November 2007 the bill was presented 
to the National Assembly and was passed on April 11 2008, and the law came into force on 8th 
of June 2008. It was revised by The Banking and Financial Institutions Act (Financial Lease) 
2011 by Government Notice No.151. 
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The point to take from that is that leasing has now a legal framework on which it is 
operating, and several companies are in the business, starting with the SERO Lease Finance 
Ltd., Tanzania Investment Bank,  Scania Finance South Africa (PTY) Ltd to mention but a few. 
Public education is still important to develop this even further (World Bank, 2007a). 
5.6.4 Development Financial Institution 
One of the agendas of the SGFSR was to transform Tanzania Investment Bank into a 
National Development Bank/Development Financial Institution (NDB/DBI). This was to carry 
on with the normal long term lending while offering technical assistance and support such as 
Business Support Services, equity financing, as well as acting as conduit to Official 
Development Assistance. This transformation is aimed at promoting long term finance in the 
economy which is vital for long term growth. The capital of NDB/DBI was provided by the 
government, and was TShs. 50 billion in 2008 (Tanzania Bankers Association, 2007, pp. 10-
12). 
This bank is necessary because the private financial institutions failed to be attracted to 
priority economic sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture, which have the capacity to 
promote exports while using local resources both human and natural, while striving to embrace 
modern technology (Tanzania Bankers Association, 2007, p. 12). 
5.7 Improvement in the Financial System Infrastructure 
5.7.1 Payment System 
Payment systems play a critical role in promoting greater access by the population to 
banking and financial services and reduce the use of cash as a means of effecting payments in 
the economy. So FSAP felt a need to develop a payment system infrastructure to facilitate retail 
payment. 
However, there were efforts already underway for modernisation of payment systems that 
were launched in 1996. In April 2004 Tanzania Inter-bank Settlement System was launched, 
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which offers online real time account management and inter-bank high value and time sensitive 
fund transfers (Bank of Tanzania, 2010). 
Biggest development in the payment systems, however, came about from the avenue that 
was not expected, due to innovations in the use of mobile phone money transfer and payment 
systems. This needed a regulatory framework to make sure that the transactions are safe enough, 
and up to now has contributed very much in the inclusion of many people, formerly excluded 
from financial services. 
5.7.2 Credit registry 
Section 4.4.1.1 has already treated what was done regarding the creation of credit registry. 
But it was important to have it under this section because it is also one of the most important 
financial infrastructure that help to create incentives for both lenders and borrowers to develop 
credit provision. 
From the side of lenders, they are now able to overcome the problem of information 
asymmetry, and hence they are in the position to screen in the best possible way their loan 
applicants and identify risky borrowers, and avoid them, while granting loans to safe borrowers. 
On the side of borrowers, credit registry create the incentive for compliance with the loan 
contract, to avoid having bad reputation, because whatever they do with their current loans 
affect their future prospects of getting credit in the future. 
5.7.3 Accounting Standards 
FSAP noted that Tanzania had adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) since July 2004. Some of the standards were directly applicable to banks and financial 
institutions, yet some were in conflict with requirements of some of the BOT regulations. One 
such requirement was IAS No. 39 that takes into account the value of collateral when 
calculating the amount of provision for loan losses, which was conflicting with a Prudential 
Regulation of BOT: the Management of Risky Assets Regulation of 2001 which does not take 
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into account the value of collateral in the determination of provision for loan losses. Also in 
some cases IFRS require the use of Fair Value Accounting whereas the prudential regulations 
required to use historical cost accounting (IMF, 2010, p. 50). 
So there was a need to synchronise the reporting requirement. The BOT, the TBA and the 
NBAA were to work out the differences and come out with harmonized regulations, and that 
was done accordingly. 
However, NBAA needs to update its capacity to coordinate the auditing of the financial 
institutions, because it is the duty of the NBAA to provide a list of auditors acceptable for 
auditing financial institutions, and also to monitor those auditors to ensure that they audit in 
accordance with the International Auditing Standards (IMF, 2010, p. 50) 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has covered the policy measures introduced by the SGFSR. They are mainly 
concerned with the institutions that create incentives for the development of the financial sector. 
This included the creation of credit registry, which gives incentives to the borrower to use the 
borrowed funds wisely as it may affect their future borrowing capacity. On the side of the 
lenders, credit registry is a mechanism of obtaining important information that enable them to 
choose low risk borrowers to extend credit to, and so even those who lack physical collateral 
could be able to get credit. The SGFSR also dealt with the issues of improvement of the business 
environment and enhancement of property rights. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion on Findings  
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter findings were presented about the different reforms that were done 
during the SGFSR that have relevance in the financial sector, especially banking sector. The 
findings were presented after a background of the first generation of financial sector reforms 
and their effect in the development of the financial sector. It was clear that the first generation 
of financial sector reforms brought about an increase in the number of institutions offering 
financial services, and that there was an overall improvement in terms of the It is not sufficient 
to establish free market mechanism if the quality of institutions supporting the market system 
are dysfunctional or of poor quality. 
6.2 Benchmarking Tanzania against Low Income Countries 
Figure 16: Deposit Money as a Percentage of GDP 
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In terms of deposit money as a percentage of GDP, Tanzania was just below the average 
of LICs as is shown in Figure 16. With just over 10% of GDP being mobilized, the financial 
sector was quite behind the peers after the FGFSR. It can be said that the financial sector of 
Tanzania had the Financial Possibility frontier below its potential, hence calling for market 
developing policies and market enhancing policies. 
Figure 17 Benchmarking Tanzania’s Liquid Liabilities as a percentage of GDP  
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Here again, liquid liabilities as a percentage of GDP Tanzania was again just below the 
LIC average, indicating that Tanzania was performing below its potential. The financial 
possibility frontier was below that of the peers, and so much needed to be done to improve the 
state variables, including stabilizing the inflation, and making sure communication and 
infrastructure was efficient. 
Figure 18: Domestic Credit to Private Sector 
                 
Source: World Bank (2014) World Development Indicators 
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Figures 16-18 provide the positioning of Tanzania financial development by the time 
SGFSR were about to be prepared. It was the interest of this study to see whether Tanzania was 
at the same level with the countries of similar level of development or not. The choice of the 
indicators is due to the availability of data for the majority of the countries at that time, 
moreover, they are all measures of depth of the financial sectors, which gives fairly a good 
picture of the degree of development of the sector. 
In all the three indicators, Tanzania is below the average of the LIC. We may conclude 
that Tanzania’s level of financial development was below the countries of equal level of 
development. This has got some implications for policy options. 
Beck & de la Torre (2007) are of the position that if a country’s level of financial 
development is below those of countries of similar level of development, then the set of policy 
options that is best for that country is supposed to be market developing policies as well as 
market enhancing policies. 
This study showed in chapter 4 what was done in the SGFSR. In this chapter attempt will 
be made to categorize those reforms and assess whether they were the type of policies actually 
needed at that level of development. 
6.2.1 Market Developing Policies done 
In chapter 2 of this study, a financial possibilities frontier framework by Beck & de la 
Torre (2007) was introduced. This is a method of determining which variables are relevant for 
policy reforms in a financial sector at a given moment. In the framework, the authors propose 
that if at the time of reforms, a country’s financial sector is at the level of development below 
other countries of the same level of development, then that country needs to embark first in the 
market developing policies. Market developing policies were explained to mean those policies 
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that aim to push out (shift) the financial possibilities frontier, by addressing constitutional 
changes, legal reforms and an upgrade of macroeconomic performance. 
The SGFSR addressed mainly the legal challenges matters related to property rights 
(sections 5.4.1 and 5.6.1), company law, and bankruptcy law and contract enforcement (Section 
5.4.3): which involved both the reform in the civil procedure and the strengthening of the 
commercial court, as well as facilitating capacity building for the courts to handle the regular 
volume of cases for timely resolution. 
6.3 Agenda Comparison: FGFSR and SGFSR 
The FGFSR was an outcome of policy prescriptions for the Structural Adjustment 
Program that were prepared by the World Bank/IMF and had the backing of the US 
Government. The package of policies came to be known as the Washington Consensus. 
The emphasis of those policies for the financial sector was on stabilization of the 
macroeconomic fundamentals, liberalization of the financial sectors, and privatization of the 
state owned financial institutions. It was believed by the architects of the policies that any 
country, regardless of its history and social economic and political conditions, will experience 
immediate effect of growth and development once it adopts such policies. So Tanzania received 
the same packages through several projects from IMF/World Bank and African Development 
Bank, and was expected to experience a significant development in the financial sector. 
The first thing done in Tanzania was to establish a new legal framework for the proposed 
change in the way the financial sector should operate. This was done by the passing of the BFIA 
1991 and later followed by other acts. Among other things the new act allowed the 
establishment of private financial institutions both domestic and foreign. It was necessary for 
the government to restructure the state owned financial institutions, beginning with the removal 
of non-performing loans from the banks’ balance sheets and transferring them to the Loans and 
Assets Realisation Trust (LART), then the split of NBC into NBC (1997) Ltd., to be specializing 
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in serving large business customers and, NMB which was to specialize to serve small urban and 
rural customers. Then both NBC (1997) Ltd and NMB were privatized alongside CRDB, 
another state owned commercial bank existing in Tanzania at that time. Attempts were done to 
privatize PBZ but did not produce the desired results 
The FGFSR also found it necessary to set up a financial infrastructure that would support 
the private sector dominated financial system. This included the supervisory framework and the 
payment systems. The supervisory framework required necessitated the upgrading of the 
Supervision Department at the BOT into a Directorate of Banking Supervision, as well as 
building the capacity of the new directorate to function and discharge the assigned duties 
efficiently. This capacity building included technological upgrade in terms of computer systems 
as well as the experts of operating them, and a lot of training for all the staff members on how 
to handle risk based supervision. Of course new technical staff, equipped with skills of risk 
based supervision was hired too. 
6.4 SGFSR and Correction of Market Failure 
The preoccupation of the SGFSR was first to complete the unfinished agenda of the 
FGFSR and then to proceed to upgrade the institutions and create new ones where there was 
none. The main aim of the institutions so created and strengthened by the SGFSR was to correct 
the market failure which manifested itself by the fact that the FGFSR failed to promote access 
to finance to the population in remote rural areas and to the small businesses and low income 
individuals in the urban centers and the failure to improve the availability of long term finance.  
6.4.1 Nature of Market Failure: An Institutional Economics Explanation 
Still the majority of Tanzanians live in rural areas, and most of their activities are 
accompanied by title deeds to certify the ownership. So they could not be used as collateral. 
Moreover, Tanzania has not yet issued national identification cards to her citizens and so there 
was a difficulty even of establishing identities of the people in the informal sector. So, most 
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people could not qualify to open an account in a formal financial institution. These factors 
curtailed demand, and excluded people from the possibility of having access to finance. 
Apart from the demand side constraints, there were also supply side problems. These were 
mainly connected with the weak contract enforcement mechanism. In the case of credit, there 
was so much risk involved in lending because in the event of default it was difficult to recover 
the funds so extended. The court system, that through the civil justice system was supposed to 
enforce the contract, was still undeveloped. The commercial court was already established 
during the FGFSR, but had pecuniary jurisdiction and so excluded those claims that fall outside 
the pecuniary jurisdiction. Even for those claims that went to the commercial court, lawyers 
found some legal loopholes that enabled them to keep postponing the cases and appeal, to the 
extent that the delays in the cases continued. Moreover, even in the case where a bank or 
financial institution managed to get a favorable judgment, court brokers who were supposed to 
execute the judgment were sometimes disappointing with some corrupt practices whereby some 
of the properties were sold at a price below actual cost. All these increased the transaction costs 
(costs of monitoring and enforcing the contract) tremendously. 
In addition, there was also a market failure caused by lacking important information about 
the reputation of the potential credit recipients. This resulted in the reluctance on the side of the 
banks to lend to new and unknown customers. Even when they had to lend, there was a problem 
of moral hazard (hidden actions by the borrowers with the proceeds of the loan) and adverse 
selection (high interest rates so charged omitted good borrowers and so increased risk of 
default). 
Thus it was clear that there was a market failure and in such case, it was necessary for the 
government to intervene to correct the market failure, without which the overall economic 
objective of growth and poverty reduction was impossible to achieve. 
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It is from this that we can understand the steps taken by the government to correct such 
failures in the market. The government had to intervene to ensure that access to finance was 
enhanced, but also medium and long term finance was available and kept growing. 
6.4.1.1 Addressing Information Asymmetry  
Information was assumed to be readily available and costless by the neo classical 
economists’ analysis in their basic assumption of perfect competition. But information is not 
actually free and financial institutions as well as their clients have to incur some costs to avail 
themselves with information necessary to make prudent business decisions before entering into 
a contract. 
In the financial sector in Tanzania, there was no credit information bureau. Without the 
vital information from credit bureaus, when companies are applying for loans, they normally 
disclose only limited information about themselves the projects which they are applying the 
loan for. Most of these applications are turned down, unless the company is big enough, with 
sufficient collateral, and with reputation built through transparency in accounting system, by 
publishing regularly their audited reports. So new companies, especially small and medium, 
with no collateral were mostly excluded, because they were perceived to be risky borrowers. 
Even when some of them were accepted, they were charged high interest rates. 
So the government in consultation with IMF/World Bank and other bilateral partners 
decided to invest in the creation of credit information databank as well as credit reference 
bureaus through the SGFSR, which are already operational. 
6.4.1.1.1 Expected impact of Credit Bureaus 
The formation of credit bureaus in Tanzania is expected to provide reliable, less costly 
and readily available credit information. This will be a source of objective information which 
will help the lenders make unbiased decisions, whereby one of clear criteria for assessing the 
risk of default will be the credit information.  
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6.4.1.1.1.1 Informed Decisions by Lenders 
Efficient credit information bureau is a source of reliable and objective information, the 
access to which helps the lenders to make informed and unbiased decisions in their lending, in 
terms of riskiness of borrowers. 
6.4.1.1.1.2 Increase Access to Credit to Hitherto Excluded Groups 
The establishment of credit bureaus gives the lenders greater incentive to lend to the 
hitherto excluded groups of small businesses and individuals lacking acceptable physical 
collateral, because credit information gives them reputational collateral. In this way credit 
information bureaus are expected to promote credit to the poor, and increase the possibility of 
small businesses to succeed. The ultimate consequence will be to stimulate innovation, increase 
business activity, reduce poverty and promote growth. 
6.4.1.1.1.3 Increase Borrowers Discipline 
The awareness of the presence of credit information bureau increases discipline among 
the borrowers. Borrowers know that their reputation is at stake in their management of 
borrowed money, in that way they become more careful. They know that failure to repay their 
loan to only one lender may destroy their future access to loans from other financial institutions. 
In this way, credit bureau is an institution that creates incentive in the part of the borrowers to 
repay the loans they borrow in time. 
6.4.1.1.1.4 Fosters competition 
When efficient credit information sharing mechanism exists, it allows new entrants to 
make use of existing information, which would have been a privilege of only the biggest 
companies without such a sharing mechanism. Here active government involvement is needed 
(Beck , Maimbo, Faye, & Triki, 2011, p. 8) 
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6.4.1.2 Addressing Transaction Costs 
Another cause of market failure is transaction costs, which were not part of the Neo 
Classical Economic analysis, but which distort the mechanism through which the market 
reaches the equilibrium. In the case of financial institutions in Tanzania, source of transaction 
cost emanates mainly from the business environment, quality of property rights as well as 
contract enforcement mechanism. 
6.4.1.2.1 Business Environment 
A poor business environment characterized by poor contract enforcement mechanism, 
weak judiciary, difficult process of registering and closing a business, including bankruptcy 
procedures. All these factors provide disincentives for entrepreneurs to enter business in the 
respective economy. Those who decide to enter business, have to cope with higher risks due to 
uncertainty of the fulfilment of contracts, and the potential losses that could result therein. That 
is why business environment was one of the major focuses of the SGFSR. 
6.4.1.2.1.1 Contract Enforcement 
Banks and financial institutions willingness to extend credit to small enterprises and 
individuals as well as to new relationships depend very much on the confidence they have in 
the contract enforcement mechanism in the country. There is so much risk involved in lending 
even with the presence of credit bureau and acceptable collateral. If lenders believe that, through 
the contract enforcement mechanism in place, they will be in the position to recover their funds 
quickly and at very low costs even when the borrowers did not have the inclination to repay, 
then they have more incentive to extend more credit even to new and unfamiliar customers. 
Empirical studies testify to that. Bae & Goyal (2009) concluded in their study that 
efficient contract enforcement mechanism results into greater access to credit by firms. Safavian 
& Sharma (2007) found out that in countries where the contract enforcement mechanism is 
slow there is a tendency of having lower credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP than 
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where contract enforcement mechanism is efficient. Ahlquist & Prakash (2010) observed that 
countries with efficient contract enforcement mechanisms tend to attract more FDI than those 
with inefficient ones. Dabbla-Norris & Inchauste (2008) concluded in their study that the 
informal sector tends to decrease in places where there is efficient contract enforcement 
mechanism. 
6.4.1.2.1.2 Strengthening the Commercial Court  
Tanzania addressed this issue by strengthening the performance of the Commercial court 
by opening the branches of Mwanza and Arusha, by equipping the court with modern 
technology of handling court documents, by capacity building through training to judges and 
supporting staff, and by changing some laws to make the commercial court more efficient, and 
by the amendment of the civil procedure law, to remove the loopholes that were used by the 
advocates to delay the procedures and so delay the contract enforcement. 
6.4.1.2.1.3 Bankruptcy Laws 
Bankruptcy has to do with the enforcement of debt contracts. Creating efficient 
bankruptcy procedures creates incentives that encourage good behaviour by discouraging high 
risk lending, and also discourage borrowers from engaging in non-prudent loans and reckless 
financial decisions. 
When bankruptcy procedures are efficient firms and individuals get rid of the stigma of 
bankruptcy and have the motivation to innovate and start new businesses. This is because they 
are sure that efficient firms are protected by bankruptcy procedures, whereas distressed firms 
are liquidated quickly and efficiently, hence they maximize the value of debt recovered at the 
lowest cost. On the contrary, when the insolvency procedures are less efficient, debt is 
recovered at lower rate, and much costs are involved than necessary. 
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From the side of the providers of secured credit, when they operate in an efficient 
bankruptcy framework they are assured of the mechanism of their debt recovery, hence are 
motivated to continue lending. 
6.4.1.3 Addressing the Shortage of Long Term Lending 
The FGFSR did not succeed to promote long term lending. We cannot over-emphasize 
that long term lending is crucial for any economy because it is an important driver of growth, 
which in turn contributes to poverty alleviation. 
Long term finance did not respond to the reforms done by the FGFSR because of several 
reasons. Among them is the macroeconomic condition that did not give confidence to providers 
of finance to lend long term is inflation.  
Figure 19: Historical Inflation in Tanzania 
             
Source: World Bank (2014) World Development Indicators 
Apart from inflation, inefficient contract enforcement mechanism discussed above is a 
serious impediment to long term finance too, as it creates a disincentive to lending in general 
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The issue of property rights is also important. This is both for the supply side as well as 
demand side. From the supply side, because lending requires collateral. But there are cases 
where the collateral pledged for specific loans were also pledged for another loan, or were not 
as described in the documents presented with application documents. This is because of the 
weaknesses in collateral registry. The existing property registry was manual and fragmented, 
and so there was a possibility of having one property pledged even for two projects, or having 
a property registered at a value very much above the actual value. For the demand side because 
some potential long term loan applicants  
An important sub section of long term finance is housing finance. This was almost 
neglected after the liquidation of THB, and there was almost a complete absence of this 
important component of long term finance. The poor performance of housing finance in 
Tanzania is partly explained by the legal framework in the issues related to property rights.  
SGFSR addressed this issue, by modernizing the existing property registry, transforming 
it from paper based manual handling to electronic handling, aided by computer systems and 
information technology. 
6.5 Recommendations 
I am convinced that strengthening the institutions is the right thing. So the SGFSR has 
done a good job in this aspect so far, and is continuing to do so even further. 
It is my opinion that the government should go further, and apply moral suasion, to make 
the banks to go more for the unbanked. There are mechanisms that have already been tried and 
were proved to be working that can be promoted in Tanzania too. Among these, two most 
prominent are agent banking, and mobile branch banking. Agent banking is the type of banking 
in which the commercial banks use other businesses such as post office to offer their services 
in places where the construction of brick and mortar branches has not yet materialized. In this 
way the banks can expand outreach using agents.  
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The photo below shows a truck that is used as a mobile branch for offering banking 
services, and in that way they can be deployed to more than one place in a single day, and in 
that way give the possibilities for as many people who are otherwise excluded from the financial 
services to get their access. 
Figure 20: Mobile Banking Services in Rural Areas 
Source: Field Data (photo taken by the researcher) 
6.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has made a discussion on the main findings of the study. It has highlighted 
that the focus of the FGFSR was to make a transition from financial sector in a socialist country 
to one in a liberalized economy. The FGFSR was driven by the Washington consensus, a 
package of reforms that were stressing on stabilization, liberalization and privatization. 
However the SGFSR came in to provide the financial sector with the necessary institutions that 
were needed to provide the right incentives for behaviour that promote the financial sector and 
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to provide sanctions against those practices that are holding back the financial sector. It was a 
switch from the Washington Consensus to New Institutional Economics. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusion 
7.1 Study Overview 
This study sought to investigate the nature and content of SGFSR in Tanzania, in terms 
of the uniqueness of the reforms and the rationale in the light of New Institutional Economics. 
It was necessary for the study to begin by going through the background of the financial sector 
in Tanzania from the colonial times, to the post-independence time. In the post-independence 
time, it was useful to divide the financial environment of Tanzania into the Pre Arusha 
Declaration, the Arusha Declaration era, the FGFSR era and the SGFSR era. 
It has been shown that FGFSR was a necessary consequence of the deep economic crisis 
in the 1980s in Tanzania, which was caused, among other factors, by the structural imbalances 
that affected even the financial sector. The lack of indirect monetary policy instruments, the 
rigid control of prices of the financial products (interest rates, foreign exchange rates, etc.), the 
direct intervention of the government in the allocation of credit, and the fact that the major 
customers of the financial institutions were state owned enterprises, resulted into a financial 
system that was made up of banks with poor asset qualities (heavy presence of non-performing 
loans) and which crowded out private sector credit. So, even the other economic reforms that 
were going on under the structural adjustment programs could not be complete without 
reforming the financial sector. So the FGFSR began in 1991 with the U-turn legislation: the 
BFIA 1991, followed by other acts reforming the BOT, the Foreign Exchange policy, the 
inauguration of capital markets by the enacting of the CMSA 1995 and many more. The focus 
of the FGFSR was first to aim to achieve stability in terms of the prices of different products in 
the financial sector, as well as striving for fiscal and external balances and the control of 
inflation, to liberalize the financial sector and to restructure and eventually privatize the state 
owned financial institutions, starting with the commercial banks and other specialized banks.  
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However, despite embarking on these reforms with high intensity from 1991, by 2003 
when the FSAP was done, the financial sector was still wanting in important aspects, greatest 
among them being the failure to stimulate long term lending, and the failure to expand the 
outreach of the financial sector especially to rural areas and to lower income segments of 
individuals, households and enterprises. There were still a good number of barriers that held 
back the development of such aspects of the financial sector, but most of them could be grouped 
under the poor quality of institutions. The state of property rights at that time in Tanzania were 
not supporting the collateralization and hence the development of credit to private sector; 
contract enforcement mechanisms was such that it was discouraging banks to extend credit to 
new and small customers, and the absence of credit reference bureaus, the non-existence of 
registries for properties and businesses as well as the absence of identification of citizens and 
street addresses continued to act as a barrier to the development of credit to the private sector, 
especially long term investments. And finally the business climate, especially the high inflation, 
the business registration regulations and corruption acted as barriers to the establishment of new 
businesses, and increase the cost of doing business for the financial institutions, hence make 
the products to be too expensive for marginal customers. 
So, following the recommendations of the FSAP, agendas for the SGFSR were prepared 
and different committees to oversee specialized agendas were put in place. This study shows 
that the major focus of the SGFSR was on building good quality institutions where they were 
completely absent, and to improve the quality of existing institutions. Those institutions were 
meant to provide the right incentives for profitable behaviour in the financial sectors as well as 
put the sanctions for undesirable behaviour. 
Specifically the SGFSR focused on four major issues: the improvement of property rights, 
the improvement of contract enforcement mechanism, the institutions for generating and 
sharing critical information (credit bureaus, national identification database, property registries, 
and business registries) and the general improvement of the business climate, including the 
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attempt to remove the rigidities in the starting and winding up a business, conducive macro-
economic conditions, and addressing the problems of corruption. 
7.2 Assessment of the Financial Sector after Starting the SGFSR 
This study accepts that the steps taken in the reform of the financial sector are in the right 
direction. Most of the reforms were market developing and market enhancing, and these are the 
real needs of the financial sector in Tanzania, This is because Tanzania’s financial sector 
development was below that of the countries with similar level of development (mostly low 
income countries). There was a need to stimulate competition, which was done in the FGFSR 
by allowing new entrants to enter the financial sector in Tanzania, while splitting the largest 
bank NBC into NBC (1997) Ltd. and NMB banks. This reduced the market share of the two 
newly formed banks, although not significantly. The SGFSR dealt with institution building. 
The institutions that were formed and improved removed some obstacles to financial sector 
development. For example, the establishment of credit bureau empowers the marginal 
borrowers, who had no physical collateral, by providing them with the possibility to build a 
reputational collateral, which gives him/her the possibility of getting credit to invest in 
productive ventures. The simplification of the procedures to register property as well as the 
provision for the occupiers of land under customary law of the possibility to get the customary 
right of occupancy is a step forward to the removal of the people from informal sector to the 
formal sector, and making them bankable. 
7.2.1 Financial Depth 
Using domestic credit to private sector as a measure of financial depth, we see that 
Tanzania is still behind the regional neighbours and averages for SSA and LIC, although it is 
narrowing the gap. But the trend for Tanzania is that credit to private sector is growing albeit 
slowly from 14.9% in 2007 to 17.9% in 2012 
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Figure 21: Domestic Credit to Private Sector as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank (2014) World Development Indicators 
In terms of broad money as a percentage of GDP, Tanzania has more depth than Uganda 
but lower than Kenya throughout. During this period Tanzania has higher depth than the 
regional averages of Sub Saharan Africa and Low income countries. The trend is also positive 
from 29.7% in 2007 to 32.8% in 2012, despite a one year decline from 2011 level of 34.7% to 
32.8% in 2012 as shown in figure below. 
Figure 22: Broad Money as a Percentage of GDP 
             
Source: World Bank (2014) World Development Indicators 
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7.2.2 Financial Access 
Figure 23: Commercial Bank Branches per 100,000 adults 
              
Source: World Bank (2014) World Development Indicators 
In terms of financial access, Tanzania is moving in the right direction. The number of 
branches is rising, although the country still lags behind Kenya and Uganda in this aspect and 
is below the average for SSA and LIC. More incentives are needed to promote further growth 
in access to financial services. However it has to be noted that the current trend in Tanzania is 
the fast increase in mobile phone financial services. 
7.2.3 Banking Efficiency  
Figure 24: Interest Rate Spread 
             
Source: World Bank (2014) World Development Indicators 
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Again we use Interest Rate spread as the measure of efficiency. This measure shows how 
efficient the banking system is in the country. The criteria for assessment is the lower the spread 
the better the efficiency of that respective country. 
Here is the indicator in which Tanzania performs better than the neighbours. From 2007 
the spread in Tanzania is lower than in the neighboring countries of Kenya and Uganda, and 
the averages for Sub-Saharan Africa and the Low Income Countries. 
Again this is an indication that the results of these reforms are producing their effects, but 
the effects are going to manifest in the long run, and so discipline and patience should be 
maintained. 
7.3 New Opportunities 
Financial services in Tanzania and other developing countries have received a big boost 
by the growing possibilities of using the mobile phone to provide financial services. Regulators 
have to encourage innovations in this regard, strengthen risk based supervision to ensure that 
the system remains safe will increasing financial access, payment and savings services and even 
credit. 
New opportunities can always be found if innovation is encouraged and if the institutions 
that support the financial sector are strengthened. 
It is also my position that the Government must also consider to rethink its role in the 
financial sector in the case of market failure, which is evident in the issues of access to finance 
and long term finance. Despite the wisdom from Washington Consensus of government to keep 
out of the business of the financial sector, still there will always be a gap that will not be filled 
if there continues to be market failure. 
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7.4 Contribution 
 This is the first study to explore the financial sector reforms of the first and second 
generations in Tanzania in a single study. This study also is the first in using the framework of 
New Institutional Economics as a conceptual framework to understand the underpinning of the 
reform process. It is my hope that other scholars of Financial Institutions in Tanzania will follow 
suit and explore other aspects of the financial institutions in Tanzania using this framework. 
7.6 Future Studies 
This study limited itself to the banking sector, except for issues whose challenges could 
be solved by other financial institutions, as the case of pension funds and insurance companies 
and their role in filling the gap of long term finance. There is a possibility of making other 
studies that are more focused on the other types of financial institutions and markets. The issues 
addressed in the SGFSR such as information asymmetry and finance, or property rights and 
finance, or contract enforcement and finance are also ripe for investigation. 
There is also a possibility of making a comparative study, say between Kenya and 
Tanzania, or Uganda and Tanzania, where more than one economy are studied together 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: List of Interviewees 
1. All Senior Staff of Mkombozi Bank Mkombozi Bank 24.03.2012 
2. Mr. Deogratias Usangira  NMB Bank 12.04.2012 
3.  James Isaack Mabula CRDB Bank 17.04.2012 
4.  Mr. Ndaskoi NBC Bank 18.04.2012 
5.  Dr. Mung’ong’o & Dr. Zegezege Bank of Tanzania 10.05.2012 
6.  Dr. Longinus Rutasitara  Planning Commission 01.09.2013 
7. Mr. Albert Mkenda Bank of Tanzania 02.09.2013 
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Appendix 5: Appointment for Interview: Ndaskoi - NBC 
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